Criminal Responsibility and Partial Excuses


Book Description

Publsihed in 1998, this book examines the relationship between responsibility and criminal liability through an analysis of provocation and related criminal defences. It begins by identifying fundamental questions about the role of justifications and excuses in the criminal law as they emerge from the discussion of philosophical theories of responsibility. Following an outline of the distinction between murder and manslaughter and its history, the basic doctrinal issues relating to the nature and rationale of provocation and other partial defences are then identified and discussed in depth, together with the circumstances under which these defences can be raised. Although the analysis focuses, for the most part, on English law, the references to other legal systems which are included in the work add an important comparative perspective to the discussion of the issues. The book should be of special interest to criminal lawyers, legal theorists and students interested in comparative criminal law and jurisprudence.




Partial Excuses to Murder


Book Description

Sixteen papers on provocation, diminished responsibility, excessive self-defence and intoxication described in the Adelaide Law Review as: "a comprehensive and illuminating view of the four defences" Other publications agree: "Those of us who must defend in the cold aftermath of a killing would do well to have a copy of this book handy."ACT Law Society Newsletter "There is a healthy balance between theoretical perspective and practical application."Victorian Law Institute Journal




Partial Defences to Murder


Book Description

Following on from an earlier consultation paper by the Law Commission (Consultation paper 173, ISBN 0117302597) published in October 2003, this report makes recommendations on the law and practice of the partial defences to murder of diminished responsibility and provocation, as covered by the Homicide Act 1957, with particular regard to domestic violence situations. It also considers whether there should be a partial defence to murder in cases involving the use of excessive force in self-defence. Appendices include sections detailing: research into the ways in which the law of provocation and diminished responsibility are working; a brief empirical survey of public opinion relating to partial defences to murder; a synopsis of sample cases of female defendants convicted of murder; and a sociological history of provocation and diminished responsibility.




Understanding Parricide


Book Description

Understanding Parricide is the most comprehensive book available about juvenile and adult sons and daughters who kill their parents. Dr. Heide moves far behind the statistical correlates of parricide by synthesizing the professional literature on parricide in general, matricide, patricide, double parricides, and familicides. As a clinician, she explains the reasons behind the killings. Understanding Parricide includes in-depth discussion of issues related to prosecuting and defending parricide offenders. The book is enriched with its focus on clinical assessment, case studies, and follow-up of parricide offenders, as well as treatment, risk assessment, and prevention.





Book Description




Moral Puzzles and Legal Perplexities


Book Description

Engages with the life and work of Larry Alexander to explore puzzles and paradoxes in legal and moral theory.




Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility


Book Description

This book provides a leading point of reference in the field of partial defences to murder and with respect to the mental condition defences of loss of control and diminished responsibility in general. The work includes contributions from leading specialists from different jurisdictions. Divided into two parts, the first provides an analysis from the perspective of the UK, looking at particular concerns such as domestic violence, revenge and mixed motive killings, mistaken beliefs. The second part presents a comparative and international view to provide a wider background of how alternative systems treat issues of human frailty short of full insanity (loss of control, diminished responsibility) in the context of the criminal law.




Murder and the Reasonable Man


Book Description

A man murders his wife after she has admitted her infidelity; another man kills an openly gay teammate after receiving a massage; a third man, white, goes for a jog in a “bad” neighborhood, carrying a pistol, and shoots an African American teenager who had his hands in his pockets. When brought before the criminal justice system, all three men argue that they should be found “not guilty”; the first two use the defense of provocation, while the third argues he used his gun in self-defense. Drawing upon these and similar cases, Cynthia Lee shows how two well-established, traditional criminal law defenses—the doctrines of provocation and self-defense—enable majority-culture defendants to justify their acts of violence. While the reasonableness requirement, inherent in both defenses, is designed to allow community input and provide greater flexibility in legal decision-making, the requirement also allows majority-culture defendants to rely on dominant social norms, such as masculinity, heterosexuality, and race (i.e., racial stereotypes), to bolster their claims of reasonableness. At the same time, Lee examines other cases that demonstrate that the reasonableness requirement tends to exclude the perspectives of minorities, such as heterosexual women, gays and lesbians, and persons of color. Murder and the Reasonable Man not only shows how largely invisible social norms and beliefs influence the outcomes of certain criminal cases, but goes further, suggesting three tentative legal reforms to address problems of bias and undue leniency. Ultimately, Lee cautions that the true solution lies in a change in social attitudes.




Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds


Book Description

"You can't be convicted of a crime without a guilty act and a guilty mind." A lawyer might dress the same idea up in Latin: "You can't be convicted of a crime without actus reus and mens rea." Things like that are often said, but what do people mean when they say them? Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds proposes an understanding of mens rea and actus reus as limits on the authority of a state, and in particular the authority of a democratic state, to ascribe guilt through positive law to those accused of crime. Actus reus and mens rea are necessary conditions, among others, for the legitimacy, as distinct from the justice, of state punishment. The actus reus requirement disables a democratic state from using its authority, on the one hand, to ascribe guilt to those who didn't realize they were committing a crime, provided they lacked the capacity to realize they were committing a crime; and on the other, to ascribe guilt to those who realized they were committing a crime, but who lacked the capacity to conform their conduct to the requirements of law. The mens rea requirement disables a democratic state from using its authority, on the one hand, to ascribe guilt to those who didn't realize they were committing a crime, provided their ignorance manifested no lack of law-abiding concern for the law and its ends, and on the other, to ascribe guilt to those who realized they were committing a crime, but whose failure to conform to the law nonetheless manifested no lack of law-abiding concern for the law and its ends"--




Just and Unjust Warriors


Book Description

Can a soldier be held responsible for fighting in a war that is illegal or unjust? This is the question at the heart of a new debate that has the potential to profoundly change our understanding of the moral and legal status of warriors, wars, and indeed of moral agency itself. The debate pits a widely shared and legally entrenched principle of war - that combatants have equal rights and equal responsibilities irrespective of whether they are fighting in a war that just or unjust - against a set of striking new arguments. These arguments challenge the idea that there is a separation between the rules governing the justice of going to war (the jus ad bellum) and the rules governing what combatants can do in war (the jus in bello). If ad bellum and in bello rules are connected in the way these new arguments suggest, then many aspects of just war theory and laws of war would have to be rethought and perhaps reformed. This book contains eleven original and closely argued essays by leading figures in the ethics and laws of war and provides an authoritative treatment of this important new debate. The essays both challenge and defend many deeply held convictions: about the liability of soldiers for crimes of aggression, about the nature and justifiability of terrorism, about the relationship between law and morality, the relationship between soldiers and states, and the relationship between the ethics of war and the ethics of ordinary life. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.