Statebuilding and Counterinsurgency in Oman


Book Description

In the depths of the Cold War and in the wake of Britain's announcement of its intention to withdraw 'East of Suez' by the end of 1971, Britain was faced with the stark reality of a Marxist rebellion in the Dhofar province of Oman. This rebellion, whose explicit aim was to 'liberate' the oil-rich Gulf region, confronted the British with the challenge of securing a political order in Oman conducive to protecting Britain's remaining interests in the midst of its military withdrawal from the region. 'State Building and Counter Insurgency in Oman' offers a nuanced picture of Britain's response to the challenges posed by this withdrawal, through an examination the complex Anglo-Omani relationship at this vital juncture in Middle East and Imperial History. James Worrall offers an examination of how officials in London and the Gulf defined British interests in Oman, and the debates that raged throughout Whitehall, under the successive governments led by Wilson and Heath, about how to best tackle the growing insurgency in Oman. The means by which this challenge was to be met (including the extent of both overt and covert support for the Sultan) in the post-Suez era, posed a number of challenges for decision-makers in Whitehall. The military, economic and diplomatic assistance given to the Omani government to re-establish Sultanate control and crush the rebellion in Dhofar is thus analysed within the context of a complex balancing act, as British politicians and officials tried to reconcile their attempts to create effective and centralised Omani administration and security bodies whilst maintaining the image of strategic withdrawal and the sovereign independence of Oman. Drawing extensively from newly released archival records and interviews with former officials and high-ranking officers, this book provides a systematic re-examination of the Anglo-Omani relationship during the critical years of Oman's transformation into a modern state. It will therefore provide vital information and analysis for students and researchers of Middle East History and Politics, the decline and end of empire and the policymaking processes at the heart of an imperial and military withdrawal.




Statebuilding and Counterinsurgency in Oman


Book Description

Introduction -- 1. Between the Pax Britannica and the World -- 2. Events and Policy Surrounding Britain's Increasing Involvement in Oman -- 3. The Conservative Ascendancy: Getting the Troops In -- 4. Britain and Oman's Internal//External Legitimacy Dilemma -- 5. The Search for International Recognition: Britain's Role in Securing Legitimacy -- 6. British Policy, Whitehall Debates and External Aid, 1972-74 -- 7. Continuity and Change: The Labour Government and Defence Reviews -- Conclusion: Themes and Implications.




A History of Counterinsurgency


Book Description

This two-volume history of counterinsurgency covers all the major and many of the lesser known examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict, addressing the various measures employed in the attempt to overcome the insurgency and examining the individuals and organizations responsible for everything from counterterrorism to infrastructure building. How and when should counterinsurgency be pursued as insurgency is growing in frequency and, conversely, while conventional warfare continues to decline as a means by which political rivals seek to impose their will upon each other? What lessons from the past should today's policymakers, strategists, military leaders, and soldiers in the field keep in mind while facing off against 21st-century insurgents? This two-volume set offers a comprehensive history of modern counterinsurgency, covering the key examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict. It identifies the political, military, social, and economic measures employed in attempting to overcome insurgency, examining the work of the individuals and organizations involved, demonstrating how success and failure dictated change from established policy, and carefully analyzing the results. Readers will gain valuable insight from the detailed assessments of the history of counterinsurgency that demonstrate which strategies have succeeded and which have failed—and why. After an introductory essay on the subject, each chapter provides historical background to the insurgency being addressed before focusing on the specific policies pursued and actions taken by the counterinsurgency force. Each section also provides an assessment of those operations, including in most cases an analysis of lessons learned and, where appropriate, their relevance to counterinsurgency operations today. The set's coverage spans modern counterinsurgencies from Europe to Asia to Africa since 1900 and includes the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan today. Its wide, international approach to the subject makes the set a prime resource for readers seeking specific information on a particular conflict or a better understanding of the general theories and practices of counterinsurgency.




