Rethinking Governance of the Army's Arsenals and Ammunition Plants


Book Description

With its large industrial base of ammunition plants and arsenals, the Army has more ordnance manufacturing capacity than it needs. This study proposes a strategic vision for this capacity and explores four options for managing it: privatization, creation of a federal government corporation, consolidation, and recapitalization on multifunction posts. It weighs the options from different perspectives, including feasibility, economic viability, and risk posed to national interests. ISBN: 0-8330-3322-0 Price: $30.00 Page count: 350




Rethinking Governance of the Army's Arsenals and Ammunition Plants


Book Description

The Department of the Army meets its materiel requirements principally through purchase from private sources. However, the Army produces certain ordnance-related items and performs some ordnance-related services in a set of arsenals, ammunition plants, other ammunition activities, and depots. The Army operates some of these facilities; contractors operate others. Although this set of facilities has been reduced since the end of the Cold War, the remaining facilities still operate at less than their full capacity today. The unused and underused capacity raises questions about how many of these facilities the Army needs, how large they need to be, and who should own and operate them. This report represents the third phase of a multiyear study that examines the Army's ordnance industrial base and makes recommendations about these issues.




Rethinking Governance of the Army's Arsenals and Ammunition Plants


Book Description

The Department of the Army meets its materiel requirements principally through purchase from private sources. However, the Army produces certain ordnance-related items and performs some ordnance-related services in a set of arsenals, ammunition plants, other ammunition activities, and depots. The Army operates some of these facilities; contractors operate others. Although this set of facilities has been reduced since the end of the Cold War, the remaining facilities still operate at less than their full capacity today. The unused and underused capacity raises questions about how many of these facilities the Army needs, how large they need to be, and who should own and operate them. This report represents the third phase of a multiyear study that examines the Army's ordnance industrial base and makes recommendations about these issues.




Managing the Army's Arsenals and Ammunition Plants


Book Description

The Army has a large industrial base that consists, in part, of 11 contractor-operated and 3 government-operated plants that make ammunition and 2 government-operated arsenals that make ordnance items such as gun tubes for artillery pieces and tanks. These facilities provide the Army more capacity than it needs or believes it will need, so a portion of this industrial base is underused or mothballed. Further, much of the equipment in these plants is old, obsolete, and expensive to operate. Finally, manufacturing is a commercial function that is peripheral to the Army's inherently governmental functions and one uncommon to Western armed forces and even governments. In fact, the Army already spends most of its ammunition dollars in completely commercial plants. The Army asked RAND Arroyo Center to assess options for managing these facilities. Drawing on data current in fiscal year 2001 (FY01), Arroyo Center researchers carried out that assessment and report their results in Rethinking Governance of the Army's Arsenals and Ammunition Plants.







Lessons from the North: Canada's Privatization of Military Ammunition Production


Book Description

The U.S. Army owns more than a dozen plants that today manufacture ammunition, ammunition components, and other ordnance materiel such as gun tubes and gun mounts. Some 70 completely private plants, at which the Army spends roughly two-thirds of its ammunition dollars, complement this government-owned base. In contrast, during the period 1965-86, Canada privatized all its government-owned munitions plants, achieving beneficial results. This report is a companion to Rethinking Governance of the Army's Arsenals and Ammunition Plants, a report published by the RAND Corporation's Arroyo Center (Hix et al., 2003b). That report recommends that the Army privatize most of its government-owned ammunition plants and divest of two of its arsenals. This case study addresses the applicability of Canada's experience should the United States decide to follow the Canadian example by privatizing its ammunition plants along the lines of RAND's earlier recommendations. Familiarity with the earlier report is essential to a thorough appreciation of the context in which this case study's findings and recommendations are made.




Options for Managing the Army's Arsenals and Ammunition Plants


Book Description

The Army has a large installation base, much of which has been shaped by demands that no longer exist. For example, much of today's installation structure was determined by the mobilizations the nation went through to fight two World Wars. In particular, the Army's existing arsenals and ammunition plants are operating at a fraction of their capacities. As a result, in the fall of 1999 the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Army to prepare a report on the right sizing of these facilities. At the request of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans for Force Development, RAND's Arroyo Center undertook this study on behalf of the Army. An earlier report delivered findings about the Watervliet and Rock Island arsenals. This report expands its focus to include all 16 arsenals and ammunition plants.




Army Ammunition


Book Description

The Army is responsible for procuring and producing certain types of ammunition for all the military services. The Army procures most of this ammunition from five government- owned, contractor-operated plants, which, according to the Army, reduces its role in the production process to one of management. The Army also retains a significant capacity for ammunition production that can withstand fluctuations in demand. This report addresses the Army’s relationships and challenges related to government-owned, contractor-operated ammunition plants, among other issues. GAO is making two recommendations to the Army, including that it revise the documents governing management of the procurement and production of ammunition at government-owned, contractor-operated plants to clarify roles and responsibilities.




Optimizing the Capacity and Operation of US Army Ammunition Production Facilities


Book Description

As the executive agent for ammunition, the Army manages the arsenals and plants that produce conventional ammunition for the Department of Defense. This industrial base must be able to manufacture a wide range of ammunition and ordnance items. In peacetime, the Army tests new rounds, makes training rounds, and manufactures rounds or components for war reserves, stockpile maintenance and upgrades. The Army must also manage and maintain capacity to replenish ammunition consumed by major theater wars without expanding the industrial base. The combined organic and inorganic industrial base can meet current requirements, but parts are becoming obsolete, and are expensive to operate To improve efficiency and reduce per-unit costs while maintaining strategic control of this key defense capability, the Army is seeking to reconfigure facilities, and stabilize production rates. The Army realizes that the industrial base structure has to change. This thesis provides a prototypic decision support model that captures the essence of their problem by optimizing transition actions while satisfying complicated long-term constraints on resources, management, and capacity. The model suggests yearly decisions for a planning horizon of a decade or more, and is demonstrated with 16 organic installations, structures located therein, and process centers housed in those structures.




MR


Book Description