Pay-For-Delay Deals


Book Description

In 2012, analysts estimate that Americans spent $325 billion on prescription drugs and they predict that drug sales will rise by more than four percent in the year 2014. Generic drugs, which can cost as much as 90 percent lower than brand-name drugs, help rein in the costs. A brand-name drug that costs $300 per month might be sold as a generic for as little as $30 per month, but for several years, pay-for-delay deals have robbed consumers of cost-saving generic drugs. At the very core, these deals involve collusion between brand and generic competitors to keep generic competition off the market. A brand-name drug company pays their generic competitor cash or another form of payment. In exchange, the generic delays its entry into the marketplace. The brand company wins because it gets to maintain its monopoly, and the generic company wins because they get paid more than they would have if they came to market. But American consumers and American taxpayers lose out on lower-cost generic drugs to the tune of billions of dollars each year, $3.5 billion according to the Federal Trade Commission.




Delay, Deny, Defend


Book Description

An expose of insurance injustice and a plan for consumers and lawmakers to fight it Over the last two decades, insurance has become less of a safety net and more of a spider's web: sticky and complicated, designed to ensnare as much as to aid. Insurance companies now often try to delay payment of justified claims, deny payment altogether, and defend these actions by forcing claimants to enter litigation. Jay M. Feinman, a legal scholar and insurance expert, explains how these trends developed, how the government ought to fix the system, and what the rest of us can do to protect ourselves. He shows that the denial of valid claims is not occasional or accidental or the fault of a few bad employees. It's the result of an increasing and systematic focus on maximizing profits by major companies such as Allstate and State Farm. Citing dozens of stories of victims who were unfairly denied payment, Feinman explains how people can be more cautious when shopping for policies and what to do when pursuing a disputed claim. He also lays out a plan for the legal reforms needed to prevent future abuses. This exposé will help drive the discussion of this increasingly hot- button issue.




Pay-for-delay Deals


Book Description




Pay to Delay


Book Description







Generic Drugs


Book Description

Brand-name pharmaceutical companies can delay generic competition that lowers prices by agreeing to pay a generic competitor to hold its competing product off the market for a certain period of time. These so-called "pay-for-delay" agreements have arisen as part of patent litigation settlement agreements between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies. "Pay-for-delay" agreements are "win-win" for the companies: brand name pharmaceutical prices stay high, and the brand and generic share the benefits of the brand's monopoly profits. Consumers lose, however: they miss out on generic prices that can be as much as 90 percent less than brand prices. For example, brand-name medication that costs $300 per month, might be sold as a generic for as little as $30 per month. This book examines the "pay-for-delay' program and how drug company pay-offs cost consumers billions.




Pay-For-Delay Deals


Book Description

Pay-for-delay deals : limiting competition and costing consumers : hearing before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, first session, July 23, 2013.




Pay-for-delay Deals


Book Description

Pay-for-delay deals : limiting competition and costing consumers : hearing before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, first session, July 23, 2013.




The Antitrust Enterprise


Book Description

After thirty years, the debate over antitrust's ideology has quieted. Most now agree that the protection of consumer welfare should be the only goal of antitrust laws. Execution, however, is another matter. The rules of antitrust remain unfocused, insufficiently precise, and excessively complex. The problem of poorly designed rules is severe, because in the short run rules weigh much more heavily than principles. At bottom, antitrust is a defensible enterprise only if it can make the microeconomy work better, after accounting for the considerable costs of operating the system. The Antitrust Enterprise is the first authoritative and compact exposition of antitrust law since Robert Bork's classic The Antitrust Paradox was published more than thirty years ago. It confronts not only the problems of poorly designed, overly complex, and inconsistent antitrust rules but also the current disarray of antitrust's rule of reason, offering a coherent and workable set of solutions. The result is an antitrust policy that is faithful to the consumer welfare principle but that is also more readily manageable by the federal courts and other antitrust tribunals.