Book Description

Excerpt from Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session on S. 1745, Vol. 2: Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997 for Military Activities of the Department of Defense, for Military Construction, and for Defense Activities of the Department of Energy, to Prescribe Personnel Strengths for Such Fiscal Year for the Armed Fo Although the naval forces performed extremely well during Desert Storm, a clear lesson learned was the limit that our Navy mine countermeasures capability placed on the commanders' operational options. Although the Iraqi mining capability was primitive at best, amphibious assault from the sea was ruled out because of, among other considerations, an inability to confidently provide lanes of approach clear of mines. Additionally, the only damage to Navy ships that occurred during Desert Shield and Desert Storm occurred as a result of mines. In the years since Desert Storm, this committee has placed continuing emphasis on improving the Navy's mine countermeasures capability. As a consequence, there is a statutory requirement for the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report that the Navy is pursuing a coherent MCM program that addresses the evolving threat and there are sufficient resources programmed in the future years defense program to execute the Navy's development and procurement plans. The committee also initiated the creation of the Director for Expeditionary Warfare on the Chief of Naval Operations Staff to ensure that mine countermeasures and other programs associated with forcible entry from the sea were accorded adequate priority in the Navy's warfare assessment and resource allocation process. I mention these committee initiatives, as well as the research and development funds that we have added periodically, to emphasize the committee's sustained interest in addressing mind countermeasures challenges that confront the Navy. We think this emphasis is particularly relevant in light of the Navy's strategic concept, articulated in" From the Sea" and "Forward From the Sea," that postulates warfare in littoral and near-land areas as the principal focus for naval operations in a post-Cold War world. I think it is also worth noting that the Navy's historical track record on meeting the mine threat has been cyclical at best, characterized by periodic bursts of activity when a mine threat disrupted naval operations, such as Wonsan during the Korean War or during Desert Storm, with a subsequent inexorable decline as lessons learned have been forgotten. Another important consideration is the constrained mission of port breakout that was assigned to the Navy's mine countermeasures during the Cold War. It was assumed that the offensive type of mine clearance needed for amphibious operations would be provided by our allies. Consequently, the MCM capabilities needed to support expeditionary warfare were ignored, neglected, or at best marginally funded in the competition for defense dollars. Over 5 years have passed since Desert Storm. Our principal purpose today is to sample what progress the Navy has made in improving its mine warfare capabilities, what its priorities and programs are for the future, what shortfalls still exist, if any, that would limit the ability of naval forces to conduct an imposed amphibious assault, and whether the resources that have been included in this year's budget and future years defense programs are adequate. Another area the committee has monitored for many years is the Navy's surface fire support capability. It is a capability that must be robust if naval forces are to conduct expeditionary warfare. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com