Author : José L. Zalabardo
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 228 pages
File Size : 41,7 MB
Release : 2012-07-26
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 019965607X
In this book the author assesses the main arguments against the possibility of knowledge, and defends a reliabilist theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition.
Author : Duncan Pritchard
Publisher :
Page : 137 pages
File Size : 20,60 MB
Release : 2019
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 0198829167
This book explores the nature of scepticism, asking when it is legitimate, for example as the driver of new ideas, and when it is problematic. It also tackles how scepticism is related to contemporary social and political phenomena, such as fake news, and examines a radical form of scepticism which maintains that knowledge is impossible.
Author : Dylan Dodd
Publisher :
Page : 385 pages
File Size : 42,49 MB
Release : 2014
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 019965834X
New essays on scepticism about the senses explore the problem of whether and how experience can provide knowledge or justification for belief about the objective world outside the experiencer's mind.
Author : Philip De Bary
Publisher : Psychology Press
Page : 224 pages
File Size : 26,27 MB
Release : 2002
Category : Skepticism
ISBN : 9780415263399
This book bears witness to the current reawakening of interest in Reid's philosophy. It first examines Reid's negative attack on the Way of Ideas, and finds him to be a devastating critic of his predecessors. Turning to the positive part of Reid's programme, the author then develops a fresh interpretation of Reid as an anticipator of present-day 'reliabilism'. Throughout the book, Reid is presented as a powerful thinker with much to say to philosophers in the twenty-first century. The book will be of interest not only to Reid scholars and historians of philosophy, but also to specialists and students in contemporary epistemology.
Author : Jennifer Nagel
Publisher : Oxford University Press, USA
Page : 153 pages
File Size : 10,83 MB
Release : 2014
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 019966126X
What is knowledge? Is it the same as opinion or truth? Do you need to be able to justify a claim in order to count as knowing it? How can we know that the outer world is real and not a dream? Questions like these have existed since ancient times, and the branch of philosophy dedicated to answering them - epistemology - has been active for thousands of years. In this thought-provoking Very Short Introduction, Jennifer Nagel considers the central problems and paradoxes in the theory of knowledge and draws attention to the ways in which philosophers and theorists have responded to them. By exploring the relationship between knowledge and truth, and considering the problem of scepticism, Nagel introduces a series of influential historical and contemporary theories of knowledge, incorporating methods from logic, linguistics, and psychology, using a number of everyday examples to demonstrate the key issues and debates. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.
Author : Donald C. Ainslie
Publisher : Oxford University Press, USA
Page : 301 pages
File Size : 40,61 MB
Release : 2015
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 0199593868
Provides a sustained interpretation of Part 4 of Book 1 of Hume's Treatise, arguing that Hume uses our reactions to the sceptical arguments as evidence in favor of his model of the mind.
Author : Barry Stroud
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 294 pages
File Size : 31,85 MB
Release : 1984-07-05
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 0198247613
He author argues that the sceptical thesis is motivated by a persistent philosophical problem that calls the very possibility of knowledge about the external world into question, and that the sceptical thesis is the only acceptable answer to this problem as traditionally posed.
Author : Penelope Maddy
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 265 pages
File Size : 50,89 MB
Release : 2017
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 0190618698
How do you know the world around you isn't just an elaborate dream, or the creation of an evil neuroscientist? If all you have to go on are various lights, sounds, smells, tastes and tickles, how can you know what the world is really like, or even whether there is a world beyond your own mind? Questions like these -- familiar from science fiction and dorm room debates -- lie at the core of venerable philosophical arguments for radical skepticism: the stark contention that we in fact know nothing at all about the world, that we have no more reason to believe any claim -- that there are trees, that we have hands -- than we have to disbelieve it. Like non-philosophers in their sober moments, philosophers, too, find this skeptical conclusion preposterous, but they're faced with those famous arguments: the Dream Argument, the Argument from Illusion, the Infinite Regress of Justification, the more recent Closure Argument. If these can't be met, they raise a serious challenge not just to philosophers, but to anyone responsible enough to expect her beliefs to square with her evidence. What Do Philosophers Do? takes up the skeptical arguments from this everyday point of view, and ultimately concludes that they don't undermine our ordinary beliefs or our ordinary ways of finding out about the world. In the process, Maddy examines and evaluates a range of philosophical methods -- common sense, scientific naturalism, ordinary language, conceptual analysis, therapeutic approaches -- as employed by such philosophers as Thomas Reid, G. E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and J. L. Austin. The result is a revealing portrait of what philosophers do, and perhaps a quiet suggestion for what they should do, for what they do best.
Author : Matthew A. Benton
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 356 pages
File Size : 27,51 MB
Release : 2018
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 0198798709
Recent decades have seen a fertile period of theorizing within mainstream epistemology which has had a dramatic impact on how epistemology is done. Investigations into contextualist and pragmatic dimensions of knowledge suggest radically new ways of meeting skeptical challenges and of understanding the relation between the epistemological and practical environment. New insights from social epistemology and formal epistemology about defeat, testimony, a priority, probability, and the nature of evidence all have a potentially revolutionary effect on how we understand our epistemological place in the world. Religion is the place where such rethinking can potentially have its deepest impact and importance. Yet there has been surprisingly little infiltration of these new ideas into philosophy of religion and the epistemology of religious belief. Knowledge, Belief, and God incorporates these myriad new developments in mainstream epistemology, and extends these developments to questions and arguments in religious epistemology. The investigations proposed in this volume offer substantial new life, breadth, and sophistication to issues in the philosophy of religion and analytic theology. They pose original questions and shed new light on long-standing issues in religious epistemology; and these developments will in turn generate contributions to epistemology itself, since religious belief provides a vital testing ground for recent epistemological ideas.
Author : Steven D. Hales
Publisher : MIT Press
Page : 227 pages
File Size : 20,71 MB
Release : 2009-08-21
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 0262263130
A defense of the view that philosophical propositions are true in some perspectives and false in others, arguing that the rationalist, intuition-driven method of acquiring basic beliefs favored by analytic philosophy is not epistemically superior to such alternate belief-acquiring methods as religious revelation and the ritual use of hallucinogens. The grand and sweeping claims of many relativists might seem to amount to the argument that everything is relative—except the thesis of relativism. In this book, Steven Hales defends relativism, but in a more circumscribed form that applies specifically to philosophical propositions. His claim is that philosophical propositions are relatively true—true in some perspectives and false in others. Hales defends this argument first by examining rational intuition as the method by which philosophers come to have the beliefs they do. Analytic rationalism, he claims, has a foundational reliance on rational intuition as a method of acquiring basic beliefs. He then argues that there are other methods that people use to gain beliefs about philosophical topics that are strikingly analogous to rational intuition and examines two of these: Christian revelation and the ritual use of hallucinogens. Hales argues that rational intuition is not epistemically superior to either of these alternative methods. There are only three possible outcomes: we have no philosophical knowledge (skepticism); there are no philosophical propositions (naturalism); or there are knowable philosophical propositions, but our knowledge of them is relative to doxastic perspective. Hales defends relativism against the charge that it is self-refuting and answers a variety of objections to this account of relativism. Finally, he examines the most sweeping objection to relativism: that philosophical propositions are not merely relatively true, because there are no philosophical propositions—all propositions are ultimately empirical, as the naturalists contend. Hales's somewhat disturbing conclusion—that intuition-driven philosophy does produce knowledge, but not absolute knowledge—is sure to inspire debate among philosophers.
