Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security


Book Description

In July 2005, the National Academies released the report Strengthening Long-term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia. The report highlighted several obstacles in the transition from a U.S.-Russian cooperative program to a Russian-directed and Russian-funded fully indigenized program that will ensure the security of 600 tons of weapon-usable nuclear material at a level of international acceptability. Overcoming these obstacles requires an increased political commitment at a number of levels of the Russian Government to modern material protection, control, and accounting systems (MPC&A). Adequate resources must be provided to facilities where weapon-usable material is located for upgrading and maintaining MPC&A systems. Additionally, the technical security systems that are being installed through the cooperative program need to be fully embraced by Russian managers and specialists. The report recommends the establishment of a ten-year indigenization fund of about $500 million provided by Russia and its G-8 partners as a new mechanism for gradually shifting the financial burden of MPC&A to the Russian Government.




Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description

Safeguarding nuclear warheads & materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons is a primary nat. security concern of the U.S. Since 1993, the DoE & DoD have worked to improve security at sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material & warheads in Russia & other countries. In 1995, DoE established the Materials Protection, Control, & Accounting program to implement these efforts. The author examined the: (1) progress DoE has made in improving security at nuclear-material sites in Russia & other countries; (2) progress DoE & DoD have made in improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites; & (3) efforts DoE & DoD have undertaken to ensure the continued effective use of U.S.-funded security upgrades. Illustrations.




Report 1 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise


Book Description

A congressionally mandated study carried out in 2013-2014 led to the November 2014 report A New Foundation for the Nuclear Enterprise. That report summarizes the panel's findings on the current health of the enterprise, examines the root causes of its governance challenges, and offers the panel's recommendations to address the identified problems. It concludes that the existing governance structures and many of the practices of the enterprise are inefficient and ineffective, thereby putting the entire enterprise at risk over the long term. It offers recommendations to put the entire nuclear security enterprise on a stronger footing. Recognizing the persistence of governance and management concerns, this report serves as an initial assessment of the implementation plan developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department Of Energy for addressing the recommendations from A New Foundation for the Nuclear Enterprise. There will be seven semi-annual interim reports to evaluate progress in implementing the plan. A final report will be issued at the end of the study to document the overall progress in executing the implementation plan, assess the effectiveness of the reform efforts under that plan, and recommend whether further action is needed.







Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description

IAEA plays a crucial role in supporting U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals through its safeguards and nuclear security programs. The Department of State coordinates the United States' financial and policy relationship with IAEA. IAEA's safeguards program is designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, while the agency's nuclear security program assists countries in improving the physical protection of their nuclear material and facilities. IAEA plans to create an international fuel bank to guarantee the supply of fuel for civilian nuclear power programs. GAO was asked to examine (1) any challenges that IAEA faces in carrying out its safeguards program, (2) any limitations regarding the nuclear security program, and (3) the status of IAEA's planned nuclear fuel bank. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from IAEA and U.S. federal agencies, 15 nuclear nonproliferation experts, and representatives from 16 countries. GAO recommends, among other things, that State work with IAEA to (1) clearly define and communicate how IAEA will implement the state-level concept, (2) evaluate the nuclear security program's long-term resource needs, and (3) prepare a plan for the long-term operation and funding of IAEA's fuel bank. State agreed with several of the recommendations and disagreed with two, including the one on the nuclear security program's long-term resource needs. GAO continues to believe that implementing all of these recommendations would enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of IAEA's programs.




Strategic Vision


Book Description




The Nuclear Security Summit


Book Description

This report finds that multilateral initiatives from the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit are improving targeted areas of nuclear security, but more ambitious initiatives are needed to address the lack of transparency and regime cohesion in the global nuclear security system. Countries must begin to put short-term projects like those described in these joint statements into the broader context of a long-term effort to improve the nuclear security system. The joint statement model should be carried forward into the 2014 and 2016 summits, but future joint statements should have at least one clear deliverable and incorporate time for follow-up by participants and reporting to the international community. Broad international cooperation is still needed in a number of areas to address significant remaining global nuclear security challenges. While these joint statements helped clarify states' goals and focus efforts to improve nuclear security, limited multilateral actions will not contribute to the overall strengthening of the global nuclear security system. Looking forward to the 2016 summit, NSS participants should push for a more cohesive, transparent, and effective nuclear security regime that includes more standardized reporting mechanisms and review measures to earn the confidence of the global community.




Improving the Characterization and Treatment of Radioactive Wastes for the Department of Energy's Accelerated Site Cleanup Program


Book Description

The Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management (EM) directs the massive cleanup of more than 100 sites that were involved in the production of nuclear weapons materials during the Manhattan Project and the Cold War. This report offers suggestions for more effectively characterizing and treating the orphan and special-case wastes that are part of EM's accelerated cleanup program. It identifies technical opportunities for EM to improve the program that will save time and money without compromising health and safety. The opportunities identified include: making more effective use of existing facilities and capabilities for waste characterization, treatment, or disposal; eliminating self-imposed requirements that have no clear technical or safety basis; and investing in new technologies to improve existing treatment and characterization capabilities. For example, the report suggests that EM work with DOE classification officers to declassify, to the extent possible, classified materials declared as wastes. The report also suggests a new approach for treating the wastes that EM will leave in place after cleanup.




Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description

Safeguarding nuclear warheads and materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the United States. Since 1993, the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD) have worked to improve security at sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other countries. In 1995, DOE established the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program to implement these efforts. GAO examined the (1) progress DOE has made in improving security at nuclear material sites in Russia and other countries, (2) progress DOE and DOD have made in improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites, and (3) efforts DOE and DOD have undertaken to ensure the continued effective use of U.S.-funded security upgrades. To address these objectives, among other things, GAO analyzed agency documents, conducted interviews with key program officials, and visited four Russian nuclear sites.




Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety of U.S. Nuclear Plants


Book Description

The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan. They were responsible for more than 15,900 deaths and 2,600 missing persons as well as physical infrastructure damages exceeding $200 billion. The earthquake and tsunami also initiated a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Three of the six reactors at the plant sustained severe core damage and released hydrogen and radioactive materials. Explosion of the released hydrogen damaged three reactor buildings and impeded onsite emergency response efforts. The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. "Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants" is a study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This report examines the causes of the crisis, the performance of safety systems at the plant, and the responses of its operators following the earthquake and tsunami. The report then considers the lessons that can be learned and their implications for U.S. safety and storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, commercial nuclear reactor safety and security regulations, and design improvements. "Lessons Learned" makes recommendations to improve plant systems, resources, and operator training to enable effective ad hoc responses to severe accidents. This report's recommendations to incorporate modern risk concepts into safety regulations and improve the nuclear safety culture will help the industry prepare for events that could challenge the design of plant structures and lead to a loss of critical safety functions. In providing a broad-scope, high-level examination of the accident, "Lessons Learned" is meant to complement earlier evaluations by industry and regulators. This in-depth review will be an essential resource for the nuclear power industry, policy makers, and anyone interested in the state of U.S. preparedness and response in the face of crisis situations.