Book Description

Although Turkey is lost in the shuffle in global academic discussions evoking the concept of soft power, it occupies centre stage in soft power debates in the context of Southeastern Europe and beyond, among Turkey originated and regional experts. Since the beginning of the second decade of the new millennium, a divergence of ideas and even facts regarding Turkey's soft power position in Southeast Europe have been occupying both academic and topical discussions. Taking all the various approaches into account, it might fairly be argued that Turkey is not a purely effective and unarguable soft power in Southeast Europe, according to Nye's coining of the term. Yet, considering the transnational state apparatuses, such as the Diyanet, Yunus Emre Institutes and others, that the country runs and the image that it carries among the Muslim populations of the region, it may also be fairly claimed that Turkey displays strong elements of soft power. Therefore, I argue that while Turkey has many soft power tools and much soft power potential, it has also many weak points within its current circumstances. Challenging the previous discussions on whether Turkey is a soft power or there is a discursive level of transformation into the Turkish soft power, within the paper, I claim that Turkey is an ambivalent soft power particularly in the context of Southeast Europe. According to Nye, soft power is the ability of a state to persuade others to do what it wants without sanctions, force or coercion. Countries' skills in digital diplomacy, cultural outputs, economic models, commitments to basic freedoms, human rights and democracy are also the other aspects of the soft power. Under these circumstances, roughly between 2002-2013, Turkey's AKP initiated a pro-democratic agenda alongside its unofficial coalition partner the Gülen Movement, a shift that positioned Turkey externally as an influential rising soft power player focused on democracy and humanitarian aid, in the region. However, I underlined that Turkey has not managed to establish itself regional as a permanent, solid and indisputable soft power player because 2010 the AKP has been shifting in the direction of authoritarianism, shrinking economic environment disproportionate use of Islamist discourse and policies at home and abroad, particularly into the countries of Southeast Europe.This new-born religion-based and repressive policy of Turkey, it seems, can not simply be regarded as an element of soft power. It creates, however, different effects on different actors in the region: some groups (mostly Muslims) are rather happy with Turkey's religiously fuelled approach, while some others are seriously concerned. This one of the reasons of why I prefer to define Turkey as an ambiguous actor which has not been instrumentalising its soft power resources efficiently. Yet, Turkey can still increase its capacity. In order to do so, it should increase its democratic credentials and strengthen the constitutional institutions, and thereby boost the EU process. It should declare that it will not use its religious influence to provide guardianship for Muslims in a hegemonic way. On the contrary, it should promote religious freedom and peaceful coexistence both domestically and in the region. Supporting a specific religious group would harm Southeast Europe that has suffered greatly from religious divisions and conflicts. Bringing its sui generis secular culture to the fore would differentiate Turkey from Wahhabi and Salafist powers that are also trying to exercise influence on the region. Turkey should also be careful in its emphasis on the common Ottoman heritage with the countries of the region, because this does not necessarily imply a peaceful and harmonious past, as envisaged by the AKP elite. Lastly, Turkey should not view the region as a single entity and should avoid implementing wholesale policies for the region. Rather, it should tailor specific policies for each country considering the sensitivity of historical, cultural, sociological and political dynamics in each context.