Regulating Competition in Stock Markets


Book Description

A guide to curbing monopoly power in stock markets Engaging and informative, Regulating Competition in Stock Markets skillfully analyzes the impact of the recent global financial crisis on health and happiness, and uses this opportunity to put regulatory systems in perspective. Happiness is lost because of emotional and physical health deterioration resulting from the crisis. Therefore, the authors conclude that financial crisis prevention should be the focus of public policy. This book is the most comprehensive study so far on potential risks to the stock market, especially various forms of market manipulation that lead to mania and eventual crisis. Based on litigation cases from international stock markets, and borrowing multidisciplinary findings in the fields of finance, economics, accounting, media studies, criminology, legal studies, psychology, and medicine, this book is the first to provide thorough micro-level regulatory proposals rooted in financial reality. By focusing on securities trading, they apply antitrust measures to limiting monopolistic power that is used for the manipulation of investors' perception and monopolistic profit. These proposals are quantifiable, adjustable, inexpensive, and can be easily implemented by any securities regulating agency for real-time oversight and daily operations. The recommendations found here are intended to improve the fairness and transparency of the financial markets, thereby perfecting the market competition, protecting investors, stabilizing the market, and preventing crises Explores how avoiding crises can to contribute to a more scientific, health aware, and civilized economic and social development Written by a team of authors who have extensive experience in this dynamic field, including Nobel Laureate Lawrence R. Klein Since the founding of the first, organized stock exchange in Amsterdam 400 years ago, no systematic economic research results on stock markets have been implemented in stock market regulation around the world. Regulating Competition in Stock Markets aims to fill this void.




The Antitrust Paradox


Book Description

The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.




The Goals of Competition Law


Book Description

What are the normative foundations of competition law? That is the question at the heart of this book. Leading scholars consider whether this branch of law serves just one or more than one goal, and if it serves to protect unfettered competition as such, how this goal relates to other objectives such as the promotion of economic welfare. The book brings together contributions on the relevance of different welfare standards, on the concept of 'freedom to compete' and on distributional fairness as a goal of competition law. Moreover, it discusses the relationship to other legal goals such as mar.




The Analysis Of Competition Policy And Sectoral Regulation


Book Description

This volume contains a selection of papers that were presented at the CRESSE Conferences held in Chania, Crete, from July 6th to 8th, 2012, and in Corfu from July 5th to 7th, 2013. The chapters address current policy issues in competition and regulation. The book contains contributions at the frontier of competition economics and regulation and provides perspectives on recent research findings in the field. Written by experts in their respective fields, the book brings together current thinking on market forces at play in imperfectly competitive industries, how firms use anti-competitive practices to their advantage and how competition policy and regulation can address market failures. It provides an in-depth analysis of various ongoing debates and offers fresh insights in terms of conceptual understanding, empirical findings and policy implications. The book contributes to our understanding of imperfectly competitive markets, anti-competitive practices and competition policy and regulation.




