The Causal Structure of Natural Selection


Book Description

Recent arguments concerning the nature of causation in evolutionary theory, now often known as the debate between the 'causalist' and 'statisticalist' positions, have involved answers to a variety of independent questions – definitions of key evolutionary concepts like natural selection, fitness, and genetic drift; causation in multi-level systems; or the nature of evolutionary explanations, among others. This Element offers a way to disentangle one set of these questions surrounding the causal structure of natural selection. Doing so allows us to clearly reconstruct the approach that some of these major competing interpretations of evolutionary theory have to this causal structure, highlighting particular features of philosophical interest within each. Further, those features concern problems not exclusive to the philosophy of biology. Connections between them and, in two case studies, contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of physics demonstrate the potential value of broader collaboration in the understanding of evolution.




Evolutionary Causation


Book Description

A comprehensive treatment of the concept of causation in evolutionary biology that makes clear its central role in both historical and contemporary debates. Most scientific explanations are causal. This is certainly the case in evolutionary biology, which seeks to explain the diversity of life and the adaptive fit between organisms and their surroundings. The nature of causation in evolutionary biology, however, is contentious. How causation is understood shapes the structure of evolutionary theory, and historical and contemporary debates in evolutionary biology have revolved around the nature of causation. Despite its centrality, and differing views on the subject, the major conceptual issues regarding the nature of causation in evolutionary biology are rarely addressed. This volume fills the gap, bringing together biologists and philosophers to offer a comprehensive, interdisciplinary treatment of evolutionary causation. Contributors first address biological motivations for rethinking evolutionary causation, considering the ways in which development, extra-genetic inheritance, and niche construction challenge notions of cause and process in evolution, and describing how alternative representations of evolutionary causation can shed light on a range of evolutionary problems. Contributors then analyze evolutionary causation from a philosophical perspective, considering such topics as causal entanglement, the commingling of organism and environment, and the relationship between causation and information. Contributors John A. Baker, Lynn Chiu, David I. Dayan, Renée A. Duckworth, Marcus W Feldman, Susan A. Foster, Melissa A. Graham, Heikki Helanterä, Kevin N. Laland, Armin P. Moczek, John Odling-Smee, Jun Otsuka, Massimo Pigliucci, Arnaud Pocheville, Arlin Stoltzfus, Karola Stotz, Sonia E. Sultan, Christoph Thies, Tobias Uller, Denis M. Walsh, Richard A. Watson




Causal Complexity and Comprehension of Evolution by Natural Selection


Book Description

Learning the theory of evolution by natural selection has proven to be difficult for students and adults alike. This may be due, in part, to the finding that adults reject the existence of within-species variation. Within-species variation is a requirement if evolution is to occur. Individuals who reject within-species variation often times misconstrue the process of evolutionary change as not the survival of some members of the species at the expense of others, but rather as the gradual change of all members of the species simultaneously. In this manner, rejection of within-species variation leads to misconstruals and misunderstandings of the theory of evolution by natural selection. One proposal for this tendency to reject within-species variation is psychological essentialism, which proposes that individuals construe species as possessing an underlying essence, shared by all species members, determining the observable properties of that species. Here we propose an alternative explanation, which we term the causal complexity hypothesis. We posit that biases for single-cause explanations lead participants to reject within-species variation. We argue that these simpler causal structures make within-species variation probabilistically less likely. In Studies 1 and 2 we find evidence that not only are preferences for single-cause explanations correlated with decreased estimates of within-species variability, but that manipulating number of causes has a causal effect on variability judgments. In Study 3, we find that evolution comprehension also predicts performance on category identity tasks, and find some support for the proposal that this is also related to within-species variability and causal complexity. Overall, we find that our causal complexity hypothesis can account for individual differences in variability judgments, and may offer a target for interventions in the domain of evolution comprehension. However, whether a preference for single-cause explanations influences reasoning within intuitive biology beyond judgments of within-species variation remains an open question and direction for future studies.




Mechanism and Causality in Biology and Economics


Book Description

This volume addresses fundamental issues in the philosophy of science in the context of two most intriguing fields: biology and economics. Written by authorities and experts in the philosophy of biology and economics, Mechanism and Causality in Biology and Economics provides a structured study of the concepts of mechanism and causality in these disciplines and draws careful juxtapositions between philosophical apparatus and scientific practice. By exploring the issues that are most salient to the contemporary philosophies of biology and economics and by presenting comparative analyses, the book serves as a platform not only for gaining mutual understanding between scientists and philosophers of the life sciences and those of the social sciences, but also for sharing interdisciplinary research that combines both philosophical concepts in both fields. The book begins by defining the concepts of mechanism and causality in biology and economics, respectively. The second and third parts investigate philosophical perspectives of various causal and mechanistic issues in scientific practice in the two fields. These two sections include chapters on causal issues in the theory of evolution; experiments and scientific discovery; representation of causal relations and mechanism by models in economics. The concluding section presents interdisciplinary studies of various topics concerning extrapolation of life sciences and social sciences, including chapters on the philosophical investigation of conjoining biological and economic analyses with, respectively, demography, medicine and sociology.




Tychomancy


Book Description

Tychomancy—meaning “the divination of chances”—presents a set of rules for inferring the physical probabilities of outcomes from the causal or dynamic properties of the systems that produce them. Probabilities revealed by the rules are wide-ranging: they include the probability of getting a 5 on a die roll, the probability distributions found in statistical physics, and the probabilities that underlie many prima facie judgments about fitness in evolutionary biology. Michael Strevens makes three claims about the rules. First, they are reliable. Second, they are known, though not fully consciously, to all human beings: they constitute a key part of the physical intuition that allows us to navigate around the world safely in the absence of formal scientific knowledge. Third, they have played a crucial but unrecognized role in several major scientific innovations. A large part of Tychomancy is devoted to this historical role for probability inference rules. Strevens first analyzes James Clerk Maxwell’s extraordinary, apparently a priori, deduction of the molecular velocity distribution in gases, which launched statistical physics. Maxwell did not derive his distribution from logic alone, Strevens proposes, but rather from probabilistic knowledge common to all human beings, even infants as young as six months old. Strevens then turns to Darwin’s theory of natural selection, the statistics of measurement, and the creation of models of complex systems, contending in each case that these elements of science could not have emerged when or how they did without the ability to “eyeball” the values of physical probabilities.




The Structure of Evolutionary Theory


Book Description

The world’s most revered and eloquent interpreter of evolutionary ideas offers here a work of explanatory force unprecedented in our time—a landmark publication, both for its historical sweep and for its scientific vision. With characteristic attention to detail, Stephen Jay Gould first describes the content and discusses the history and origins of the three core commitments of classical Darwinism: that natural selection works on organisms, not genes or species; that it is almost exclusively the mechanism of adaptive evolutionary change; and that these changes are incremental, not drastic. Next, he examines the three critiques that currently challenge this classic Darwinian edifice: that selection operates on multiple levels, from the gene to the group; that evolution proceeds by a variety of mechanisms, not just natural selection; and that causes operating at broader scales, including catastrophes, have figured prominently in the course of evolution. Then, in a stunning tour de force that will likely stimulate discussion and debate for decades, Gould proposes his own system for integrating these classical commitments and contemporary critiques into a new structure of evolutionary thought. In 2001 the Library of Congress named Stephen Jay Gould one of America’s eighty-three Living Legends—people who embody the “quintessentially American ideal of individual creativity, conviction, dedication, and exuberance.” Each of these qualities finds full expression in this peerless work, the likes of which the scientific world has not seen—and may not see again—for well over a century.




