Book Description
A study of patronage politics and the persistence of clientelism across a range of countries.
Author : Herbert Kitschelt
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 344 pages
File Size : 44,51 MB
Release : 2007-03-29
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 0521865050
A study of patronage politics and the persistence of clientelism across a range of countries.
Author : S. N. Eisenstadt
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 356 pages
File Size : 32,78 MB
Release : 1984-10-18
Category : Family & Relationships
ISBN : 9780521288903
About interpersonal relations in society.
Author : Aris Trantidis
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 256 pages
File Size : 49,55 MB
Release : 2016-04-28
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1317326601
With its deep economic crisis and dramatic political developments Greece has puzzled Europe and the world. What explains its long-standing problems and its incapacity to reform its economy? Using an analytic narrative and a comparative approach, the book studies the pattern of economic reforms in Greece between 1985 and 2015. It finds that clientelism - the allocation of selective benefits by political actors (patrons) to their supporters (clients) - created a strong policy bias that prevented the country from implementing deep-cutting reforms. The book shows that the clientelist system differs from the general image of interest-group politics and that the typical view of clientelism, as individual exchange between patrons and clients, has not fully captured the wide range and implications of this phenomenon. From this, the author develops a theory on clientelism and policy-making, addressing key questions on the politics of economic reform, government autonomy and party politics. The book is an essential addition to the literatures on clientelism, public choice theory, and comparative political economy. It will be of key interest to scholars and students of European Union politics, economic policy and party politics.
Author : Bo Rothstein
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 187 pages
File Size : 32,67 MB
Release : 2017-03-09
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1107163706
This book provides a systematic analysis of how the understanding of corruption has evolved and pinpoints what constitutes corruption.
Author : Susan C. Stokes
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 343 pages
File Size : 12,48 MB
Release : 2013-09-23
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1107042208
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism studies distributive politics: how parties and governments use material resources to win elections. The authors develop a theory that explains why loyal supporters, rather than swing voters, tend to benefit from pork-barrel politics; why poverty encourages clientelism and vote buying; and why redistribution and voter participation do not justify non-programmatic distribution.
Author : Didi Kuo
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 181 pages
File Size : 20,72 MB
Release : 2018-08-16
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1108426085
In the United States and Britain, capitalists organized in opposition to clientelism and demanded programmatic parties and institutional reforms.
Author : Walter C. Ladwig III
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 363 pages
File Size : 45,85 MB
Release : 2017-06-09
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1316764400
After a decade and a half of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, US policymakers are seeking to provide aid and advice to local governments' counterinsurgency campaigns rather than directly intervening with US forces. This strategy, and US counterinsurgency doctrine in general, fail to recognize that despite a shared aim of defeating an insurgency, the US and its local partner frequently have differing priorities with respect to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Without some degree of reform or policy change on the part of the insurgency-plagued government, American support will have a limited impact. Using three detailed case studies - the Hukbalahap Rebellion in the Philippines, Vietnam during the rule of Ngo Dinh Diem, and the Salvadorian Civil War - Ladwig demonstrates that providing significant amounts of aid will not generate sufficient leverage to affect a client's behaviour and policies. Instead, he argues that influence flows from pressure and tight conditions on aid rather than from boundless generosity.
Author : Sharon Kettering
Publisher : New York : Oxford University Press
Page : 333 pages
File Size : 28,26 MB
Release : 1986
Category : Decentralization in government
ISBN : 0195036735
A bold new study of politics and power in 17th-century France, this book argues that the French Crown extended its control over the provinces and laid the foundations for a centralized state by removing patronage power from the provincial governors and putting it instead in the hands of newly-created provincial power brokers--regional notables who cooperated with the Paris ministers in exchange for their patronage.
Author : Ernest Gellner
Publisher : Bloomsbury Academic
Page : 366 pages
File Size : 41,83 MB
Release : 1977
Category : Political Science
ISBN :
Author : Aris Trantidis
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 49,17 MB
Release : 2016
Category :
ISBN :
How does clientelism affect policy-making? Can patrons in government discard groups of clients in order to pursue reforms in conditions of crisis? The article argues that clientelism goes beyond the exchange of votes and may permeate organizations with the capacity for collective action such as labour unions. This merger gives rise to a clientelist-collective system that changes both patron-client relations and the context of collective action with important implications for the design of economic policy. As evidence from Greece shows, patrons in government are better off avoiding reforms that deprive their client groups of collective and personal benefits (clientelist bias in policy-making). Labour unions infiltrated by party clients have weak autonomy from the patron party but, operating inside the party network, they can effectively safeguard their access to club goods. Interdependent preferences and organizational linkages between the patron party and its client organizations favour collaboration and co-optation over open confrontation in policy-making processes.