The experience of ecological fiscal transfers: Lessons for REDD+ benefit sharing


Book Description

In many countries, the state owns or manages forests in the national interests of economic development, ecosystem service provision or biodiversity conservation. A national approach to reducing deforestation and forest degradation and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) will thus most likely involve governmental entities at different governance levels from central to local. Sub-national governments that implement REDD+ activities will generate carbon ecosystem services and potentially other co-benefits, such as biodiversity conservation, and in the process incur implementation and opportunity costs for these actions. This occasional paper analyses the literature on ecological fiscal transfers (EFTs), with a focus on experiences in Brazil and Portugal, to draw lessons for how policy instruments for intergovernmental transfers can be designed in a national REDD+ benefit-sharing system. EFTs can be an effective policy instrument for improving revenue adequacy and fiscal equalization across a country. They facilitate financial allocations based on a sub-national government’s environmental performance, and could also partly compensate the costs of REDD+ implementation. We find that intergovernmental EFTs targeting sub-national public actors can be an important element of policy mix for REDD+ benefit sharing, particularly in a decentralized governance system, as decisions on forest and land use are being made at sub-national levels. Given the increasing focus and interest on jurisdictional REDD+, EFTs may have a role in filling the shortfall of revenues for REDD+ readiness and for implementing enabling actions related to forest governance. If EFTs are to have efficient and equitable outcomes, however, they will require strong information-sharing and transparency systems on environmental indicators and performance, and the disbursement and spending of EFT funds across all levels







Lessons for multi-level REDD+ benefit-sharing from revenue distribution in extractive resource sectors (oil, gas and mining)


Book Description

This brief focuses on lessons from the extractive resource sectors (oil, gas and mining) for REDD+ benefit-sharing. Specifically, it examines the different ways that revenues accruing to the government are distributed to subnational levels and the outcomes of different arrangements for doing so. These lessons are particularly relevant for scenarios where REDD+ revenues might reach significant volumes. Two main sorts of revenue would need to be distributed in the case of REDD+: i) payments to central or sub-national governments from international sources for emissions reduced and ii) taxes and fees collected by central government from REDD+ activities (Irawan et al. 2014). In both cases, decisions are needed on how to redistribute revenue between central and sub-national levels. A key concern in decisions over public revenues is allocation across jurisdictions. In this paper, we look at the rationales behind the way revenues from the sector are shared both with sub-national governments and across extractive and non-extractive localities. This experience is relevant for key questions facing REDD+ such as how to link benefit to performance at the sub-national levels, how to compensate costs, how to distribute benefits across a nation and how to enhance development outcomes. In so doing, we address key concerns in the debate about REDD+ benefit-sharing. These include how REDD+ might act as an incentive for reducing deforestation and degradation, and how it might also be integrated into development planning to help achieve wider outcomes.







Lessons from Payments for Ecosystem Services for REDD+ Benefit-Sharing Mechanisms


Book Description

Where benefits and costs accrue at different scales, financial intermediaries are needed to facilitate relations between global-scale buyers and local-scale providers of carbon sequestration and storage. These intermediaries can help to collect and distribute payments and to promote the scheme to potential beneficiaries. The benefits distributed should compensate for the transaction, opportunity and implementation costs incurred by stakeholders for providing ecosystem services. Therefore, calculating the costs and understanding who incurs them are essential for benefit sharing. Targeting benefits according to a set of criteria that match the objectives of the specific mechanism increases the mechanism’s efficiency. As the level of performance-based payments may not be able to compete with the opportunity costs of highly profitable land uses, performance-related benefit-sharing mechanisms should be focused on areas with moderate opportunity costs. Benefits should be divided into upfront payments to cover startup costs and to give an initial incentive for participation, and payments upon delivery of ecosystem services to ensure adherence to conditionality.




The experience of conditional cash transfers


Book Description

Conditionality is a key element of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs and its use has broad political and social appeal. The use of intermediate indicators for ease of implementing conditionality and monitoring (e.g. school enrollment or visits to the clinic) may not fully capture the desired long-term outcomes (e.g. learning achievement or health indicators). The parallel for REDD+ is in choosing between simpler input-based conditionality indicators (e.g. number of trees planted, number of monitoring surveys carried out) or long-term outcome-based indicators (e.g. forest cover maintained, amount of carbon emissions reduced).




Lessons from local environmental funds for REDD+ benefit sharing with indigenous people in Brazil


Book Description

Key lessons While the constitutional rights (e.g. property rights) of indigenous peoples (IP) are strong in Brazil and may help to overcome their vulnerability, they are rarely enforceable and do not offer sufficient safeguards.Informed consultation and a structured free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) process that considers cultural issues are fundamental to ensuring acceptance and consent by IP.Local environmental funds can be a tool for increasing autonomy and decentralization while sharing benefits with IP and financing long-term and specific demands that can change over time.Safeguard strategies implemented by the Amazon Fund to avoid conflicts of interest may result in restrictions on the participation of IP, having implications related to the legitimacy of decision-making in the distribution of benefits.The absence of timely financial flows to meet IP needs may be a considerable risk since it can encourage environmentally damaging activities.Relying on the voluntary market may be risky for IP initiatives because of market instability and possible lack of funding.




OECD Fiscal Federalism Studies Local Public Finance and Capacity Building in Asia Issues and Challenges


Book Description

Subnational governments’ capacity to effectively fund and deliver public services are crucial for the realisation of the benefits of decentralisation. However, subnational capacities often suffer from significant weaknesses, ranging from inadequate assignments of own-revenues, through to flaws in tax administration, the design of intergovernmental transfers, spending assignments and various aspects of public financial management.







Lessons from voluntary partnership agreements for REDD+ benefit sharing


Book Description

The experience of FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreements offer several lessons on how to design benefit sharing mechanisms under REDD+ so that they build credibility and trust among the potential recipients of REDD+ benefits. This paper focuses on lessons for three specific design aspects of REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanisms: (i) the balance between state and non-state actors in the architecture of benefit-sharing mechanism institutions; (ii) the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) in monitoring; and (iii) the design of multistakeholder processes. The choice and arrangement of institutions and actors is crucial for credibility: independence can be enhanced or reduced by the architecture of check and balance mechanisms and the type of actors involved. Lessons from VPAs also highlight the trade-off between the cost efficiency and capacity building gains of using existing (often state) institutions and actors versus the potential increased effectiveness and independence that may be provided by new and/or non-state institutions and actors. The use of civil society monitors and multistakeholder processes can provide credibility through enhancing accountability and transparency as well as increasing commitment and confidence in the system. The impact of civil society monitoring can be enhanced by formal recognition of its role, establishing complaints mechanisms and formalizing access to information. Multistakeholder processes can be strengthened by clarifying roles, responsibilities and decision-making mandates of the process; clarifying who should be included; accepting that such processes take time; and maintaining technical and financial support.