Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description

The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system has been a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was adopted in 1970. IAEA has strengthened its safeguards system & increased efforts to combat nuclear terrorism by helping countries secure nuclear & radioactive material & facilities. This report: (1) identifies the steps IAEA has taken to strengthen safeguards; (2) assesses the challenges in implementing strengthened safeguards; (3) identifies U.S. financial support for safeguards; & (4) describes IAEA's efforts to help secure nuclear material & facilities. Includes recommendations. Illustrations.




Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description




Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description

IAEA plays a crucial role in supporting U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals through its safeguards and nuclear security programs. The Department of State coordinates the United States' financial and policy relationship with IAEA. IAEA's safeguards program is designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, while the agency's nuclear security program assists countries in improving the physical protection of their nuclear material and facilities. IAEA plans to create an international fuel bank to guarantee the supply of fuel for civilian nuclear power programs. GAO was asked to examine (1) any challenges that IAEA faces in carrying out its safeguards program, (2) any limitations regarding the nuclear security program, and (3) the status of IAEA's planned nuclear fuel bank. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from IAEA and U.S. federal agencies, 15 nuclear nonproliferation experts, and representatives from 16 countries. GAO recommends, among other things, that State work with IAEA to (1) clearly define and communicate how IAEA will implement the state-level concept, (2) evaluate the nuclear security program's long-term resource needs, and (3) prepare a plan for the long-term operation and funding of IAEA's fuel bank. State agreed with several of the recommendations and disagreed with two, including the one on the nuclear security program's long-term resource needs. GAO continues to believe that implementing all of these recommendations would enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of IAEA's programs.




Gao-06-93 Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description

GAO-06-93 Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed




Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description

" IAEA plays a crucial role in supporting U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals through its safeguards and nuclear security programs. The Department of State (State) coordinates the United States' financial and policy relationship with IAEA. IAEA's safeguards program is designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, while the agency's nuclear security program assists countries in improving the physical protection of their nuclear material and facilities. IAEA plans to create an international fuel bank to guarantee the supply of fuel for civilian nuclear power programs. GAO was asked to examine (1) any challenges that IAEA faces in carrying out its safeguards program, (2) any limitations regarding the nuclear security program, and (3) the status of IAEA's planned nuclear fuel bank. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from IAEA and U.S. federal agencies, 15 nuclear nonproliferation experts, and representatives from 16 countries. "







Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description







Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description

A key mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through its Technical Cooperation (TC) program, which provides equipment, training, fellowships, and other services to its member states. The U.S. provides approx. 25% of the TC program's annual budget. This report addresses the: (1) extent to which the U.S. and IAEA have policies limiting member states' participation in the TC program on the basis of nuclear proliferation and related concerns; (2) extent to which the U.S. and IAEA evaluate and monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) any limitations and challenges in IAEA's mgmt. of the TC program. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.




Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety


Book Description

The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs asked the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) to review the safeguards and nuclear power plant safety programs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This report examines (1) the effectiveness of IAEA's safeguards program and the adequacy of program funding, (2) the management of U.S. technical assistance to the IAEA's safeguards program, and (3) the effectiveness of IAEA's program for advising United Nations (UN) member states about nuclear power plant safety and the adequacy of program funding. Under its statute and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA is mandated to administer safeguards to detect diversions of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses. Because of limits on budget growth and unpaid contributions, IAEA has had difficulty funding the safeguards program. IAEA also conducts inspections of facilities or locations containing declared nuclear material, and manages a program for reviewing the operational safety of designated nuclear power plants. The U.S. technical assistance program for IAEA safeguards, overseen by an interagency coordinating committee, has enhanced the agency's inspection capabilities, however, some weaknesses still exist. Despite financial limitations, IAEA is meeting its basic safety advisory responsibilities for advising UN member states on nuclear safety and providing requested safety services. However, IAEA's program for reviewing the operational safety of nuclear power plants has not been fully effective because the program is voluntary and UN member states have not requested IAEA's review of all nuclear reactors with serious problems. GAO believes that IAEA should have more discretion in selecting reactors for review.