Bullets Not Ballots


Book Description

In Bullets Not Ballots, Jacqueline L. Hazelton challenges the claim that winning "hearts and minds" is critical to successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Good governance, this conventional wisdom holds, gains the besieged government popular support, denies support to the insurgency, and makes military victory possible. Hazelton argues that major counterinsurgent successes since World War II have resulted not through democratic reforms but rather through the use of military force against civilians and the co-optation of rival elites. Hazelton offers new analyses of five historical cases frequently held up as examples of the effectiveness of good governance in ending rebellions—the Malayan Emergency, the Greek Civil War, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the Dhofar rebellion in Oman, and the Salvadoran Civil War—to show that, although unpalatable, it was really brutal repression and bribery that brought each conflict to an end. By showing how compellence works in intrastate conflicts, Bullets Not Ballots makes clear that whether or not the international community decides these human, moral, and material costs are acceptable, responsible policymaking requires recognizing the actual components of counterinsurgent success—and the limited influence that external powers have over the tactics of counterinsurgent elites.




The New Counter-insurgency Era in Critical Perspective


Book Description

The notion of counter-insurgency has become a dominant paradigm in American and British thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This volume brings together international academics and practitioners to evaluate the broader theoretical and historical factors that underpin COIN, providing a critical reappraisal of counter-insurgency thinking.




Oman's Transformation after 1970


Book Description

Oman's 1970 coup launched a new political and economic structure that was created by and for Sultan Qaboos. The initially haphazard construction matured into a durable structure that continues under Sultan Haitham. This work details the early construction of the Qabusid state in the 1970s-1980s, emphasizing the interplay between personalities and the process of institutionalization. The narrative continues to the present demonstrating the resilience of the Qaboosid system.




Allies at the End of Empire


Book Description

The wars of decolonization fought by European colonial powers after 1945 had their origins in the fraught history of imperial domination, but were framed and shaped by the emerging politics of the Cold War. In all the counter-insurgencies mounted against armed nationalist risings in this period, the European colonial powers employed locally recruited militias – styled as ‘loyalists’ – to fight their ‘dirty wars’. These loyalist histories have been neglected in the nationalist narratives that have dominated the post-decolonization landscape, and this book offers the first comparative assessment of the role played by these allies at the end of empire. Their experience illuminates the deeper ambiguities of the decolonization story: some loyalists were subjected to vengeful violence at liberation; others actually claimed the victory for themselves and seized control of the emergent state; while others still maintained a role as fighting units into the Cold War. The overlap between the history of decolonization and the emergence of the Cold War is a central theme in the studies presented here. The collection discusses the categorization of these ‘irregular auxiliary’ forces after 1945, and presents seven case studies from five European colonialisms, covering nine former colonies – Portugal (Angola), the Netherlands (Indonesia), France (Algeria), Belgium (Congo) and Britain (Cyprus, Kenya, Aden, South Yemen and Oman). This book was originally published as a special issue of the International History Review.




Community and Autonomy in Southern Oman


Book Description

This book explores how there is latitude for people to make their own choices and how the chances to assert independence change over time in a Muslim, Arab, tribal culture. The book first gives a brief overview of day-to-day life in the Dhofar region of southern Oman, then focuses on how the traits of self-control and self-respect are linked in the everyday actions of several groups of tribes who speak Gibali (Jibbali, also known as Shari/Śḥeret), a non-written, Modern South Arabian language. Although no work can express the totality of a culture, this text describes how Gibalis are constantly shifting between preserving autonomy and signaling membership in family, tribal, and national communities. The work reflects observations and conclusions from over ten years of research into the history and culture of the Dhofar region along with longstanding, deep involvement with both men and women in the Gibali community.




Statebuilding and Counterinsurgency in Oman


Book Description

In the depths of the Cold War and in the wake of Britain's announcement of its intention to withdraw 'East of Suez' by the end of 1971, Britain was faced with the stark reality of a Marxist rebellion in the Dhofar province of Oman. 'State Building and Counter Insurgency in Oman' offers an exploration of the attempts by officials and politicians in Whitehall and the Gulf to reconcile attempts to protect national interests and create an effective, centralised Omani administration and security bodies, whilst maintaining the image of strategic withdrawal and the sovereign independence of Oman. This book thus provides vital information and analysis for students and researchers of Middle East History and Politics, the decline and end of empire and the policymaking processes at the heart of an imperial and military withdrawal.




Counterinsurgency in Crisis


Book Description

Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.