Book Description

The current defence programme is unaffordable. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has already reduced the deficit between the defence budget and planned expenditure by £15 billion, but a shortfall of between £6 billion and £36 billion remains. The financial crisis means a substantial increase in funding is unlikely, and closing the gap will require bold action as part of the Strategic Defence Review which is expected after the General Election. The MOD has reduced equipment numbers being bought on some projects and taken short-term decisions to slip other projects, but this approach will lead to long-term cost increases. In 2008-09, costs on the 15 major defence projects examined by the NAO increased by £1.2 billion, with two thirds (£733 million) directly due to the decision to slow projects. This approach does not address the fundamental affordability problems, increases through-life costs and represents poor value for money on the specific projects affected. There are signs of improvement in project cost control with innovative decisions being taken to ensure progress but unless the MOD addresses the underlying budgetary and governance issues it will not consistently deliver value for money nor will the operational benefits of expensive new capabilities be available to the Armed Forces in a timely manner or in the numbers originally planned. The current cost of 15 major military projects has risen by £3.6 billion, compared with the expected costs when the investment decisions were taken. The total slippage, averaged over the 14 major projects with in service dates, is over two years per project.