Philosophy's Nature: Husserl's Phenomenology, Natural Science, and Metaphysics


Book Description

This book offers a systematic interpretation of the relation between natural science and metaphysics in Husserl’s phenomenology. It shows that Husserl’s account of scientific knowledge is a radical alternative to established methods and frameworks in contemporary philosophy of science. The author’s interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy offers a critical reconstruction of the historical context from which his phenomenological approach developed, as well as new interpretations of key Husserlian concepts such as metaphysics, idealization, life-world, objectivism, crisis of the sciences, and historicity. The development of Husserl’s philosophical project is marked by the tension between natural science and transcendental phenomenology. While natural science provides a paradigmatic case of the way in which transcendental phenomenology, ontology, empirical science, and metaphysics can be articulated, it has also been the object of philosophical misunderstandings that have determined the current cultural and philosophical crisis. This book demonstrates the ways in which Husserl shows that our conceptions of philosophy and of nature are inseparable. Philosophy’s Nature will appeal to scholars and advanced students who are interested in Husserl and the relations between phenomenology, natural science, and metaphysics.




Husserl’s Phenomenology


Book Description

Drawing upon both Husserl's published works and posthumous material, Husserl's Phenomenology incorporates the results of the most recent Husserl research. It can consequently serve as a concise and updated introduction to his thinking.




Phenomenological Approaches to Physics


Book Description

This book offers fresh perspective on the role of phenomenology in the philosophy of physics which opens new avenues for discussion among physicists, "standard" philosophers of physics and philosophers with phenomenological leanings. Much has been written on the interrelations between philosophy and physics in the late 19th and early 20th century, and on the emergence of philosophy of science as an autonomous philosophical sub-discipline. This book is about the under-explored role of phenomenology in the development and the philosophical interpretation of 20th century physics. Part 1 examines questions about the origins and value of phenomenological approaches to physics. Does the work of classical phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty or Heidegger contain elements of systematic value to both the practice and our philosophical understanding of physics? How did classical phenomenology influence “standard” philosophy of science in the Anglo-American and other traditions? Part 2 probes questions on the role of phenomenology in the philosophies of physics and science: - Can phenomenology help to solve “Wigner’s puzzle”, the problem of the "unreasonable effectiveness" of mathematics in describing, explaining and predicting empirical phenomena? - Does phenomenology allow better understanding of the principle of gauge invariance at the core of the standard model of contemporary particle physics? - Does the phenomenological notion of “Lifeworld” stand in opposition to the “scientific metaphysics” movement, or is there potential for dialogue? Part 3 examines the measurement problem. Is the solution outlined by Fritz London and Edmond Bauer merely a re-statement of von Neumann’s view, or should it be regarded as a distinctively phenomenological take on the measurement problem? Is phenomenology a serious contender in continuing discussions of foundational questions of quantum mechanics? Can other interpretational frameworks such as quantum Bayesianism benefit from implementing phenomenological notions such as constitution or horizonal intentionality?




Kant & Phenomenology


Book Description

Phenomenology, together with Marxism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy, dominated philosophy in the twentieth century—and Edmund Husserl is usually thought to have been the first to develop the concept. His views influenced a variety of important later thinkers, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who eventually turned phenomenology away from questions of knowledge. But here Tom Rockmore argues for a return to phenomenology’s origins in epistemology, and he does so by locating its roots in the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant and Phenomenology traces the formulation of Kant’s phenomenological approach back to the second edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In response to various criticisms of the first edition, Kant more forcefully put forth a constructivist theory of knowledge. This shift in Kant’s thinking challenged the representational approach to epistemology, and it is this turn, Rockmore contends, that makes Kant the first great phenomenologist. He then follows this phenomenological line through the work of Kant’s idealist successors, Fichte and Hegel. Steeped in the sources and literature it examines, Kant and Phenomenology persuasively reshapes our conception of both of its main subjects.




Groundwork of Phenomenological Marxism


Book Description

In Groundwork of Phenomenological Marxism: Crisis, Body, World, Ian H. Angus investigates the crisis of reason in a contemporary context. Beginning with Edmund Husserl’s The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Angus connects the phenomenology of human motility to Marx’s ontology of labor in Capital and shows its basis in natural fecundity (excess). He argues that the formalization of reason creates an inability to foster differentiated community as expected by both Husserl and Marx and that the formalization of human motility by the regime of value reveals the ontological productivity of natural fecundity, showing that ecology is the contemporary exemplary science. Addressing the crisis requires a philosophy of technology (especially digital technology) and a dialogue between cultural-civilizational lifeworlds, which surpasses Husserl’s assumption that Europe is the home of reason. Angus’s overall conception of phenomenology is Socratic in that it is concerned with the presuppositions and applications of knowledge-forms in their lifeworld grounding. He further shows that the contemporary event is the epochal confrontation between planetary technology and place-based Indigeneity. This book lays out the fundamental concepts of a systematic phenomenological Marxian philosophy.




Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences


Book Description

The present volume contains many of the papers presented at a four-day conference held by the Husserl-Archives in Leuven in April 2009 to c- memorate the one hundred and ?ftieth anniversary of Edmund Husserl’s birth. The conference was organized to facilitate the critical evaluation of Husserl’s philosophical project from various perspectives and in light of the current philosophical and scienti?c climate. Still today, the characteristic tension between Husserl’s concrete and detailed descriptions of consciousness, on the one hand, and his radical philosophical claim to ultimate truth and certainty in thinking, feeling, and acting, on the other, calls for a sustained re?ection on the relation between a Husserlian phenomenological philosophy and philosophy in general. What can phenomenological re?ection contribute to the ongoing discussion of certain perennial philosophical questions and which phi- sophical problems are raised by a phenomenological philosophy itself? In addition to addressing the question of the relation between p- nomenology and philosophy in general, phenomenology today cannot avoid addressing the nature of its relation to the methods and results of the natural and human sciences. In fact, for Husserl, phenomenology is not just one among many philosophical methods and entirely unrelated to the sciences. Rather, according to Husserl, phenomenology should be a “?rst philosophy” and should aim to become the standard for all true science.




Naturalism in Mathematics


Book Description

Our much-valued mathematical knowledge rests on two supports: the logic of proof and the axioms from which those proofs begin. Naturalism in Mathematics investigates the status of the latter, the fundamental assumptions of mathematics. These were once held to be self-evident, but progress in work on the foundations of mathematics, especially in set theory, has rendered that comforting notion obsolete. Given that candidates for axiomatic status cannot be proved, what sorts of considerations can be offered for or against them? That is the central question addressed in this book. One answer is that mathematics aims to describe an objective world of mathematical objects, and that axiom candidates should be judged by their truth or falsity in that world. This promising view—realism—is assessed and finally rejected in favour of another—naturalism—which attends less to metaphysical considerations of objective truth and falsity, and more to practical considerations drawn from within mathematics itself. Penelope Maddy defines this naturalism, explains the motivation for it, and shows how it can be helpfully applied in the assessment of candidates for axiomatic status in set theory. Maddy's clear, original treatment of this fundamental issue is informed by current work in both philosophy and mathematics, and will be accessible and enlightening to readers from both disciplines.




From Kant to Husserl


Book Description

In From Kant to Husserl, Charles Parsons examines a wide range of historical opinion on philosophical questions from mathematics to phenomenology. Amplifying his early ideas on Kant’s philosophy of arithmetic, the author then turns to reflections on Frege, Brentano, and Husserl.




Phenomenology and QBism


Book Description

This volume brings together philosophers and physicists to explore the parallels between Quantum Bayesianism, or QBism, and the phenomenological tradition. It is the first book exclusively devoted to phenomenology and quantum mechanics. By emphasizing the role of the subject’s experiences and expectations, and by explicitly rejecting the idea that the notion of physical reality could ever be reduced to a purely third-personal perspective, QBism exhibits several interesting parallels with phenomenology. The central message of QBism is that quantum probabilities must be interpreted as the experiencing agent’s personal Bayesian degrees of belief—degrees of belief for the consequences of their actions on a quantum system. The chapters in this volume elaborate whether and specify how phenomenology could serve as the philosophical foundation of QBism. This objective is pursued from the perspective of QBists engaging with phenomenology as well as the perspective of phenomenologists engaging with QBism. These approaches enable us to realize a better understanding of quantum mechanics and the world we live in, achieve a better understanding of QBsim, and introduce the phenomenological foundations of quantum mechanics. Phenomenology and QBism is an essential resource for researchers and graduate students working in philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, quantum mechanics, and phenomenology.




Nature and Experience


Book Description

What do we mean when we speak about and advocate for ‘nature’? Do inanimate beings possess agency, and if so what is its structure? What role does metaphor play in our understanding of and relation to the environment? How does nature contribute to human well-being? By bringing the concerns and methods of phenomenology to bear on questions such as these, this book seeks to redefine how environmental issues are perceived and discussed and demonstrates the relevance of phenomenological inquiry to a broader audience in environmental studies. The book examines what phenomenology must be like to address the practical and philosophical issues that emerge within environmental philosophy, what practical contributions phenomenology might make to environmental studies and policy making more generally, and the nature of our human relationship with the environment and the best way for us to engage with it.