Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry under US Antitrust and EU Competition Law


Book Description

Reverse payment settlements or “pay-for-delay agreements” between originators and generic drug manufacturers create heated debates regarding the balance between competition and intellectual property law. These settlements touch upon sensitive issues such as timely generic entry and access to affordable pharmaceuticals and also the need to preserve innovation incentives for originators and to strengthen the pipeline of life-saving pharmaceuticals. This book is one of the first to critically and comparatively analyse how such patent settlements and various other strategies employed by the pharmaceutical industry are scrutinised by both United States (US) and European courts and enforcement authorities, and to discuss the applicable legal tests and the main criteria used for their assessment. The book’s ultimate objective is to provide guidance to the pharmaceutical industry regarding the types of patent settlements, strategies and conduct which may be problematic from US antitrust and European Union (EU) competition law perspectives and to assist practitioners in structuring settlements which are both efficient and compliant. To this end, an exhaustive legal analysis of some of the most controversial issues regarding pharmaceutical patent settlements is provided, including: – the lengthy split among US Circuit Courts on the issue of pay-for-delay settlements, its resolution by the US Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavisand subsequent jurisprudence; – the decision of Lundbeck v. Commissionby the European General Court and the Servier decision of the European Commission; – the Roche/Novartisdecision of the European Court of Justice and the most important decisions by National Competition Authorities on pharma patent settlements in the EU; – an overview of other types of strategies such as product-hopping and product reformulations, no-authorised generic commitments, problematic side-deals, mechanisms affecting generic substitution; – the rejection of the “scope of the patent” test in both the US and the EU and the balancing of patent law and antitrust law considerations in the prevailing applicable tests; – the benefits of settlements and the main criteria for assessing their legitimacy under US antitrust and EU competition law. The analysis provides concrete examples of both illegitimate and legitimate settlements and strategies, emphasising on conduct that falls within a grey zone and on the circumstances and criteria under which such conduct could be deemed problematic from an antitrust perspective. This book will serve as a valuable guide for pharmaceutical companies wishing to minimise the risk of engaging in conduct that could potentially infringe US antitrust and EU competition law. It further aims to save courts and enforcement agencies and also practitioners and academics considerable time and resources by providing an exhaustive analysis of the relevant caselaw, with the ultimate goal to increase legal certainty on the most controversial aspects of patent settlements in the pharmaceutical industry.




Reverse Payment Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Sector Under EU and US Competition Laws


Book Description

Within the tool-box developed by originator companies in order to prepare and respond to generic entry, a prominent position must be recognized to a category of patent strategies particularly controversial under antitrust scrutiny, i.e. patent settlement agreements, in particular in the form of reverse payment patent settlements (also called pay-for-delay settlements), due to the fact that they provide for the patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather than the opposite, with the aim of delaying its market entry. It is a fact that reverse payment settlement agreements arise mainly in the pharmaceutical industry. The paper firstly analyzes US and EU regulatory frameworks in order to highlight similarities and differences between them. Then, it examines the relevant case law in both contexts with a view to conducting a comparative study. Finally, the paper discusses the approaches to reverse payment patent settlements adopted by antitrust authorities and courts and their clashes with IP law, and contains a final proposal for the assessment of these agreements.




Reverse Payment Patent Settlements in the European Union and the United States


Book Description

In recent years, reverse patent settlement agreements -- whereby a patent holder pays or gives other forms of value to an infringer in order to avoid or to settle patent litigation -- have raised considerable debate in the pharmaceutical field in both the United States and the European Union, with the antitrust authorities and courts reaching different conclusions as to their compatibility with competition rules. In the United States, the Supreme Court addressed this matter in the Actavis case, in which it determined that reverse patent settlements should be assessed under the “rule of reason.” In contrast, the European Commission in its Lundbeck decision considered that reverse patent settlements were per object restrictions of EU competition law and therefore the effects of such agreements did not need to be analyzed. This decision is, however, being appealed before the General Court of the EU. In its more recent Servier decision, the Commission has modified its approach as, while it declared that the reverse patent settlements in question were per object restrictions, it also demonstrated that these agreements had anticompetitive effects. Against this background, we contrast the approaches taken in the US and the EU with respect to reverse patent agreements, and assess which approach makes the most sense. We also address a number of important questions, which are being looked at by lower courts in the US and may also be relevant in the EU.




EU Law of Competition and Trade in the Pharmaceutical Sector


Book Description

This book provides a systematic analysis of the law and practice of EU competition and trade in the pharmaceutical sector. Authored by leading private practitioners, economists, scholars and high-level officials at competition regulators, this work provides valuable insider knowledge on the application of law and policies to the pharmaceutical industry. The work contains extensive commentary on the legislation and the latest case law and administrative precedents in this sector, at both EU and national level, including certain significant jurisdictions (e.g., the US, China). Coverage of various key developments includes the recent pay-for-delay antitrust investigations, the perennial issues around parallel trade, and an examination of mergers among pharmaceutical companies and medical devices manufacturers. In addition to the legal analysis, it offers vital economic and business perspectives to ensure that the reader has the full range of tools with which to prepare for cases and conduct transactions within the pharmaceutical industry.




Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector


Book Description

Editors --Contributors --Foreword --Preface --Pharmaceutical Patents and Competition Issues --What Is Going on in National Systems?




Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry


Book Description

Patent settlements between originator and generic firms in the pharmaceutical industry are a controversial topic, both in EU competition policy and U.S. antitrust law. The main concern is that patent settlements, which involve large payments from the originator to generic firms (reverse payments) and simultaneously restrict or delay market entry of generic firms, might have to be regarded as anti-competitive agreements that protect weak and perhaps unjustified patents from challenges. Therefore, certain types of patent settlements might harm consumers, both by defending unjustifiable patents and restricting competition by generic firms. In this article, we use the dispute in U.S. antitrust law between the U.S. antitrust authorities and various U.S. courts about how to deal with patent settlements with reverse payments as a starting point for an economic analysis of this problem. We particularly focus on two aspects: (1) Patent settlements have also to be seen as potentially endangering the already weak mechanisms within patent law for challenging and weeding out weak patents. (2) The incentives for originator and generic firms for negotiating patent settlements depend crucially on the entire institutional framework in pharmaceutical markets. Therefore, the competitive assessment of patent settlements requires the analysis of the interplay between patent law rules, the regulations for drug approval (FDA regulations in the U.S.), antitrust law rules, and, in the U.S., the Hatch-Waxman Act with its specific rules for the relation between originator and generic firms. Important conclusions are the need for a much deeper analysis of this interplay of different regulations, and the insight that the U.S. criteria for assessing patent settlements might not be directly transferable to the EU, due to different institutional frameworks for pharmaceutical markets.




Patent Settlements in Europe and the Lundbeck Case


Book Description

The paper studies the Lundbeck patent settlement antitrust case of the European Commission from an economic perspective. The Commission concludes that the agreements in Lundbeck involving reverse payments from the originator to generics have violated competition law. The paper shows that this decision is the correct one. More broadly the paper analyzes problem areas of patent settlement assessment in Europe. It assesses what we can learn from the U.S. patent settlement debate with particular focus on the differences in regulatory frameworks of the pharmaceutical sector which are relevant for patent settlement assessment. The recommendation is presented that, instead of taking into account the wide range of factors and effects which are important for the correct assessment of these agreements, we should rather aim at a more pragmatic approach. The paper suggests that a presumption of the illegality of reverse payments in patent settlements and a safe harbor rule for agreements without reverse payments can be a feasible approach.




Pay to Delay


Book Description




A Brief Introduction to Competition Concerns in 'Pay-for-Delay' Settlement Agreements Between Brand-Name and Generic Drug Companies


Book Description

Antitrust authorities in both the United States and Europe have expressed deep concern over settlements of antitrust cases in the pharmaceutical sector, settlements involving “reverse payments” from plaintiffs to defendants, large sums paid by branded pharmaceutical companies to generic competitors in exchange for promises to stay off the market. Such “pay-for-delay” settlements have proliferated in the United States since federal circuit courts of appeals have found them unproblematic despite the Federal Trade Commission's persistently strong position that they violate the antitrust laws. These cases arise at the intersection of three statutory regimes seeking to promote innovation, three clusters of doctrine and policy that have interacted only to reach impasse: the Patent Act, the 1984 amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and finally the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Antitrust is a late comer to the fierce competition over patented drugs, competition that permeates the approval process in the Food & Drug Administration [the FD , competition that is restrained by these pay-for-delay settlement agreements. To set the stage, we begin with the Patent Act and its relationship to the FDA approval process. The story of pay-for-delay settlements then proceeds to the settlement agreements and their antitrust implications. We conclude that the best solution in these antitrust cases would be adoption of the FTC's approach of presumptive illegality. Together with an amendment proposed to fix the food and drug act, the presumptive illegality of pay-for-delay settlements under the antitrust laws would make the market for pharmaceuticals more price competitive, open weak patents to serious challenge, and as a result save consumers billions of dollars annually without taking from branded drug companies legitimately earned incentives to engage in research and development.




A Fistful of Euros


Book Description

With the Commission's Decisions in Lundbeck, Johnson & Johnson and Servier, reverse payments in the pharmaceutical sector have recently come into EU Competition Policy's focus. On the other side of the Atlantic, instead, the decennial jurisprudential debate seems to have arrived at a turning point after the US Supreme Court judgement in Actavis. The US practice shows that antitrust assessment of such agreements can be problematic, as they lie at the intersection point between Competition and Patent Policies. Whilst the Commission has dealt with relatively “easy” cases until now, this article puts forward an interpretative solution for potential “hard” cases by drawing on the US experience. Such a solution has two main advantages. On the one hand, it would reconcile the two policy dimensions embedded in reverse payments. On the other hand, it would enable the Commission to enforce Competition Law taking into account the peculiarities of the European context.