Our Constitutional Constraints


Book Description

Suitable for the American law school classroom or self-study, this book is about the criminal attorney-what the federal Constitution says prosecutors and defense attorneys can and cannot do in the adjudication of crime. It is also critically about what those actors _ought_ to do in the adjudication of crime. The text proceeds as chronologically as possible through the process of a prosecution, beginning with pretrial release and the charging decision, considering trial preparation and the right to counsel, turning to the jury and then the defense, stepping back to consider guilty pleas and plea bargaining, and finishing off with double jeopardy and sentencing.







Criminal Procedure


Book Description




Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11


Book Description

The surprising truth behind Barack Obama's decision to continue many of his predecessor's counterterrorism policies. Conventional wisdom holds that 9/11 sounded the death knell for presidential accountability. In fact, the opposite is true. The novel powers that our post-9/11 commanders in chief assumed—endless detentions, military commissions, state secrets, broad surveillance, and more—are the culmination of a two-century expansion of presidential authority. But these new powers have been met with thousands of barely visible legal and political constraints—enforced by congressional committees, government lawyers, courts, and the media—that have transformed our unprecedentedly powerful presidency into one that is also unprecedentedly accountable. These constraints are the key to understanding why Obama continued the Bush counterterrorism program, and in this light, the events of the last decade should be seen as a victory, not a failure, of American constitutional government. We have actually preserved the framers’ original idea of a balanced constitution, despite the vast increase in presidential power made necessary by this age of permanent emergency.




Fidelity & Constraint


Book Description

The fundamental fact about our Constitution is that it is old -- the oldest written constitution in the world. The fundamental challenge for interpreters of the Constitution is how to read that old document over time. In Fidelity & Constraint, legal scholar Lawrence Lessig explains that one of the most basic approaches to interpreting the constitution is the process of translation. Indeed, some of the most significant shifts in constitutional doctrine are products of the evolution of the translation process over time. In every new era, judges understand their translations as instances of "interpretive fidelity," framed within each new temporal context. Yet, as Lessig also argues, there is a repeatedly occurring countermove that upends the process of translation. Throughout American history, there has been a second fidelity in addition to interpretive fidelity: what Lessig calls "fidelity to role." In each of the cycles of translation that he describes, the role of the judge -- the ultimate translator -- has evolved too. Old ways of interpreting the text now become illegitimate because they do not match up with the judge's perceived role. And when that conflict occurs, the practice of judges within our tradition has been to follow the guidance of a fidelity to role. Ultimately, Lessig not only shows us how important the concept of translation is to constitutional interpretation, but also exposes the institutional limits on this practice. The first work of both constitutional and foundational theory by one of America's leading legal minds, Fidelity & Constraint maps strategies that both help judges understand the fundamental conflict at the heart of interpretation whenever it arises and work around the limits it inevitably creates.




Constitutional Constraints on Ad Hoc Legislation


Book Description

Legislatures sometimes adopt laws that create a special legal regime for a particular case, rather than general rules for an indefinite number of situations or persons. These ad hoc laws are controversial. Politically, legislatures may be forced to act in one specific case (for example, as a response to a public outcry), but, in doing so, they risk violating the principles of the rule of law. Such legislative practice might lead to abuse of legislative power, inequality of citizens before the law, legal uncertainty, and weakening of the position of the courts. This in-depth study in the fields of constitutional law and legislative studies clarifies the use and existence of ad hoc laws, placing them within a constitutional framework of the rule of law. The book is a comparative study of the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands. Those who will benefit from this book are academics of constitutional law/legislation/human rights, practitioners of constitutional law, judges from constitutional courts, legislative lawyers, and legislators. It provides innovative and profound insights and will be a valuable addition to library collections. (Series: Ius Commune Europaeum - Vol. 96)




Parchment Barriers


Book Description

The United States has become ever more deeply entrenched in powerful, rival, partisan camps, and its citizens more sharply separated along ideological lines. The authors of this volume, scholars of political science, economics, and law, examine the relation between our present-day polarization and the design of the nation's Constitution. The provisions of our Constitution are like “parchment barriers”—fragile bulwarks intended to preserve liberty and promote self-government. To be effective, these barriers need to be respected and reinforced by government officials and ordinary citizens, both in law and in custom. This book asks whether today’s partisan polarization is threatening these constitutional provisions and thus our constitutional order. The nation's founders, clearly concerned about political division, designed the Constitution with numerous means for controlling factions, restraining majority rule, and preventing concentrations of power. In chapters that span the major institutions of American government, the authors of Parchment Barriers explore how partisans are pushing the limits of these constitutional restraints to achieve their policy goals and how the forces of majority faction are testing the boundaries the Constitution draws around democratic power. What, for instance, are the dangers of power being concentrated in the executive branch, displaced to the judiciary, or assumed by majority party leaders in Congress? How has partisan polarization affected the nature, size, and power of the administrative state? And why do political parties, rather than working to facilitate the constitutional order as envisioned by James Madison, now chafe against its limits on majority rule? Parchment Barriers considers the implications of polarization for policy, governance, and the health of American democracy.




Buddhism, Politics and the Limits of Law


Book Description

Examining Sri Lanka's religious and legal pasts, this is the first extended study of Buddhism and constitutional law.




Constitutional Theocracy


Book Description

At the intersection of two sweeping global trends—the rise of popular support for principles of theocratic governance and the spread of constitutionalism and judicial review—a new legal order has emerged: constitutional theocracy. It enshrines religion and its interlocutors as “a” or “the” source of legislation, and at the same time adheres to core ideals and practices of modern constitutionalism. A unique hybrid of apparently conflicting worldviews, values, and interests, constitutional theocracies thus offer an ideal setting—a “living laboratory” as it were—for studying constitutional law as a form of politics by other means. In this book, Ran Hirschl undertakes a rigorous comparative analysis of religion-and-state jurisprudence from dozens of countries worldwide to explore the evolving role of constitutional law and courts in a non-secularist world. Counterintuitively, Hirschl argues that the constitutional enshrinement of religion is a rational, prudent strategy that allows opponents of theocratic governance to talk the religious talk without walking most of what they regard as theocracy’s unappealing, costly walk. Many of the jurisdictional, enforcement, and cooptation advantages that gave religious legal regimes an edge in the pre-modern era, are now aiding the modern state and its laws in its effort to contain religion. The “constitutional” in a constitutional theocracy thus fulfills the same restricting function it carries out in a constitutional democracy: it brings theocratic governance under check and assigns to constitutional law and courts the task of a bulwark against the threat of radical religion.




The Guardian of the Constitution


Book Description

The first English translation of Hans Kelsen's and Carl Schmitt's debate on the 'Guardian of the Constitution'.