Book Description

In yet another incisive and detailed work focused on the changing face of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Dr. Thomas Young provided a unique perspective on a very timely issue.that of bi-/multi national land formations within the Alliance. I say timely because, with recent Council agreement on the new command structure, implementation work on this structure will no doubt, in due course, result in a review of the NATO force structure. In this regard, Dr. Young's research and study provide an invaluable source of essential background reading for this subsequent phase of work. The problems Dr. Young grapples with in this account have been exacerbated by a variety of evolving realities stemming from the new, post-Cold War security environment. Reduced national force structures, new NATO roles and missions emanating from the military implementation of Alliance Strategy and the rapid reaction requirements associated with the embryonic Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) Concept are but three of a multitude of inter-related issues which have driven the requirement to address NATO force structure requirements as a whole, as part of the ongoing internal adaptation of Alliance structures and procedures. Dr. Young's basic, underlying premise cannot be challenged.embedded in the 1991 Strategic Concept is the pre-eminence of Alliance cohesion and solidarity. One of the most visible manifestations of cohesion in a new NATO will continue to be the willingness of member nations to contribute elements of their respective force structures to the Alliance, commanded by joint and combined, multi-nationally manned allied headquarters. Neither can the essential, ongoing requirement for multi-national land formations be contested.now more than ever before. I distinctly remember the bold political decision of the early 1990's to transition from national to bi-national/multi-national corps within NATO. In Dr. Young's words: "As political manifestations of Alliance and European solidarity in an era of diminished force structure and strategic ambiguity, their creation at the end of the Cold War served a very important purpose." The reality is, as the author perceptively points out, that in the ensuing years, national force reductions, driven both by national expectations for the conclusions drawn from the evolving security environment with no direct threat to NATO and by the very tangible quotas imposed under the provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, have resulted in the fact that "may current national force structures are incapable of conducting unilateral corps-level operations." Hence, multi-national land formations are an essential component of NATO's future force structure and Dr. Young articulates three themes he sees as fundamental in making them more operationally effective.the empowerment of NATO corps commanders in peace, crisis and conflict, enhancing the operational effectiveness of the corps headquarters themselves and the rationalisation of overall roles, responsibilities and missions in light of the newly agreed command structure model which has no land component commands. With his usual insight, Dr. Young provides unique recommendations worthy of consideration by both NATO and NATO nations' planners. I should stress, however, that some of his recommendations clearly fall into the sole responsibility of nations, and no NATO authority would wish to infringe upon a nation's sovereign right to decide which forces a nation is prepared to contribute.