Book Description

The research study comprises of two preceding Chapters, three main empirical Parts, and CONCLUSION. The first Chapter, Introduction, presents the overall research objectives and questions of the study based on the existing agency perspectives regarding the issues of control and governance conflicts in modern corporations. The second Chapter, Review of Theoretical Frameworks, presents a brief account of similarities and differences between the existing theoretical frameworks relevant to the control of corporations. The review identified that the agency theory provides powerful testable models and tools that can be used in the investigation of the agency conflicts and the possible solutions that mitigate the governance problems. The three empirical Chapters follow mainly the deductive research approach of making statistical inferences using a sample of major UK listed firms in the FTSE All Share Index for the period 2003-2007. Chapter Three deals with the analysis of the state and trends or evolution of corporate ownership and control structure and some board structures of the UK listed firms. The Chapter has been instrumental in preparing the raw materials of ownership and control structure variables that are used in the succeeding two chapters. Chapter Four deals with the analysis of the relationship between ownership structure and performance using aggregate stake of all identifiable blockholders? categories and all external blockholders in the agency perspective. Chapter Five presents analysis of the relationship among ownership, control structures and firm performance using the structural equations framework in the control dominance-contestability perspective. Finally, the Thesis closes with a Conclusion. In summary, the Theses of this empirical research study suggest the followings. Firstly, there is the prevalence of multiple significant blockholders in the modern listed firms even when share ownership is dispersed. Secondly, in the presence of multiple significant blockholders in the firm, there is a likelihood that the second-type agency conflicts between large shareholders and minority shareholders exists, and that might be the dominant force that determines the possible control configuration even in listed firms with dispersed ownership. Thirdly and finally, the traditional one-equation modelling and their estimations in the methodology of looking into the relationship of separate share ownership categories or accounting for few of the categories might not precisely identify (1) the blockholders? (control forces?) incentives and ability of exerting control over the modern corporations, (2) the problem of endogeneity that might arise in the relationships, and (3) the way significant multiple blockholders interact and share control of the firms. Hence, the use of structural equations modelling and control dominance-contestability perspectives, in which the roles of blockholders structure control forces, internal and external governance mechanisms, and the problems of endogeneity are accounted for might be appropriate to reveal the control configuration of modern listed firms with multiple large blockholders.