Power Indices and Coalition Formation


Book Description

In recent years, publications on power indices and coalition formation have multiplied. Obviously, the application of these concepts to political institutions, more specifically, to the analysis of the European Union and, as it seems, the election of the President of the United States is getting more and more popular. There are, however, also new theoretical instruments and perspectives that support these applications: First of all, the probabilistic model of coalition formation has to be mentioned which is made operational by the multilinear extension of the characteristic function form of coalition games. This instrument triggered off a reinterpretation of existing power indices and the formulation of new indices. This development is accompanied by an intensive discussion of the concept of power in general - what do we measure when we apply power measures? - and the properties that an adequate measure of power has to satisfy. Various concepts of monotonicity were proposed as litmus test. The discussion shows that the underlying theories of coalition formation play a decisive role. New results will be discussed in this volume. Its contributions put flesh and blood on the theoretical innovations and their applications that led to a growing interest in power indices and coalition formation.




Coalition Formation and Social Choice


Book Description

Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games.




A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation


Book Description

Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.




The Encyclopedia of Public Choice


Book Description

The Encyclopedia provides a detailed and comprehensive account of the subject known as public choice. However, the title would not convey suf- ciently the breadth of the Encyclopedia’s contents which can be summarized better as the fruitful interchange of economics, political science and moral philosophy on the basis of an image of man as a purposive and responsible actor who pursues his own objectives as efficiently as possible. This fruitful interchange between the fields outlined above existed during the late eighteenth century during the brief period of the Scottish Enlightenment when such great scholars as David Hume, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith contributed to all these fields, and more. However, as intell- tual specialization gradually replaced broad-based scholarship from the m- nineteenth century onwards, it became increasingly rare to find a scholar making major contributions to more than one. Once Alfred Marshall defined economics in neoclassical terms, as a n- row positive discipline, the link between economics, political science and moral philosophy was all but severed and economists redefined their role into that of ‘the humble dentist’ providing technical economic information as inputs to improve the performance of impartial, benevolent and omniscient governments in their attempts to promote the public interest. This indeed was the dominant view within an economics profession that had become besotted by the economics of John Maynard Keynes and Paul Samuelson immediately following the end of the Second World War.




Advances in Behavioral Economics


Book Description

This volume is dedicated to Horst Todt who celebrated his seventieth an niversaryon March 14, 2000. All the contributors know Horst Todt personally and (with the exception of two younger co-authors) have accompanied his scientific career for sev eral years, some as his assistants, some as his colleagues at the Frankfurt or Hamburg University, some as fellow members in scientific societies. All who know him acknowledge inspiring conversations on a broad field of issues often reaching far beyond the scope of economics. Being friendly and entertaining and without exaggerated personal ambition he often initiated work which others completed. In particular the two editors of this volume experienced and enjoyed the stimulating atmosphere at his Chair of Economics at the Hamburg University. We like to remember these scientifically and personally fruitful years under the tutorship of Horst Todt. The editors would like to thank the contributors to this volume for their readiness to cooperate and for the promptness of their delivery.




Theories of Coalition Formation


Book Description

First published in 1984. In this book, the authors set forth the central ideas and results of the major theories of coalition forming behavior. These theories address situations of partial conflict of interest with the following aspects: (1) there are three or more players, (2) players may openly communicate with each other, and (3) players form coalitions by freely negotiating agreements on how to disburse the gains that result from the coalition members’ joint coordinated efforts. These models arise from the two disciplines of mathematics, in the theory of cooperative n-person games with side payments, and social psychology, in theories of small group behavior in mixed-motive situations. The goal is to explore the various solution concepts that make up this body of theory, and in particular to examine the psychological premises that underlie the various theoretical models.




Handbook of Public Administration and Policy in the European Union


Book Description

The Handbook of Public Administration and Policy in the European Union focuses on the current state of the EU while also demonstrating how its current structure came into being and how it may change in the near future. Although most existing literature is either policy-oriented or institution-oriented, this textbook employs a different, more comprehensive approach. Not only does it analyze selected EU laws and most EU institutions, it is also unique in that it brings together EU public administration, EU institutions, and, most importantly, EU policies into a comprehensive text. Divided into five parts, the book provides an overview of theory discourses on European integration, followed by an analysis of the development of European organizations. Part II explains the nature of the EU, highlighting its institutions. Part III addresses various dimensions of public administration, followed by a review in Part IV of major EU policies, including the Common Agricultural Policy. The textbook concludes with a history of Economic and Monetary Union and a study of the European Central Bank and the euro.




An Introduction to Game-Theoretic Modelling: Third Edition


Book Description

This book introduces game theory and its applications from an applied mathematician's perspective, systematically developing tools and concepts for game-theoretic modelling in the life and social sciences. Filled with down-to-earth examples of strategic behavior in humans and other animals, the book presents a unified account of the central ideas of both classical and evolutionary game theory. Unlike many books on game theory, which focus on mathematical and recreational aspects of the subject, this book emphasizes using games to answer questions of current scientific interest. In the present third edition, the author has added substantial new material on evolutionarily stable strategies and their use in behavioral ecology. The only prerequisites are calculus and some exposure to matrix algebra, probability, and differential equations.




Democratic Politics in the European Parliament


Book Description

With the European Parliament comprising politicians from many different countries, cultures, languages, national parties and institutional backgrounds, one might expect politics in the Parliament to be highly-fragmented and unpredictable. By studying more than 12,000 recorded votes between 1979 and 2004 this 2007 book establishes that the opposite is in fact true: transnational parties in the European Parliament are highly cohesive and the classic 'left-right' dimension dominates voting behaviour. Furthermore, the cohesion of parties in the European Parliament has increased as the powers of the Parliament have increased. The authors suggest that the main reason for these developments is that like-minded MEPs have incentives to form stable transnational party organizations and to use these organizations to compete over European Union policies. They suggest that this is a positive development for the future of democratic accountability in the European Union.




Game Theory in Communication Networks


Book Description

Focusing on heterogeneous networks, this book addresses important resource management and security issues found in networks and uses theoretical tools to model them. Although it explores network design and management from the perspective of game theory and graph theory, the text also provides practical solutions for each mechanism that needs improvement with a step-by-step approach. It also includes simulation code, so readers can use some or all of the proposed models for better network planning.