Competition Overdose


Book Description

Stucke and Ezrachi’s analysis of the nature of competition is refreshingly non-ideological and counterintuitive. Their idea that competition can be either toxic or noble—all depending on how governments structure markets—is something so clear that it’s remarkable it’s taken us decades to recognize the wisdom of it. This is a must-read for anyone interested in how to use public policy to harness the competitive drive for the public good. — Chris Hughes, cofounder of Facebook Stucke and Ezrachi show us the important differences between destructive and noble competition and what we can do to pursue a more just and prosperous world. This book changes how you will view the role of the market in our economy and society at large. — Spencer Weber Waller, director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies and law professor at Loyola University Chicago Entertaining and thought-provoking, Competition Overdose fiercely articulates the raw, hard truth behind the toxic aspects of competition. — Tommaso Valletti, professor of economics at Imperial College London and Chief Competition Economist (2016–2019), European Commission Competition Overdose is probably the most important book to be published on the subject since The Antitrust Paradox hit the bookshelves in 1978. It is destined to transform how governments across the world think about the role competition in domestic and international policy for decades to come. Stucke and Ezrachi are the new rock stars of competition policy. — Ali Nikpay, partner at Gibson Dunn & Crutcher Anything, in the wrong dosage, can be poisonous. Competition Overdose takes a sacred cow of contemporary western thought—that ‘more competition is always good’—and reveals that while competition can be noble, it can also be toxic. An engaging and compelling read that will make you think differently about situations we all deal with every day. — Tim Wu, professor at Columbia Law School, contributing opinion writer for the New York Times, and author of The Master Switch and The Attention Merchants A must-read for anyone concerned about the future of our economy and society, Competition Overdose provides a no-nonsense analysis of how toxic competition can be bad for competitors, consumers, workers, and society overall. The authors highlight the abuses of this ideology and remind us that we, as citizens and consumers, can exercise our power by choosing products, based on our values. — Monique Goyens, director general of BEUC, The European Consumer Organisation This beautifully written book helps us rethink economic principles from the ground up. As any good chemist knows, what can be helpful or harmless in small doses is deadly in excess. While technocrats push competition as a cure to all economic ailments, Stucke and Ezrachi deliver a dose of reality: cutthroat schemes to kneecap rivals, manipulate customers, and exploit workers harm far more than they help. Read this book for a brilliant account of the proper place of competition (and ethics) in society. — Frank Pasquale, law professor at University of Maryland and author of The Black Box Society Stucke and Ezrachi examine a multitude of perversities in today’s society—colleges striving to recruit applicants they likely will reject, supermarkets stocking hundreds of varieties of jam, travel deals stuffed with hidden fees—and provide a unifying explanation: a misalignment of competition. Their book illuminates how competition can go wrong, and how individuals, businesses, and the government can set it right. — Jonathan Levin, dean of Stanford Graduate School of Business Is more competition the solution to all our societal problems? Stucke and Ezrachi persuasively say: No, it depends; sometimes we need to rein in markets because they produce socially inferior outcomes. This book shows that the promotion of competition cannot be an end in of itself, but rather it should be used as a tool to improve overall welfare. Between too much and too little competition, the safest option is, as always, the ‘aurea mediocritas’” — Jorge Padilla, senior managing director and head of Compass Lexecon, Europe Stucke and Ezrachi ask critical questions about what types of rivalry are desirable and who benefits when all domains of society are governed by principles of unfettered competition. Countering simplistic prescriptions, Competition Overdose is a perceptive and timely read. — Lina Khan, author of Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox Competition Overdose is a courageous, timely attempt by two formidable legal scholars to unpack—and in some cases demolish—the dominant shibboleth of our age: the delusion that ‘more competition’ is the remedy for many social or economic ills. Should be required reading for every course in public policy. — John Naughton, professor at University of Cambridge and technology columnist for the London Observer The authors draw skillfully on a wide range of disciplines, from economics to psychology, to help us understand why more competition is not always all that it’s cracked up to be. They provide support for a more humane, nobler form of competition and wider corporate purpose, debunking the myths of shareholder value and blind faith in markets. This is a must-read. — Simon Holmes, UK Competition Appeal Tribunal Because competition has been sold for centuries as an unbridled positive, reading this book requires counterintuitive thinking and an open mind. Using a lucid, conversational style, the authors thoroughly explain each case study and anecdote. Does competition regularly result in a race to the bottom? Yes, the authors maintain, and they present ideas about how to achieve what they term ‘noble competition,’ in which sellers, buyers, and society at large all benefit. — Kirkus Reviews




Digital markets and online platforms: new perspectives on regulation and competition law


