Book Description

Executive compensation has inspired controversial debate in both academia and the general public, and many voices criticize that executive compensation designs fail to deliver desired outcomes. Although much research has been devoted to understanding the antecedents and consequences of executive compensation design, important questions remain unanswered. This dissertation contributes to the field by exploring a previously neglected aspect: executive compensation complexity. Given the absence of an established measure of executive compensation complexity, there is an incomplete understanding of how complexity enters executive compensation contracts and what the consequences are for managers and corporations. The essays of this dissertation aim to narrow this gap. The first study presents a novel measure of executive compensation complexity, which is validated and utilized to examine the antecedents of executive compensation complexity. The second study explores the consequences of executive compensation complexity and finds that complexity impairs firm performance, regardless of the performance metric chosen (accounting-based, market-based, or ESG-based performance metrics). The third study explores the link between compensation design dispersion and executive turnover and reveals that executives with riskier compensation packages and fewer performance goals are more likely to move. The fourth study provides experimental evidence on the effect of CSR Fit dimensions and organizational reputation. Taken together, the essays of this dissertation make a significant and valuable contribution to the scholarly discourse on executive compensation. By shedding light on the complex nature of executive compensation and its implications for managers and corporations, this dissertation advances the current understanding of executive compensation and provides insights for policymakers, managers, and investors.