Planning the American Air War: Four Men and Nine Days in 1941


Book Description

Even if it hadn't been used, the United States' air war plan for World War II would have been uniquely significant. It marked the first time that airmen in the Army Air Forces were permitted to do their own planning; thus it was a crucially important step in their move toward independence. Further, it raised seriously the question of whether a major industrial nation could be defeated solely through air bombardment. For these reasons and others, the plan deserves attention from all who concern themselves with strategies for national defense.But plans don't write themselves, and the planning process, rather than the finished document, is the focal point of this study. The author uses the plan as a lens for studying that process. He looks through the document to follow events on the floor of the planners' arena.What he finds is that the arena is far from an impersonal, purely intellectual environment. Intellect counts there, he says, but so does the political savvy of a Hal George, the abrasive intransigence of a Ken Walker, the icy persistence of a Laurence Kuter, and the quiet urgency and forethought of a Haywood Hansell. Even a noisy hallway or a foggy bay in Newfoundland can sometimes influence the process. Life isn't always quiet and clear while planners make national choices that shape world history.Though the people and events in this narrative were important to the development of the Air Force, this isn't merely an Air Force story. It's a unique look at the characteristically human process of planning. All who concern themselves with national defense can learn from what four men did in nine days in 1941.James C. Gastons refers to his book as "an inside narrative." His reason is that he is watching the planners from inside the planning room. He is also trying to narrate a story in a way that reveals the human context of an event, much as Herman Melville was doing when he called Billy Budd "an inside narrative.Lieutenant Colonel Jim Gaston learned about war plans in Southeast Asia in 1969-1970. After flying more than 130 combat missions, he was chosen In-Country Fighter Representative for Headquarters Seventh Air Force War Plans. He was responsible for various contingency plans, and he assisted in the massive planning effort for withdrawing U.S. Air Force units from their Vietnamese bases.Since then he has earned a master's degree at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and a doctorate at the University of Oklahoma. In addition to flying and teaching, he has published two books (dealing with such diverse topics as airpower and eighteenth-century literature) and contributed to several others. When he wrote this narrative, he was a student at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Associate Professor of Research at the National Defense University. In 1982 Colonel Gaston was (Acting) Head of the Department of English, U.S. Air Force Academy.







Why Air Forces Fail


Book Description

According to Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris, "Flight has been part of the human dream for aeons, and its military application has likely been the dark side of that dream for almost as long." In the twentieth century, this dream and its dark side unfolded as the air forces of the world went to war, bringing destruction and reassessment with each failure. Why Air Forces Fail examines the complex, often deep-seated, reasons for the catastrophic failures of the air forces of various nations. Higham and Harris divide the air forces into three categories of defeat: forces that never had a chance to win, such as Poland and France; forces that started out victorious but were ultimately defeated, such as Germany and Japan; and finally, those that were defeated in their early efforts yet rose to victory, such as the air forces of Britain and the United States. The contributing authors examine the complex causes of defeats of the Russian, Polish, French, British, Italian, German, Argentine, and American air services. In all cases, the failures stemmed from deep, usually prewar factors that were shaped by the political, economic, military, and social circumstances in the countries. Defeat also stemmed from the anticipation of future wars, early wartime actions, and the precarious relationship between the doctrine of the military leadership and its execution in the field. Anthony Christopher Cain's chapter on France's air force, l'Armée de l'Air, attributes France's loss to Germany in June 1940 to a lack of preparation and investment in the air force. One major problem was the failure to centralize planning or coordinate a strategy between land and air forces, which was compounded by aborted alliances between France and countries in eastern Europe, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the lack of incentives for design innovation in air technologies led to clashes between airplane manufacturers, laborers, and the government, a struggle that resulted in France's airplanes' being outnumbered by Germany's more than three to one by 1940. Complemented by reading lists and suggestions for further research, Why Air Forces Fail provides groundbreaking studies of the causes of air force defeats.




U.S. Government Books


Book Description




Master of Airpower


Book Description

“A valuable and long-overdue biography of one of America’s greatest soldiers.”—Parameters The story of Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz’s life is more than a biography of one of America’s great military leaders. It is a history of the development of airpower, and a fascinating, inside look at the long, difficult struggle to win autonomy for the U.S. Air Force. Spaatz earned his wings in 1918, when flying was a new and dangerous occupation; aviation school mortality rates were 18 percent. After gaining experience as a fighter pilot during the “Great War,” he became one of the Air Corps’ top pursuit commanders during the 1920s. During the 1930s, he moved over to bombers just as modern, long range aircraft were coming into service. As a senior bomber commander, Spaatz significantly influenced the emerging strategic bomber doctrine. By the time of the outbreak of the Second World War, Spaatz was one of America’s most experienced aviators. He was at the helm of the evolution of the new American military “strategic airpower” doctrine, which proved to be a decisive factor in World War II. After the Allied victory, planning and launching an independent Air Force would occupy Spaatz for the remainder of his career. Today’s Air Force bears his indelible stamp. “Tooey” Spaatz was a low-profile leader who was known for his open mind and pragmatic approach, and who was influential in a quiet, forceful way. Possessed of absolute integrity, even when his beliefs were unpopular, he pressed them at the risk of his career.




