History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: The struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942-February 1943


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During the six months covered by Volume 5: The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942-February 1943, the U.S. Navy fought six major engagements in waters surrounding Guadalcanal, more bitter and bloody than any naval battle in American history since 1814. From the Solomon Islands campaigns to the courageous action of Edson's Raiders at the Battle of the Bloody Ridge, from the great three-day Naval Battle of Guadalcanal to the Battle of Tassafaronga, Morison describes the events of these excruciating months in thrilling, heartbreaking detail from the shipdecks, cockpits, and exposed ridge-tops where the fate of thousands of soldiers and sailors was decided.







The Campaigns of the Pacific War


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Sitting Ducks at Guadalcanal


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On August 7, 1942, U.S. Marines waded ashore in the Solomons, defended by warships of the U.S. Navy. The amphibious landing was the first major American ground campaign of the Pacific War, intended to prevent the Japanese from establishing naval and air bases in the island chain and to establish Allied bases for future operations. Most famously—and most gruelingly—the invasion marked the beginning of the months-long Guadalcanal campaign. Caught off guard, the Japanese swiftly regrouped for a seaborne counterattack on the night of August 8–9. The result was one of the worst American naval defeats of the war after Pearl Harbor. In this meticulous minute-by-minute retelling of the First Battle of Savo Island, Lawrence De Graw covers the navy’s role in the initial landings on Guadalcanal before setting the stage for the naval clash that would come the next night. On the eighth, the American commander, fearing Japanese attacks and cautious about fuel levels, withdrew his aircraft carriers and let his cruisers and destroyers—exhausted from two days of high alert and combat—operate with only half their crews on duty. The navy was unaware the Japanese had been training to fight at night. The American ships were sitting ducks when the Japanese fleet steamed through “The Slot” between Savo Island and Guadalcanal and into what became known as “Ironbottom Sound.” In little more than thirty minutes, the Japanese sent three U.S. (and one Australian) heavy cruisers to the bottom and damaged three other vessels. The American fleet withdrew from the area for the foreseeable future and limited shipments of men and materiel to the daytime, helping turn the battle of Guadalcanal into a long, hard slog. Sitting Ducks at Guadalcanal is naval history, featuring a colorful narrative that covers the big picture as well as stories of individual vessels and sailors as well as a careful analysis of the battle and just what went wrong for the U.S. Navy off the island of Guadalcanal.




A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy


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For almost 20 years, more than 200 reels of microfilmed Japanese naval records remained in the custody of the U.S. Naval History Division, virtually untouched. This unique book draws on those sources and others to tell the story of the Pacific War from the viewpoint of the Japanese. Former Marine Corps officer and Asian scholar Paul Dull focuses on the major surface engagements of the war—Coral Sea, Midway, the crucial Solomons campaign, and the last-ditch battles in the Marianas and Philippines. Also included are detailed track charts and a selection of Japanese photographs of major vessels and actions.




The Last Century of Sea Power, Volume 2


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“An important contribution . . . a thoughtful account of the years preceding the Second World War and, at much greater length, of the war itself.” —History In this second volume of his history of naval power in the 20th century, H. P. Willmott follows the fortunes of the established seafaring nations of Europe along with two upstarts—the United States and Japan. Emerging from World War I in command of the seas, Great Britain saw its supremacy weakened through neglect and in the face of more committed rivals. Britain’s grand Coronation Review of 1937 marked the apotheosis of a sea power slipping into decline. Meanwhile, Britain’s rivals and soon-to-be enemies were embarking on significant naval building programs that would soon change the nature of war at sea in ways that neither they nor their rivals anticipated. By the end of a new world war, the United States had taken command of two oceans, having placed its industrial might behind technologies that further defined the arena of naval power above and below the waves, where stealth and the ability to strike at great distance would soon rewrite the rules of war and of peace. This splendid volume further enhances Willmott’s stature as the dean of naval historians. Praise for The Last Century of Sea Power series “The author, dean of naval historians, provides a sweeping look at, and analysis of, the transformation of naval power . . . Wilmott is fearless in his judgments.” —Seapower “H. P. Willmott is the finest naval historian and among the finest historians of any discipline writing today.” —Bernard D. Cole, author of The Great Wall at Sea




The Elusive Enemy


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The Elusive Enemy explores the evolution of U.S. intelligence concerning the combat capabilities of the Imperial Japanese Navy and its air arm during the interwar period and the Pacific War. Ford contends that the US Navy could not accurately determine the fighting efficiency of Japan’s forces until it engaged them in actual battle conditions over an extended period. As the conflict progressed, the Americans were able to rely on a growing array of intelligence material, including POWs, captured documents, and specimens of captured enemy weapons. These sources often revealed valuable information on the characteristics of Japanese equipment, as well as some of the ideas and doctrines which governed how they carried out their operations. First-hand observations of the Japanese navy’s performance in battle were the most frequently used source of intelligence which enabled the US Navy to develop a more informed assessment of its opponent. Ship crews, along with US aviators, were tasked to collect information by making a thorough observation of how the Japanese fought. Action reports described how the Imperial fleet demonstrated a number of weaknesses, the most important of which was a shortage of modern equipment and, after 1942, diminished air power. Yet, he demonstrates how the Japanese remained a resilient enemy who could be defeated only when the Americans deployed sufficient equipment and used it in an appropriate manner. The Office of Naval Intelligence, as well as the intelligence services operating in the Pacific theater, thus had to assess a wide array of conflicting characteristics, and provide a balanced evaluation concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the Imperial navy. At the same time, a large part of the intelligence analysis was undertaken by commanders in the Pacific Fleet. Naval personnel and aircrews assessed the information gained through encounters with the enemy so that they could develop a set of methods whereby US forces were able defeat the Japanese without incurring excessive casualties and losses. The intelligence services, in turn, played an important role in disseminating the information on the most efficient tactics and weapons that could be used to defeat the Imperial Fleet. The Elusive Enemy aims to explain how American perceptions concerning the Japanese navy evolved during the conflict, with a particular focus on the role of intelligence. It also seeks to introduce a new perspective on the question as to why the U.S. Navy carried out its campaigns during the Pacific War in the manner that it did.




Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet


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