Book Description

Of the numerous economies considered to be "transitional," Russia--with a gross domestic product (GDP) about one-fifth that of China, but a per capita product twice that of China--has the second largest. Exactly where the Russian economy lies in the market-oriented gamut of transitioning economies, however, is not yet clear: between, say, Cuba, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam at one end, and some of the Balkan and central European states and China at the other end? Also unclear, and probably more important, is the pace of the Russian economy's transition and whether it is headed forward, toward market-oriented, decentralized resource allocation; backward, toward centralized, state-controlled allocation; or is, instead, oscillating between these two. These issues are controversial and vigorously debated within Russia. Our study focused on four questions whose answers shed light on some of the ambiguities surrounding Russia's status as a transitional economy: 1. How much of Russia's relatively strong, yet varying, economic growth is attributable to oil and natural gas prices, production, and exports? 2. To what extent have other institutional and structural changes such as the growth of private enterprise and marketization affected Russia's economic growth and its prospects? 3. What have been the scope and composition of Russia's economic transactions with several of its trading partners, specifically the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan), the "proliferation-risk" countries (Iran and North Korea), and China? 4. How has the economy's transition affected Russia's defense spending, defense industry, and arms export?