Robust Mechanism Design


Book Description

Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.




Advances in Economics and Econometrics


Book Description

The first volume of edited papers from the Tenth World Congress of the Econometric Society 2010.




Limits to Competition


Book Description

How can Europe, the United States, and Japan stop the technological, trade, and financial war on which they have increasingly and wastefully embarked? How can they direct the development and uses of science and technology and the economy in the interests of the well-being of the 8 billion people who will inhabit the planet in 2010-2020? Limits to Competitionboldly frames international political economy and globalization debates within the new overarching ideology of competition and offers a balancing voice. The word compete originally meant "to seek together," but in our time it has taken on more adversarial connotations and has become a rallying cry of both firms and governments, often with devastating consequences. Limits to Competitionexplores the question of whether free-market competition can indeed deliver the full range of needs for sustainable development. Is competition the best instrument for coping with increasingly severe environmental, demographic, economic, and social problems at a global level?




Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science


Book Description

This encyclopedia provides an authoritative single source for understanding and applying the concepts of complexity theory together with the tools and measures for analyzing complex systems in all fields of science and engineering. It links fundamental concepts of mathematics and computational sciences to applications in the physical sciences, engineering, biomedicine, economics and the social sciences.




Signaling Games in Political Science


Book Description

First Published in 1991. This monograph surveys the current literature on game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics. Such work generalises earlier models by allowing relevant information to be asymmetrically held by agents, and subsequently studying the willingness and ability of these agents to transmit information through their actions. The monograph includes models of agenda control in legislatures and elections, veto threats and debate, electoral competition, regulation building, bargaining in the shadow of war and sophisticated voting. Within each topic the principal focus is on how the presence of asymmetric information enriches the strategic environment of the participants as well as how it rationalises certain types of political behavior and political institutions as equilibrium phenomena in an 'incomplete information' world.




Repeated Games with Incomplete Information


Book Description

The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.




Complex Social and Behavioral Systems


Book Description

This volume in the Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, Second Edition, combines the main features of Game Theory, covering most of the fundamental theoretical aspects under the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches, with the procedures of Agent-Based Modeling for studying complex systems composed of a large number of interacting entities with many degrees of freedom. In Game Theory, the cooperative approach focuses on the possible outcomes of the decision-makers’ interaction by abstracting from the "rational" actions or decisions that may lead to these outcomes. The non-cooperative approach focuses on the actions that the decision-makers can take. As John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern argued in their path-breaking book of 1944 entitled Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, most economic questions should be analyzed as games. The models of game theory are abstract representations of a number of real-life situations and have applications to economics, political science, computer science, evolutionary biology, social psychology, and law among others. Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) is a relatively new computational modeling paradigm which aims to construct the computational counterpart of a conceptual model of the system under study on the basis of discrete entities (i.e., the agent) with some properties and behavioral rules, and then to simulate them in a computer to mimic the real phenomena. Given the relative immaturity of this modeling paradigm, and the broad spectrum of disciplines in which it is applied, a clear cut and widely accepted definition of high level concepts of agents, environment, interactions and so on, is still lacking. This volume explores the state-of-the-art in the development of a real ABM ontology to address the epistemological issues related to this emerging paradigm for modeling complex systems.




Auctions


Book Description

Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.




The Cointegrated VAR Model


Book Description

This valuable text provides a comprehensive introduction to VAR modelling and how it can be applied. In particular, the author focuses on the properties of the Cointegrated VAR model and its implications for macroeconomic inference when data are non-stationary. The text provides a number of insights into the links between statistical econometric modelling and economic theory and gives a thorough treatment of identification of the long-run and short-run structure as well as of the common stochastic trends and the impulse response functions, providing in each case illustrations of applicability. This book presents the main ingredients of the Copenhagen School of Time-Series Econometrics in a transparent and coherent framework. The distinguishing feature of this school is that econometric theory and applications have been developed in close cooperation. The guiding principle is that good econometric work should take econometrics, institutions, and economics seriously. The author uses a single data set throughout most of the book to guide the reader through the econometric theory while also revealing the full implications for the underlying economic model. To test ensure full understanding the book concludes with the introduction of two new data sets to combine readers understanding of econometric theory and economic models, with economic reality.




Two-Sided Matching


Book Description

Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann