The Air Campaign


Book Description

"The Air Force staff quickly came up with an air campaign, the brainchild of Colonel John Warden, a brilliant, brash fighter pilot and a leading Air Force intellectual on the use of airpower... Warden's original plan would undergo numerous modifications…but his original concept remained the heart of the Desert Storm air war." Colin Powell Colin Powell, My American Journey Since its original publication The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat has been translated into more than a half dozen languages and is in use at military colleges throughout the world. This book would later serve as the basis for the planning of much of the Gulf War air campaign. Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell credited Col. Warden with creating the air campaign that defeated Iraq in the Gulf War. This new edition includes a new epilogue where Col. Warden has refined and extended many of the ideas presented in the original book. The most significant of these refinements is the development of the theory of the enemy as a system-which flows from the center of gravity concepts developed in the first edition.




The Air Campaign


Book Description

One of the first analyses of the pure art of planning the aerial dimensions of war. Explores the complicated connection between air superiority and victory in war. Focuses on the use of air forces at the operational level in a theater of war. Presents fascinating historical examples, stressing that the mastery of operational-level strategy can be the key to winning future wars. 20 photos. Bibliography.




The Air Campaign


Book Description

The Air Force staff quickly came up with an air campaign, the brainchild of Colonel John Warden, a brilliant, brash fighter pilot and a leading Air Force intellectual on the use of airpower... Warden's original plan would undergo numerous modifications…but his original concept remained the heart of the Desert Storm air war. Colin PowellColin Powell, My American JourneySince its original publication The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat has been translated into more than a half dozen languages and is in use at military colleges throughout the world. This book would later serve as the basis for the planning of much of the Gulf War air campaign. Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell credited Col. Warden with creating the air campaign that defeated Iraq in the Gulf War. This new edition includes a new epilogue where Col. Warden has refined and extended many of the ideas presented in the original book. The most significant of these refinements is the development of the theory of the enemy as a system-which flows from the center of gravity concepts developed in the first edition.




The Air Campaign: Planning For Combat


Book Description

In the short history of air warfare, no nation with superior air forces has ever lost a war to the force of enemy arms. Air superiority by itself, however, no longer guarantees victory. This book, one of the first analyses of the pure art of planning the aerial dimension of war, explores the complicated connection between air superiority and victory in war. In The Air Campaign, Colonel John A. Warden III focuses on the use of air forces at the operational level in a theater of war. The most compelling task for the theater commander, he argues, is translating national war objectives into tactical plans at operational levels. He presents his case by drawing on fascinating historical examples, stressing that the mastery of operational-level strategy can be the key to winning future wars. Colonel Warden shows us how to use air power more effectively-through rough mass, concentration, and economy of forces-because, he warns, the United States no longer holds an edge in manpower, production capacity, and technology. Simply put, an air force inferior in numbers must fight better and smarter to win. This book offers planners greater understanding of how to use air power for future air campaigns against a wide variety of enemy capabilities in a wide variety of air operations. As the reader will see, the classic principles of war also apply to air combat. One of the author's important contributions is to demonstrate that perception to those whose grave responsibility one day may be to plan and carry through a victorious air campaign.




Air Campaign


Book Description

In "The Air Campaign," Colonel John A. Warden III focuses on the use of air forces at the operational level in a theater of war. The most compelling task for the theater commander, he argues, is translating national war objectives into tactical plans at operational levels. He presents his case by drawing on fascinating historical examples, stressing that the mastery of operational-level strategy can be the key to winning future wars. Colonel Warden shows us how to use air power more effectively -- through mass, concentration, and economy of forces -- because, he warns, the United States no longer holds an edge in manpower, production capacity, and technology. Simply put, an air force inferior in numbers must fight better and smarter to win. This book offers planners greater understanding of how to use air power for future air campaigns against a wide variety of enemy capabilities in a wide variety of air operations. As the reader will see, the classic principles of war also apply to air combat. One of the author's important contributions is to demonstrate that perception to those whose grave responsibility one day may be to plan and carry through a victorious air campaign.




Airpower Advantage


Book Description

American air power is a dominant force in today's world. Its ascendancy, evolving in the half century since the end of World War II, became evident during the first Gulf War. Although a great deal has been written about military operations in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this deeply researched volume by Dr. Diane Putney probes the little-known story of how the Gulf War air campaign plan came to fruition. Based on archival documentation and interviews with USAF planners, this work takes the reader into the planning cells where the difficult work of building an air campaign plan was accomplished on an around-the-clock basis. The tension among air planners is palpable as Dr. Putney traces the incremental progress and friction along the way. The author places the complexities of the planning process within the con- text of coalition objectives. All the major players are here: President George H. W. Bush, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, General Colin Powell, General Chuck Horner, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. The air planning process generated much debate and friction, but resulted in great success - a 43-day conflict with minimum casualties. Dr. Putney's rendering of this behind-the-scenes evolution of the planning process, in its complexity and even suspense, provides a fascinating window into how wars are planned and fought today and what might be the implications for the future.




John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power


Book Description

Dr. John Andreas Olsen has written an insightful, compelling biography of retired U.S. Air Force colonel John A. Warden III, the brilliant but controversial air warfare theorist and architect of Operation Desert Storm s air campaign. Warden s radical ideas about air power s purposes and applications, promulgated at the expense of his own career, sparked the ongoing revolution in military affairs. Legendary in defense circles, Warden is also the author of "The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat" (republished by Brassey s, Inc. in 1989). Presenting both the positives and negatives of Warden s personality and impact in this objective portrait, Olsen offers a trenchant analysis of his revolutionary ideas and great accomplishments. "




Command Of The Air


Book Description

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.




NATO's Air War for Kosovo


Book Description

This book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.