Social Norms and Household Time Allocation


Book Description

Economic theories of the household predict that increases in female relative human capital lead to decreases in female housework time. However, longitudinal and crosssectional evidence seems to contradict this implication. Women's share of home time fails to decrease despite increases in women's relative earnings. The literature has proposed social norms on the household division of labor as an alternative explanation. We use the 2002 03 Spanish Time Use Survey (STUS) to explore the presence of social norms associated to the household division of housework and childcare. First, we observe that wives that earn more than their husbands still undertake more than 50% of housework and childcare. Second, we find that a woman's relative share of housework decreases as her relative earnings increase, but only up to the point when she earns the same as her husband. Finally, independently of the definition of childcare, the relative time devoted to childcare does not vary with spouses' relative earnings. All these findings suggest that social norms might be an important factor in the division of household time.







Bargaining over Time Allocation


Book Description

In this book, time use behavior within households is modeled as the outcome of a bargaining process between family members who bargain over household resource allocation and the intrafamily distribution of welfare. In view of trends such as rising female employment along with falling fertility rates and increasing divorce rates, a strategic aspect of female employment is analyzed in a dynamic family bargaining framework. The division of housework between spouses and the observed leisure differential between women and men are investigated within non-cooperative bargaining settings. The models developed are tested empirically using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and the German Time Budget Survey.




Social Norms and the Time Allocation of Women's Labor in Burkina Faso


Book Description

This paper proposes that major determinants of allocation of women's time are social norms that regulate the economic activities of women. The emphasis on norms contrasts with approaches that view time allocation as determined by household-level economic variables. Using data from Burkina Faso, it is shown that social norms significantly explain differences in patterns of time allocation between two ethnic groups: Mossi and Bwa. Econometric results show women from the two groups exhibiting different responses to changes in farm capital. Implications are that policies changing social norms may have more permanent effects on altering women's behavior.







Balancing Work and Family in a Changing Society


Book Description

Both research and policy on balancing work and family life have tended to focus on mothers' lives. There has been a general lack of comparative research to the complex intersection between old and new forms of masculinity; and between fatherhood, work-life balance, gender relations and children's well-being. As a result, men's fathering roles and their struggle with work-life balance have often been neglected. These cultural challenges should be better theorized within family and social policy research. This volume examines how fathers fulfill their roles both within the family and at work and what institutional support could be of most benefit to them in combining these roles.




Intra-household Resource Allocation


Book Description

United Nations sales no. E.90.III.A.2




Gender and the Allocation of Adult Time


Book Description

Analysis of time use data for Peru in 1994 and 1997 shows that women work up to a fifth more than men do and that women in poor households work more than those in rich ones, while there is no difference for men.




Economics of the Family


Book Description

This book provides a comprehensive, modern, and self-contained account of the research in the growing area of family economics. It is intended for graduate students in economics and for researchers in other fields interested in the economic approach to the family.




Intrafamily Bargaining and Household Decisions


Book Description

A model of household decisions based on a bargaining approach is developed providing a comprehensive framework for the analysis of family behavior. Treating the family as an economic organization, household behavior is explained by the cooperation of utility maximizing individuals. The difference to traditional microeconomic household models is that theassumption of a joint household utility function is abandoned. Instead of this, a game theoretic approach is used to model family decisions as a result of intrafamily bargaining. Considering the development of the spouses` human capital in a dynamic approach, the long-term effects of intrafamily specialization in market work and work at home are analyzed. Onemajor finding is that in a dynamic setting non-Pareto efficient allocations may result. Empirical tests demonstrate the relevanace of the bargaining approach.