Military Aircraft, 1919-1945


Book Description

An in-depth history of the time when airpower became the great equalizer, changing military strategy forever and bringing once-safe targets in reach. Military Aircraft, 1919–1945: An Illustrated History of Their Impact covers a crucial era in modern warfare technology. Ranging from the development of airpower doctrines in the aftermath of World War I to the aircraft and missions that put those doctrines into action during World War II, it provides an expert summing-up of the decades when the use of aircraft in battle came of age. In chapters covering both the history of air power and specific types of aircraft (fighters, bombers, reconnaissance and auxiliary planes), Military Aircraft, 1919–1945 introduces key theorists and designers, describes important changes in technology and production, and recreates spectacular episodes from Pearl Harbor to the London Blitz to the Enola Gay. Readers will see the dramatic impact of the first generation of modern military aircraft on land and sea. They will also see how the expansion of war to the skies brought economic opportunity to some home fronts, and looming terror and devastation to others.




The Limits of Air Power


Book Description

Tracing the use of air power in World War II and the Korean War, Mark Clodfelter explains how U. S. Air Force doctrine evolved through the American experience in these conventional wars only to be thwarted in the context of a limited guerrilla struggle in Vietnam. Although a faith in bombing's sheer destructive power led air commanders to believe that extensive air assaults could win the war at any time, the Vietnam experience instead showed how even intense aerial attacks may not achieve military or political objectives in a limited war. Based on findings from previously classified documents in presidential libraries and air force archives as well as on interviews with civilian and military decision makers, The Limits of Air Power argues that reliance on air campaigns as a primary instrument of warfare could not have produced lasting victory in Vietnam. This Bison Books edition includes a new chapter that provides a framework for evaluating air power effectiveness in future conflicts.




George C. Marshall and the Early Cold War


Book Description

Though best known for his central part in the American war effort from 1939 to 1945, George C. Marshall’s critical role in the early Cold War was probably at least as important in shaping the policies and politics of the postwar western world—and in cementing his place as a pivotal figure in twentieth-century American history. This book places Marshall squarely at the center of the story of the American century by examining his tenure in key policymaking positions during this period, including army chief of staff, special presidential envoy to China, secretary of state, and secretary of defense, among others. George C. Marshall and the Early Cold War brings together a diverse and accomplished group of scholars—including military, diplomatic, and institutional historians—to explore how Marshall, Time magazine’s “Man of the Year” in both 1943 and 1947 and the 1953 Nobel Peace Prize winner, molded debates on all the major issues of his day, such as universal military training, China’s civil war, an independent air force, the National Security Act of 1947, nuclear weapons, European Recovery Program, North Atlantic Treaty, Korean War, and racial integration of the U.S. military. With a focus on Marshall’s public service at the intersection of American policy, politics, and society, the authors provide a comprehensive historical account of his central role in shaping America during a tumultuous yet formative period in the nation’s history. Their work fills a void in the scholarship of American military history and American history generally, providing context for the consideration of broader questions about American power and the place of the military within American society.




Air Power and Warfare


Book Description

This highly selective bibliography supplements the original bibliography developed in 1978 by Ms. Betsy C. Kysely, to support the Eighth Military History Symposium While this bibliography focuses primarily on materials published since the earlier bibliography was developed, it does include some significant materials that were published prior to 1978, but that were omitted from that edition. Emphasis in this supplement is on scholarly analysis of air power itself and scholarly depictions of its history. Like most editions of the United State Air Force Academy Directorate of Libraries' publication, Special Bibliography Series, this compilation is limited to current holdings of the Academic Library at the Academy. It includes books, reports, government documents, and journal articles. Excluded are pictorial works, newspaper articles, works of fiction, studies of the technology of aircraft and associated weaponry, and items focused on the general history of aviation. Readers wanting information on the history of aviation, certainly prior to the Wright Brothers, are encouraged to consult the U S. Air Force Academy Friends of the Library publication, The Genesis of Flight: The Aeronautical History Collection of Colonel Richard Gimbel.




Air Power


Book Description

No single human invention has transformed war more than the airplane—not even the atomic bomb. Even before the Wright Brothers’ first flight, predictions abounded of the devastating and terrible consequences this new invention would have as an engine of war. Soaring over the battlefield, the airplane became an unstoppable force that left no spot on earth safe from attack. Drawing on combat memoirs, letters, diaries, archival records, museum collections, and eyewitness accounts by the men who fought—and the men who developed the breakthrough inventions and concepts—acclaimed author Stephen Budiansky weaves a vivid and dramatic account of the airplane’s revolutionary transformation of modern warfare. On the web: http://www.budiansky.com/