Polish Philosophers of Science and Nature in the 20th Century


Book Description

The volume is a collection of essays about prominent Polish 20th century philosophers of science and scientists who were concerned with problems in the philosophy of science. The contribution made by Polish logicians, especially those from the Lvov-Warsaw School, like Łukasiewicz, Kotarbiński, Czeżowski or Ajdukiewicz, is already well known. One of the aims of the volume is to offer a broader perspective. The papers collected here are devoted to the work of such philosophers as Zawirski, Metallmann, Dąmbska, Mehlberg, Szaniawski and Giedymin as well as to the work of such scientists as Smoluchowski, Fleck, Infeld and Chyliński. The introduction to the volume, written by the editor and Jacek Jadacki, presents an overview of the history of the Polish philosophy of science from the foundation of the Cracow Academy (in 1364) to the present.




Nature, Experiment, and the Sciences


Book Description

This collection of essays is a tribute to Stillman Drake by some of his friends and colleagues, and by others on whom his work has had a formative influence. It is difficult to know him without succumbing to his combination of discipline and enthusiasm, even in fields remote from Renaissance physics and natural philosophy; and so he should not be surprised in this volume to see emphases and methods congenial to him, even on topics as remote as Darwin or the chemical revolution. Therein lies whatever unity the discerning reader may find in this book, beyond the natural focus and coherence of the largest section, on Galileo, and the final section on Drake's collection of books, a major and now accessible resource for research in the field that he has made his own. We have chosen, as the occasion for presenting the volume to Stillman Drake, Galileo's birthday; Galileo has had more than one birthday party in Toronto since Drake came to the University of Toronto. As for the title, it reflects a shared conviction that experiment is the key to science; it is what scientists do. Drake has already asserted that emphasis in the title of his magisterial Galileo at Work, and we echo it here. Those who have had the privilege and pleasure of working and arguing with Stillman over the years know his tenacity, penetration, and vigour. They also know his generosity and humility. We owe him much.




Polish Essays in the Methodology of the Social Sciences


Book Description

Modern philosophy has benefited immensely from the intelligence, and sensitivity, the creative and critical energies, and the lucidity of Polish scholars. Their investigations into the logical and methodological foundations of mathematics, the physical and biological sciences, ethics and esthetics, psychology, linguistics, economics and jurisprudence, and the social science- all are marked by profound and imaginative work. To the centers of empiricist philosophy of science in Vienna, Berlin and Cambridge during the first half of this century, one always added the great school of analytic and methodol ogical studies in Warsaw and Lwow. To the world centers of Marxist theoretical practice in Berlin, Moscow, Paris, Rome and elsewhere, one must add the Poland of the same era, from Ludwik Krzywicki (1859-1941) onward. American socialists and economists will remember the careful work of Oscar Lange, working among us for many years and then after 1945 in Warsaw, always humane, logical, objective. In this volume, our friend and colleague, Jerzy J. Wiatr, has assembled a representative set of recent essays by Polish social scientists and philosophers. Each of these might lead the reader far beyond this book, to look into the Polish Sociological Bulletin which has been publishing Polish sociological studies in English for several decades, to study other translations of books and papers by these authors, and to reflect upon the interplay of logical, phenomenological, Marxist, empiricist and historical learning in modern Polish social understanding.




Philosophy and Technology II


Book Description

Until recently, the philosophy and history of science proceeded in a separate way from the philosophy and history of technology, and indeed with respect to both science and technology, philosophical and historical inquiries were also following their separate ways. Now we see in the past quarter-century how the philosophy of science has been profoundly in fluenced by historical studies of the sciences, and no longer concerned so single-mindedly with the analysis of theory and explanation, with the re lation between hypotheses and experimental observation. Now also we see the traditional historical studies of technology supplemented by phi losophical questions, and no longer so plainly focussed upon contexts of application, on invention and practical engineering, and on the mutually stimulating relations between technology and society. Further, alas, the neat division of intellectual labor, those clearly drawn distinctions be tween science and technology, between the theoretical and the applied, between discovery and justification, between internalist and externalist approaches . . . all, all have become muddled! Partly, this is due to internal revolutions within the philosophy and his tory of science (the first result being recognition of their mutual rele vance). Partly, however, this state of 'muddle' is due to external factors: science, at the least in the last half-century, has become so intimately connected with technology, and technological developments have cre ated so many new fields of scientific (and philosophical) inquiry that any critical reflection on scientific and technological endeavors must hence forth take their interaction into account.




Rational Changes in Science


Book Description

THE PROBLEMS OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY Fashion is a fickle mistress. Only yesterday scientific rationality enjoyed considerable attention, consideration, and even reverence among phi losophers; "but today's fashion leads us to despise it, and the matron, rejected and abandoned as Hecuba, complains; modo maxima rerum, tot generis natisque potens - nunc trahor exui, inops", to cite Kant for our purpose, who cited Ovid for his. Like every fashion, ours also has its paradoxical aspects, as John Watkins correctly reminds in an essay in this volume. Enthusiasm for science was high among philosophers when significant scientific results were mostly a promise, it declined when that promise became an undeniable reality. Nevertheless, as with the decline of any fashion, even the revolt against scientific rationality has some reasonable grounds. If the taste of the philosophical community has changed so much, it is not due to an incident or a whim. This volume is not about the history of and reasons for this change. Instead, it provides a view of the new emerging image of scientific rationality in both its philosophical and historical aspects. In particular, the aim of the contributions gathered here is to focus on the concept around which the discussions about rationality have mostly taken place: scientific change.




