Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949: National security affairs, foreign economic policy
Author :
Publisher :
Page : 872 pages
File Size : 15,58 MB
Release : 1976
Category : United States
ISBN :
Author :
Publisher :
Page : 872 pages
File Size : 15,58 MB
Release : 1976
Category : United States
ISBN :
Author :
Publisher :
Page : 660 pages
File Size : 28,68 MB
Release : 1976
Category : United States
ISBN :
Author : Dr. Anthony Kubek
Publisher : Pickle Partners Publishing
Page : 982 pages
File Size : 18,23 MB
Release : 2017-06-28
Category : History
ISBN : 1787205967
The Far Eastern policy pursued during the Roosevelt-Truman administrations has long been the subject of spirited controversy among historians. This volume, first published in 1963, is the result of seven years of intensive research into a mass of documentary data dealing with the Communist conquest of China. “Professor Kubek discusses with unusual candor and clear vision the many mistakes of the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations with reference to the Far East. There are new data and fresh interpretations that lend additional evidence to support the contentions of earlier writers that the diplomacy of the Administrations of Roosevelt and Truman was disastrous in the extreme. The strange actions of General Marshall in China, and his blind policy while Secretary of State, were chief factors in the loss of China to the Communists. In a noteworthy chapter that all Americans should read, Professor Kubek traces in damning detail the tragic role that Marshall played in the fall of Nationalist China. “This is a volume that will earn the sharpest criticisms of the motley hordes that crowded the Roosevelt and Truman bandwagons, but it is a must book for any American who wants to know why the present sawdust Caesar, Khrushchev, can insult at will the President of the United States and can hurl continual threats to “bury” all Americans. Soviet militate might is the direct product of billions of Democratic Lend-Lease aid, coddling of Communists in high places in the American Government, and failure to understand the basic drives of world Communism. Never before in our history was Presidential leadership so devoid of vision, and never before had the mistakes of our Chief Executives been so fraught with peril to our nation. Read this book and then begin to worry about how Americans will fare in the next decade.”—Charles Callan Tansill, Professor Emeritus of Diplomatic History, Georgetown University (Foreword)
Author : United States. Department of State
Publisher :
Page : 1074 pages
File Size : 24,18 MB
Release : 1949
Category : China
ISBN :
Author :
Publisher :
Page : 928 pages
File Size : 14,21 MB
Release : 1977
Category : United States
ISBN :
Author : United States. Department of State
Publisher :
Page : 548 pages
File Size : 17,61 MB
Release : 1976
Category : Africa
ISBN :
Author : U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Publisher :
Page : 108 pages
File Size : 32,42 MB
Release : 1973
Category : Nuclear energy
ISBN :
Author :
Publisher :
Page : 1188 pages
File Size : 18,61 MB
Release : 1976
Category : United States
ISBN :
Author : Henriette Mertz
Publisher :
Page : 270 pages
File Size : 38,38 MB
Release : 1972
Category : America
ISBN :
Author : Dr. Jeffrey Record
Publisher : Pickle Partners Publishing
Page : 105 pages
File Size : 12,7 MB
Release : 2015-11-06
Category : History
ISBN : 1786252961
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.