The Causal Scope of Natural Selection


Book Description

This dissertation is about the extent to which natural selection has causal power. In Chapter 1, I articulate and defend a version of an interventionist account of causation. Put simply, I claim that some event e causes another event e' in a causal system S just in case a precise manipulation to the value of e, while holding various other events in S fixed, results in a change to the probability of e'. Also in Chapter 1, I endorse a recent constraint on causal relata that James Woodward has endorsed, which requires that it be possible in principle to manipulate each relatum in a causal system while simultaneously holding fixed the other relata in the causal system at arbitrary values. In Chapter 2, I use this account of causation to determine the extent to which natural selection can be treated as a cause of other evolutionary phenomena. Through a variety of examples, I show that natural selection can cause trait evolution, as well as the origin of novel traits. I also show that, given various assumptions, there are cases in which natural selection can cause a particular individual to have one trait, rather than another. In Chapter 3, I analyze the extent to which natural selection can operate at various levels of the biological hierarchy, in particular among individuals within a group and between groups in a group-structured population. For reasons that I describe, while "group selection" is a coherent concept, I am dissatisfied with various accounts of that concept. As I develop my own account, I comment more broadly on the way in which we can understand natural selection and causation in a group-structured population, given the variety of non-causal dependency relationships that exist in such a setting




What Darwin Got Wrong


Book Description

Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini, a distinguished philosopher and scientist working in tandem, reveal major flaws at the heart of Darwinian evolutionary theory. They do not deny Darwin's status as an outstanding scientist but question the inferences he drew from his observations. Combining the results of cutting-edge work in experimental biology with crystal-clear philosophical argument they mount a devastating critique of the central tenets of Darwin's account of the origin of species. The logic underlying natural selection is the survival of the fittest under changing environmental pressure. This logic, they argue, is mistaken. They back up the claim with evidence of what actually happens in nature. This is a rare achievement - the short book that is likely to make a great deal of difference to a very large subject. What Darwin Got Wrong will be controversial. The authors' arguments will reverberate through the scientific world. At the very least they will transform the debate about evolution.




Advancing the Causal Theory of Natural Selection


Book Description

The Modern Synthesis embodies a theory of natural selection where selection is to be fundamentally understood in terms of measures of fitness and the covariance of reproductive success and trait or character variables. Whether made explicit or left implicit, the notion that selection requires that some trait variable cause reproductive success has been deemphasized in our modern understanding of exactly what selection amounts to. The dissertation seeks to advance a theory of natural selection that is fundamentally causal. By focusing on the causal nature of natural selection (rather than on fitness or statistical formulae), certain conceptual and methodological problems are seen in a new, clarifying light and avenues toward new, interesting solutions to those problems are illustrated. First, the dissertation offers an update to explicitly causal theories of when exactly a trait counts as an adaptation upon fixation in a population and draws out theoretical and practical implications for evolutionary biology. Second, I examine a case of a novel character that evolves by niche construction and argue that it evolves by selection for it and consider implications for understanding adaptations and drift. The third contribution of the dissertation is an argument for the importance of defining group selection causally and an argument against model pluralism in the levels of selection debate. Fourth, the dissertation makes a methodological contribution. I offer the first steps toward an explicitly causal methodology for inferring the causes of selectionsomething often required in addition to inferring the causes of reproductive success. The concluding chapter summarizes the work and discusses potential paths for future work.




Evolution and the Levels of Selection


Book Description

Does natural selection act primarily on individual organisms, on groups, on genes, or on whole species? Samir Okasha provides a comprehensive analysis of the debate in evolutionary biology over the levels of selection, focusing on conceptual, philosophical and foundational questions. A systematic framework is developed for thinking about natural selection acting at multiple levels of the biological hierarchy; the framework is then used to help resolve outstanding issues. Considerable attention is paid to the concept of causality as it relates to the levels of selection, in particular the idea that natural selection at one hierarchical level can have effects that 'filter' up or down to other levels. Unlike previous work in this area by philosophers of science, full account is taken of the recent biological literature on 'major evolutionary transitions' and the recent resurgence of interest in multi-level selection theory among biologists. Other biological topics discussed include Price's equation, kin and group selection, the gene's eye view, evolutionary game theory, outlaws and selfish genetic elements, species and clade selection, and the evolution of individuality. Philosophical topics discussed include reductionism and holism, causation and correlation, the nature of hierarchical organization, and realism and pluralism.