Greek Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science


Book Description

Our Greek colleagues, in Greece and abroad, must know (indeed they do know) how pleasant it is to recognize the renaissance of the philosophy of science among them with this fine collection. Classical and modern, technical and humane, historical and logical, admirably original and respectfully traditional, these essays will deserve close study by philosophical readers throughout the world. Classical scholars and historians of science likewise will be stimulated, and the historians of ancient as well as modern philosophers too. Reviewers might note one or more of the contributions as of special interest, or as subject to critical wrestling (that ancient tribute); we will simply congratulate Pantelis Nicolacopoulos for assembling the essays and presenting the book, and we thank the contributors for their works and for their happy agreement to let their writings appear in this book. R. S. C. xi INTRODUCTORY REMARKS Neither philosophy nor science is new to Greece, but philosophy of science is. There are broader (socio-historical) and more specific (academic) reasons that explain, to a satisfactory degree, both the under-development of philosophy and history of science in Greece until recently and its recent development to international standards. It is, perhaps, not easy to have in mind the fact that the modem Greek State is only 160 years old (during quite a period of which it was consider ably smaller than it is today, its present territory having been settled after World War II).




Spinoza and the Sciences


Book Description

Prefatory Explanation It must be remarked at once that I am 'editor' of this volume only in that I had the honor of presiding at the symposium on Spinoza and the Sciences at which a number of these papers were presented (exceptions are those by Hans Jonas, Richard Popkin, Joe VanZandt and our four European contributors), in that I have given some editorial advice on details of some of the papers, including translations, and finally, in that my name appears on the cover. The choice of speakers, and of addi tional contributors, is entirely due to Robert Cohen and Debra Nails; and nearly all the burden of readying the manuscript for the press has been borne by the latter. In the introduction to another anthology on Spinoza I opened my remarks by quoting a statement of Sir Stuart Hampshire about inter pretations of Spinoza's chief work: All these masks have been fitted on him and each of them does to some extent fit. But they remain masks, not the living face. They do not show the moving tensions and unresolved conflicts in Spinoza's Ethics. (Hampshire, 1973, p. 297) The double theme of 'moving tensions' and 'unresolved conflicts' seems even more appropriate to the present volume. What is Spinoza's rela tion to the sciences? The answers are many, and they criss-cross one another in a number of complicated ways.




Goethe and the Sciences: A Reappraisal


Book Description

of him in like measure within myself, that is my highest wish. This noble individual was not conscious of the fact that at that very moment the divine within him and the divine of the universe were most intimately united. So, for Goethe, the resonance with a natural rationality seems part of the genius of modern science. Einstein's 'cosmic religion', which reflects Spinoza, also echoes Goethe's remark (Ibid. , Item 575 from 1829): Man must cling to the belief that the incomprehensible is comprehensible. Else he would give up investigating. But how far will Goethe share the devotion of these cosmic rationalists to the beautiful harmonies of mathematics, so distant from any pure and 'direct observation'? Kepler, Spinoza, Einstein need not, and would not, rest with discovery of a pattern within, behind, as a source of, the phenomenal world, and they would not let even the most profound of descriptive generalities satisfy scientific curiosity. For his part, Goethe sought fundamental archetypes, as in his intuition of a Urpjlanze, basic to all plants, infinitely plastic. When such would be found, Goethe would be content, for (as he said to Eckermann, Feb. 18, 1829): . . . to seek something behind (the Urphaenomenon) is futile. Here is the limit. But as a rule men are not satisfied to behold an Urphaenomenon. They think there must be something beyond. They are like children who, having looked into a mirror, turn it around to see what is on the other side.




The Search for a Methodology of Social Science


Book Description

Stephen Turner has explored the ongms of social science in this pioneering study of two nineteenth century themes: the search for laws of human social behavior, and the accumulation and analysis of the facts of such behavior through statistical inquiry. The disputes were vigorously argued; they were over questions of method, criteria of explanation, interpretations of probability, understandings of causation as such and of historical causation in particular, and time and again over the ways of using a natural science model. From his careful elucidation of John Stuart Mill's proposals for the methodology of the social sciences on to his original analysis of the methodological claims and practices of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, Turner has beautifully traced the conflict between statistical sociology and a science offactual description on the one side, and causal laws and a science of nomological explanation on the other. We see the works of Comte and Quetelet, the critical observations of Herschel, Buckle, Venn and Whewell, and the tough scepticism of Pearson, all of these as essential to the works of the classical founders of sociology. With Durkheim's essay on Suicide and Weber's monograph on The Protestant Ethic, Turner provides both philosophical analysis to demonstrate the continuing puzzles over cause and probability and also a perceptive and wry account of just how the puzzles of our late twentieth century are of a piece with theirs. The terms are still familiar: reasons vs.