Book Description
"The book examines the conceptual difficulties that are raised by the belief that all, or some, persons survive death. Two versions of the belief are considered: the belief in disembodied personal survival, and the belief in bodily resurrection. In each case, two questions are raised: Can we give intelligible content to supposed accounts of the form of life such a survivor might lead? Can we give intelligible content to the claim that such a being is identical with one of ourselves? The author argues that it is only with regard to the second question that interactable difficulties of logic arise, but he suggests that these difficulties defeat the belief in disembodied survival altogether, thus leaving the belief in bodily resurrection with a very puzzling status. In the course of the argument the themes of disembodied perception, spirit agency, and reincarnation are discussed, and recent philosophical discussions of some of the puzzles of personal identity are considered."--front flap.