Book Description

Since the end of the year-long 1984-85 Miners' Strike over a quarter of a century ago, the stance of the Nottinghamshire miners still causes intense debate. Because of the apparent parallels with 'Spencerism' and 1926 the question has often been asked, was the soul of strike breaking solely to be found in the Nottinghamshire coalfield? However, was the answer to the Nottinghamshire miners actions in 1984-85 to be found in events a lot nearer than 1926? What effect did the reaction to the events under the Labour Governments in the 1960's and 1970's make on the Nottinghamshire miners and influence their actions in the early 1980's? Was the 1984-85 crisis in the NUM simply a case of disagreement over internal procedural practices? This study shows the complexity of collective identity in the NUM. It is an interpretation of the Nottinghamshire tradition within the NUM and not their apartness from it. The Nottinghamshire miners were central to the controversy in the 1984-85 miners' strike: without a fully researched account of their role with reasons put forward for their actions, the whole debate cannot be properly contested. To that end this thesis will hopefully enhance that debate. Previously un-accessed evidence and first-hand knowledge from the strike in the Nottinghamshire coalfield are used to contribute to the understanding of a defining moment in British coalmining and labour history. Historically, Nottinghamshire's policies and traditions were those of the moderate right in the NUM, while studies on NUM politics have tended to look at views with a left- wing bias. A satisfactory understanding of the 1984-85 strike and the role of the Nottinghamshire miners is required in order to get a more balanced account which accumulated in the a split in the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) ranks and the formation of the Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM). The first part of the study looks at the main events from the five years that preceded the 1984-85 strike, however the main emphasis is on the events of the year long strike in the Nottinghamshire coalfield (8 March 1984 to 3 March 1985) and the subsequent post-strike constitutional crisis that led to the formation of the Union of Democratic Mineworkers in the autumn of 1985. The second part of the thesis looks in depth at the key areas of debate surrounding the 1984-85 miners' strike, namely the ballot issue and the Rule 41 Domino Strategy. Various theories are put forward as to why the failure to hold a national ballot was a fatal tactical error and why the subsequent Rule 41 'domino theory' failed so miserably in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. Events in the Nottinghamshire coalfield in 1984-85 centred on what the majority of Nottinghamshire miners considered as a misapplication of trade union democracy. The initial controversy surrounded the decision to run the strike without recourse to a national ballot under NUM Rule 43. Instead an area by area domino strategy under NUM Rule 41 was tried, with disastrous results. The theory behind the domino strategy was that traditional left-wing Areas of the NUM would start a rolling type of industrial action with other areas falling into line i.e. that is, like a row of dominos put on their end in a line, when one falls the rest should follow suite and fall. The strategy relied on the use of cohesion, the sole strategy being based on confrontational picketing and the sanctity of the picket line. It was here that the roots of the failure of the strike lay and from this the initial split occurred in the NUM ranks from which it proved impossible to recover. The eventual outcome, played out through a series of episodes throughout 1984 and 1985 was the formation of the 'breakaway' Union of Democratic Mineworkers. The thesis will show that the Nottinghamshire miners' reaction when the strike broke in March 1984 was a defence pact guarding traditional methods of dealing with internal union politics against what they saw as unconstitutional procedures. Historically their reaction in March 1984 was similar to that of the unofficial strikes in 1969 and 1970 which launched the rise of the left in the NUM during the 1970's. It will also argue that far from being the blacklegs of 'Spencerite mythology', the Nottinghamshire miners adhered to time honoured regional autonomy in 1984-85 in line with moderate traditions within the NUM. Despite reservations, in the past Nottinghamshire miners had shown unity in the NUM with the adoption of the National Power Loading Agreement (NPLA) in 1966, their participation in the national strikes of 1972 and 1974 and by adhering to the overtime ban throughout the duration of the 1984-85 dispute, from the start of the overtime ban in the autumn of 1983 to the end of the strike in early March 1985. The actions of the NUM NEC and the left of the NUM were instrumental to the outcome of the 1984-85 strike. In the absence of a national ballot the outcome was that confusion reigned and a strike that got off to a bad start went from one crisis to another, eventually resulting in a permanent split in union ranks. A key question, is did the left of the NUM, who essentially had control of the NEC, know there was a possibility of this mayhem happening from the start and in the event of it happening needed a convenient scapegoat for the failure of the strike? Here the Nottinghamshire miners fitted the bill nicely, they were the weak link in the national chain of solidarity and were stained for time immortal because of the events of 1926 and their links with 'Spencerism'. Additionally various myths about the Nottinghamshire coalfield's apparent immunity from the effects of rationalisation and the effects of 'perfect geology' have been hatched to enhance reasons why the majority of Nottinghamshire miners failed to support the 1984-85 strike. This thesis will supply evidence to show these theories are myths and will show that the Nottinghamshire miners' acted within their normal traditions and understood union procedures. Essentially 1984-85 was a challenge to the Nottinghamshire miners' deep routed tradition. The NUM's obstinate stance and failed strike strategy were key factors in causing the split in the union and the strike being lost. It speeded up the process of decline. The eventual outcome was a tragedy not only for the NUM but for the deep coalmining industry in Britain generally. It was as the title of Adeney and Lloyd's book suggested 'Loss without Limit'. 1 At the start of the 1984-85 strike just over 170 collieries existed, by the end of 2011 just 5 collieries remain in production as the end of a significant chapter of British labour history nears its end.