Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise


Book Description

Addresses the issue of capability surprise-- what it is, why it happens, what can be done to reduce the potential for its occurrence, and how to better prepare the Department of Defense (DOD) and the nation to respond appropriately.







Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise


Book Description

Addresses the issue of capability surprise-- what it is, why it happens, what can be done to reduce the potential for its occurrence, and how to better prepare the Department of Defense (DOD) and the nation to respond appropriately.




Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise. Volume 2: Supporting Papers


Book Description

The instability and cultural complexities in today's world, the breadth of security challenges, and the capability not only of states, but of non-states and extremists to "make really bad things happen" create an environment in which the potential for surprise has reached new levels. As of yet the nation has found no simple form of deterrence to deal with this complex environment. Thus, we as a nation must be prepared to deal with surprise in new ways. This study addresses the issue of capability surprise--what it is, why it happens, what can be done to reduce the potential for its occurrence, and how the Department of Defense and the nation can be better prepared to respond appropriately.




Capability Surprise (Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study). Volume 1: Main Report


Book Description

Instability and cultural complexities in today's world, the security challenges, and the capability of non-states and extremists to "make bad things happen" has reached new levels. As of yet the nation has found no simple form of deterrence to deal with this complex environment. Thus, the nation must be prepared to deal with surprise in new ways. This study addresses the issue of capability surprise - what it is, why it happens, what can be done to reduce the potential for its occurrence, and how the Department of Defense and the nation can be better prepared to respond appropriately. Capability surprise can come from many sources: scientific breakthroughs, rapid fielding of a known technology, or new use of an existing capability or technology. A review of the past century suggests that surprises tend to fall into two major categories: 1. "Known" surprises - those few that the United States should have known were coming, but for which it did not adequately prepare. We specifically include space, cyber, and nuclear. We might also have included bio, but chose not to. 2) "Surprising" surprises - those many that the nation might have known about or anticipated, but which were buried among other possibilities. In this case, the evidence and consequences are less clear, the possibilities many, and the nation cannot afford to pursue them all. In both cases, the biggest issue is not a failure to envision events that may be surprising. It is a failure to decide which ones to act upon, and to what degree. That failure results partially from the fact that there is no systematic mechanism in place within DOD or the interagency to help decide which events to act on aggressively, which to treat to a lesser degree, and which to ignore, at least for the time being. The principle recommendations of the study focus on developing the approaches and the talent to better manage surprise-to prevent it or, should surprise occur, to be in a position to rapidly mitigate its consequences.




Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces


Book Description

A letter dated December 21, 2011, to National Academy of Sciences President Dr. Ralph Cicerone from the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, U.S. Navy, requested that the National Research Council's (NRC's) Naval Studies Board (NSB) conduct a study to examine the issues surrounding capability surprise—both operationally and technically related—facing the U.S. naval services. Accordingly, in February 2012, the NRC, under the auspices of its NSB, established the Committee on Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces. The study's terms of reference, provided in Enclosure A of this interim report, were formulated by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in consultation with the NSB chair and director. The terms of reference charge the committee to produce two reports over a 15-month period. The present report is the first of these, an interim report issued, as requested, following the third full committee meeting. The terms of reference direct that the committee in its two reports do the following: (1) Select a few potential capability surprises across the continuum from disruptive technologies, to intelligence inferred capability developments, through operational deployments and assess what U.S. Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about these surprises while mindful of future budgetary declines; (2) Review and assess the adequacy of current U.S. Naval Forces' policies, strategies, and operational and technical approaches for addressing these and other surprises; and (3) Recommend any changes, including budgetary and organizational changes, as well as identify any barriers and/or leadership issues that must be addressed for responding to or anticipating such surprises including developing some of our own surprises to mitigate against unanticipated surprises. Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces: Initial Observations and Insights: Interim Report highlights issues brought to the committee's attention during its first three meetings and provides initial observations and insights in response to each of the three tasks above. It is very much an interim report that neither addresses in its entirety any one element of the terms of reference nor reaches final conclusions on any aspect of capability surprise for naval forces. The committee will continue its study during the coming months and expects to complete by early summer 2013 its final report, which will address all of the elements in the study's terms of reference and explore many potential issues of capability surprise for U.S. naval forces not covered in this interim report.




Responding to Capability Surprise


Book Description

From a military operational standpoint, surprise is an event or capability that could affect the outcome of a mission or campaign for which preparations are not in place. By definition, it is not possible to truly anticipate surprise. It is only possible to prevent it (in the sense of minimizing the number of possible surprises by appropriate planning), to create systems that are resilient to an adversary's unexpected actions, or to rapidly and effectively respond when surprised. Responding to Capability Surprise examines the issues surrounding capability surprise, both operational and technical, facing the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. This report selects a few surprises from across a continuum of surprises, from disruptive technologies, to intelligence-inferred capability developments, to operational deployments, and assesses what the Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about them while being mindful of future budgetary declines. The report then examines which processes are in place or could be in place in the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard to address such surprises. Today's U.S. naval forces continue to face a wide range of potential threats in the indefinite future and for this reason must continue to balance and meet their force structure needs. The recommendations of Responding to Capability Surprise will help to ensure more responsive, more resilient, and more adaptive behavior across the organization from the most senior leadership to the individual sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen.




Inflicting Surprise


Book Description

Great power competition has returned after a generation of absence, and the U.S. military edge over prospective opponents is eroding. Whereas the United States previously could overwhelm adversaries with sheer force, if necessary, it now needs every advantage it can get. This study analyzes how the United States might inflict surprise on its adversaries to gain a strategic advantage. Surprise is one aspect of a broader discussion in the national security literature on innovative operational concepts, which may serve as force multipliers to enable the United States to get more out of existing capabilities. A follow up to CSIS’s highly successful 2018 study Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts, this report highlights several components of a successful surprise, including exploiting adversary vulnerabilities, using intelligence and technology, employing secrecy and deception, and doing the unexpected. The report also contains over a dozen vignettes illustrating potential future surprises.




Cases in Intelligence Analysis


Book Description

In their Second Edition of Cases in Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action, accomplished instructors and intelligence practitioners Sarah Miller Beebe and Randolph H. Pherson offer robust, class-tested cases studies of events in foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, terrorism, homeland security, law enforcement, and decision-making support. Designed to give analysts-in-training an opportunity to apply structured analytic techniques and tackle real-life problems, each turnkey case delivers a captivating narrative, discussion questions, recommended readings, and a series of engaging analytic exercises.




Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence


Book Description

The National Institute for Public Policy’s new book, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence, is the first of its kind. Dr. Keith Payne, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and an unparalleled bipartisan group of senior civilian and military experts critically examine eight basic assumptions of Minimum Deterrence against available evidence. In general, Minimum Deterrence does not fare well under the careful scrutiny. Proponents of a "Minimum Deterrent" US nuclear force posture believe that anywhere from a handful to a few hundred nuclear weapons are adequate to deter reliably and predictably any enemy from attacking the United States now and in the future. Because nuclear weapons are so destructive, their thinking goes, no foreign leader would dare challenge US capabilities. The benefits, advocates claim, of reducing US nuclear weapons to the "minimum" level needed are: better relations with Russia and China, reinforcement of the arms control and Nonproliferation Treaty, billions of defense dollars in savings, and greater international stability on the way to "nuclear zero." As political pressure builds to pursue this vision of minimum US deterrence, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence stands as the seminal study to address the many claims of great benefit using available evidence. This book was published as a special issue of Comparative Strategy.