Book Description

The question of whether or not religious believing is reasonable is one of the most important of all human concerns. This book will explore a virtue-theoretic approach, i.e., the stress on the role of agent-based intellectual virtues, to the justification of religious belief. In this thesis, I will argue that the epistemic justification or the rationality of religious beliefs is primarily based on whether the belief was conscientiously held by an intellectually virtuous agent. Rationality is not determined by the content of a belief per se, but the way in which the belief is formed and maintained. All things considered, it is the behavior of the intellectually virtuous person that determines justified believing and is the paradigm for evaluating what is rational. This means that religious beliefs are considered rational when they originate from the performance of excellent epistemic traits. We are concerned not just with what is believed, but above all with what the belief reveals of the person. Hence, rationality is better defined in relation to how rational agents or wise persons behave. There is a good-making quality about the virtues that enable the epistemic agent to connect his beliefs to the world in a way that opens the door to a heightened attentiveness to reality. This work will focus on the salient role of intellectual virtues in producing rational beliefs by using a particular framework in contemporary philosophy. It seeks to contribute positively to the on-going discourses on virtue epistemology, and also help enrich current discussions in the philosophy of religion. Overall, the book envisions an imperfect yet better epistemic state for religious communities as excellent environments for human flourishing.