Pay-for-delay


Book Description

This study was prepared by staff from the FTC's Bureau of Competition, Bureau of Economics, and Office of Policy Planning. This study is based on patent settlement agreements filed with the FTC between January 1, 2004 and September 30, 2009 pursuant to the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. & 1395w-101 note (section 110), 21 U.S.C. & 355 note (sections 1111-1118), 21 U.S.C. & 355(j)(5) (section 1102). Staff identified agreements in which restrictions on generic entry were combined with compensation from the brand to the generic. The FTC has challenged some of these agreements as violating the antitrust laws, but the agency lacks sufficient resources to investigate and litigate the legality of all of these agreements.




Pay-for-delay


Book Description

This study was prepared by staff from the FTC's Bureau of Competition, Bureau of Economics, and Office of Policy Planning. This study is based on patent settlement agreements filed with the FTC between January 1, 2004 and September 30, 2009 pursuant to the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. & 1395w-101 note (section 110), 21 U.S.C. & 355 note (sections 1111-1118), 21 U.S.C. & 355(j)(5) (section 1102). Staff identified agreements in which restrictions on generic entry were combined with compensation from the brand to the generic. The FTC has challenged some of these agreements as violating the antitrust laws, but the agency lacks sufficient resources to investigate and litigate the legality of all of these agreements.




Generic Drugs


Book Description

Brand-name pharmaceutical companies can delay generic competition that lowers prices by agreeing to pay a generic competitor to hold its competing product off the market for a certain period of time. These so-called "pay-for-delay" agreements have arisen as part of patent litigation settlement agreements between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies. "Pay-for-delay" agreements are "win-win" for the companies: brand name pharmaceutical prices stay high, and the brand and generic share the benefits of the brand's monopoly profits. Consumers lose, however: they miss out on generic prices that can be as much as 90 percent less than brand prices. For example, brand-name medication that costs $300 per month, might be sold as a generic for as little as $30 per month. This book examines the "pay-for-delay' program and how drug company pay-offs cost consumers billions.




Pay-For-Delay Deals


Book Description

In 2012, analysts estimate that Americans spent $325 billion on prescription drugs and they predict that drug sales will rise by more than four percent in the year 2014. Generic drugs, which can cost as much as 90 percent lower than brand-name drugs, help rein in the costs. A brand-name drug that costs $300 per month might be sold as a generic for as little as $30 per month, but for several years, pay-for-delay deals have robbed consumers of cost-saving generic drugs. At the very core, these deals involve collusion between brand and generic competitors to keep generic competition off the market. A brand-name drug company pays their generic competitor cash or another form of payment. In exchange, the generic delays its entry into the marketplace. The brand company wins because it gets to maintain its monopoly, and the generic company wins because they get paid more than they would have if they came to market. But American consumers and American taxpayers lose out on lower-cost generic drugs to the tune of billions of dollars each year, $3.5 billion according to the Federal Trade Commission.




Pay to Delay


Book Description




The Antitrust Enterprise


Book Description

After thirty years, the debate over antitrust's ideology has quieted. Most now agree that the protection of consumer welfare should be the only goal of antitrust laws. Execution, however, is another matter. The rules of antitrust remain unfocused, insufficiently precise, and excessively complex. The problem of poorly designed rules is severe, because in the short run rules weigh much more heavily than principles. At bottom, antitrust is a defensible enterprise only if it can make the microeconomy work better, after accounting for the considerable costs of operating the system. The Antitrust Enterprise is the first authoritative and compact exposition of antitrust law since Robert Bork's classic The Antitrust Paradox was published more than thirty years ago. It confronts not only the problems of poorly designed, overly complex, and inconsistent antitrust rules but also the current disarray of antitrust's rule of reason, offering a coherent and workable set of solutions. The result is an antitrust policy that is faithful to the consumer welfare principle but that is also more readily manageable by the federal courts and other antitrust tribunals.




Pay-for-delay Deals


Book Description







Drug Wars


Book Description

While the shockingly high prices of prescription drugs continue to dominate the news, the strategies used by pharmaceutical companies to prevent generic competition are poorly understood, even by the lawmakers responsible for regulating them. In this groundbreaking work, Robin Feldman and Evan Frondorf illuminate the inner workings of the pharmaceutical market and show how drug companies twist health policy to achieve goals contrary to the public interest. In highly engaging prose, they offer specific examples of how generic competition has been stifled for years, with costs climbing into the billions and everyday consumers paying the price. Drug Wars is a guide to the current landscape, a roadmap for reform, and a warning of what is to come. It should be read by policymakers, academics, patients, and anyone else concerned with the soaring costs of prescription drugs.