Book Description

Across the world, regulators and policy makers are grappling with how to establish a competitive, safe and fair online environment that also safeguards users’ fundamental rights as citizens. Ahead of the European Commission’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), this book “Digital markets and online platforms: new perspectives on regulation and competition law“, presents CERRE’s latest contribution to the debate with concrete policy recommendations. Together, the policy recommendations in this book present a roadmap that should be pursued for EU policy makers to safeguard competition and innovation in digital platform markets. They can be organised into three key areas for action: (i) More effective enforcement, (ii) increased transparency and switching easiness, and (iii) providing access to key innovation capabilities. “The need to safeguard fair and vibrant competition, which is also seen as an important driving factor for innovation, is nothing new for policy makers. However, the characteristics and complexities of digital markets have challenged some of the traditional approaches.” – Jan Krämer, editor of the book and CERRE Academic Co-Director The book’s recommendations highlight that platform transparency and associated data collection by authorities, as well as data sharing by platforms (initiated through consumers or authorities), are the two most important overarching policy measures for platform markets in the near future. They facilitate enforcement, consumer choice, and innovation capabilities in the digital economy. The contents of this book were presented and debated during a CERRE live debate with guest speakers Anne Yvrande-Billon (Arcep’s Director of Economic, Market and Digital Affairs), MEP Stéphanie Yon-Courtin (Vice-President of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs) and Javier Espinoza (Financial Times’ EU Correspondent covering competition and digital policy).




The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms


Book Description

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The annual cost of federal regulations in the U.S. increased to more than $1.75 trillion in 2008. Had every U.S. household paid an equal share of the federal regulatory burden, each would have owed $15,586 in 2008. While all citizens and businesses pay some portion of these costs, the distribution of the burden of regulations is quite uneven. The portion of regulatory costs that falls initially on businesses was $8,086 per employee in 2008. Small businesses, defined as firms employing fewer than 20 employees, bear the largest burden of federal regulations. This report shows that as of 2008, small businesses face an annual regulatory cost of $10,585 per employee, which is 36% higher than the regulatory cost facing large firms (500+ employees). Ill.




The Great Reversal


Book Description

A Financial Times Book of the Year A ProMarket Book of the Year “Superbly argued and important...Donald Trump is in so many ways a product of the defective capitalism described in The Great Reversal. What the U.S. needs, instead, is another Teddy Roosevelt and his energetic trust-busting. Is that still imaginable? All believers in the virtues of competitive capitalism must hope so.” —Martin Wolf, Financial Times “In one industry after another...a few companies have grown so large that they have the power to keep prices high and wages low. It’s great for those corporations—and bad for almost everyone else.” —David Leonhardt, New York Times “Argues that the United States has much to gain by reforming how domestic markets work but also much to regain—a vitality that has been lost since the Reagan years...His analysis points to one way of making America great again: restoring our free-market competitiveness.” —Arthur Herman, Wall Street Journal Why are cell-phone plans so much more expensive in the United States than in Europe? It seems a simple question, but the search for an answer took one of the world’s leading economists on an unexpected journey through some of the most hotly debated issues in his field. He reached a surprising conclusion: American markets, once a model for the world, are giving up on healthy competition. In the age of Silicon Valley start-ups and millennial millionaires, he hardly expected this. But the data from his cutting-edge research proved undeniable. In this compelling tale of economic detective work, we follow Thomas Philippon as he works out the facts and consequences of industry concentration, shows how lobbying and campaign contributions have defanged antitrust regulators, and considers what all this means. Philippon argues that many key problems of the American economy are due not to the flaws of capitalism or globalization but to the concentration of corporate power. By lobbying against competition, the biggest firms drive profits higher while depressing wages and limiting opportunities for investment, innovation, and growth. For the sake of ordinary Americans, he concludes, government needs to get back to what it once did best: keeping the playing field level for competition. It’s time to make American markets great—and free—again.




Competition in Telecommunications


Book Description

The authors analyze regulatory reform and the emergence of competitionin network industries using the state-of-the-art theoretical tools ofindustrial organization, political economy, and the economics ofincentives.




Market definition and market power in the platform economy


Book Description

With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.