The Foundations Of Common Sense


Book Description

First Published in 1999. This is Volume XV of thirty-eight in the General Psychology series. Written in 1949, this text seeks to explain how we come to believe in our common-sense world, and why, in spite of all philosophical criticism, we cannot help still believing in it. The aim is to show how we progressively build up the various constituents of that belief, and how those constituents tend to support and reinforce one another in a single, well-consolidated structure.










The Foundations Of Common Sense


Book Description

First Published in 1999. This is Volume XV of thirty-eight in the General Psychology series. Written in 1949, this text seeks to explain how we come to believe in our common-sense world, and why, in spite of all philosophical criticism, we cannot help still believing in it. The aim is to show how we progressively build up the various constituents of that belief, and how those constituents tend to support and reinforce one another in a single, well-consolidated structure.




Common Sense


Book Description

This book stands in the tradition of past and current common sense philosophers, like Reid, Berkeley, Sidgwick, Moore, Conant, Slote, Bogdan, and Lemos, who defend common sense, yet it goes beyond their accounts by not only defending common sense but also considering what common sense means. Besides giving a historical exegesis of common sense in Thomas Reid and showing parallels in Austin, Searle, Moore, and Wittgenstein, common sense is also discovered in Hume's An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals and in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It is made clear how far common sense generalizes, whether proverbs are a form of common sense, and whether common sense can be found in the common knowledge assumption in game theory. Also, folk psychology as a common sense psychology is discussed. In its account of common sense, this book draws on research from history of philosophy, philosophy of mind, and science, linguistics, and game theory to substantiate its position.
















Common Sense, Science and Scepticism


Book Description

Can we know anything for certain? Dogmatists think we can, sceptics think we cannot, and epistemology is the great debate between them. Some dogmatists seek certainty in the deliverances of the senses. Sceptics object that the senses are not an adequate basis for certain knowledge. Other dogmatists seek certainty in the deliverances of pure reason. Sceptics object that rational self-evidence is no guarantee of truth. This book is an introductory and historically-based survey of the debate, siding for the most part with scepticism to show that the desire to vanquish it has often led to doctrines of idealism or anti-realism. Scepticism, science and common sense produce another view, fallibilism or critical rationalism: although we can have little or no certain knowledge, as the sceptics maintain, we can and do have plenty of conjectural knowledge. Fallibilism incorporates an uncompromising realism about perception, science, and the nature of truth.