The Impact of Supervision on Bank Performance


Book Description

We explore the impact of supervision on the riskiness, profitability, and growth of U.S. banks. Using data on supervisors' time use, we demonstrate that the top-ranked banks by size within a supervisory district receive more attention from supervisors, even after controlling for size, complexity, risk, and other characteristics. Using a matched sample approach, we find that these top-ranked banks that receive more supervisory attention hold less risky loan portfolios and are less volatile and less sensitive to industry downturns, but do not have slower growth or profitability. Our results underscore the distinct role of supervision in mitigating banking sector risk.




The Effects of Supervision on Bank Performance


Book Description

This paper estimates causal effects of supervision on bank performance using discontinuities in the minimum frequency of examinations required by regulation. This frequency is discontinuous at a value of bank assets that varied over time, allowing us to break the endogeneity between supervision and performance and to separate the effects of examinations from confounding effects of other banking policies that are triggered by asset thresholds too. We find that more frequent examinations increase profitability by decreasing loan losses and delinquencies. This suggests that supervisors limit the risks that banks are exposed to and, consequently, limit banks' losses on risky assets.




Prudential Supervision


Book Description

Since banking systems play a crucial role in maintaining the overall health of the economy, the adverse effects of poorly supervised systems may be quite severe. Without some form of vigilant external oversight, banking systems could fall prey to excessive risk taking, moral hazard, and corruption. Prudential supervision provides that oversight, using government regulation and monitoring to ensure the soundness of the banking system and, by extension, the economy at large. The contributors to this thoughtful volume examine the current state of prudential supervision, focusing on fundamental issues and key pragmatic concerns. Why is prudential supervision so important? What kinds of excess must it guard against? What particular forms does it take? Which of these are the most effective deterrents against mismanagement and system overload in today's rapidly shifting financial climate? The contributors foresee a continued movement beyond simple regulatory rules in banking and toward a more active evaluation and supervision of a bank's risk management practices.










Financial Supervision in the 21st Century


Book Description

The financial crisis prompted financial supervisors to take a critical look at their own performance. The "toolkit" available to supervisors is considerably more varied than it was a few years ago. Supervision has become more forward-looking, taking into account also soft controls, such as ‘conduct and culture’, corporate governance, and business models of financial institutions. This collection of essays discusses several significant changes in supervision methods and supervisory organisations and examines what methods contribute to ‘good supervision’ and what can reasonably be expected of supervisors. The authors are experts in the field and most of them are affiliated to organisations responsible for financial supervision.




Does Basel Compliance Matter for Bank Performance?


Book Description

The global financial crisis underscored the importance of regulation and supervision to a well-functioning banking system that efficiently channels financial resources into investment. In this paper, we contribute to the ongoing policy debate by assessing whether compliance with international regulatory standards and protocols enchances bank operating efficiency. We focus specifically on the adoption of international capital standards and the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP). The relationship between bank efficiency and regulatory compliance is investigated using the (Simar and Wilson 2007) double bootstrapping approach on an international sample of publicly listed banks. Our results indicate that overall BCP compliance, or indeed compliance with any of its individual chapters, has no association with bank efficiency.




Bank Supervision and Corporate Finance


Book Description

We examine the impact of bank supervision on the financing obstacles faced by almost 5,000 corporations across 49 countries. We find that firms in countries with strong official supervisory agencies that directly monitor banks tend to face greater financing obstacles. Moreover, powerful official supervision tends to increase firm reliance on special connections and corruption in raising external finance, which is consistent with political/regulatory capture theories. Creating a supervisory agency that is independent of the government and banks mitigates the adverse consequences of powerful supervision. Finally, we find that bank supervisory agencies that force accurate information disclosure by banks and enhance private monitoring tend to ease the financing obstacles faced by firms.




Impact of Banking Supervision on the Cost Efficiency of Banks - An Example of Five Asian Developing Countries


Book Description

The main purpose of banking supervision is to ensure stable operation of banks, minimize the risk for the stability of finance system, increase banking efficiency and promote competitiveness. However the question is whether banking supervision can benefit or damage banking efficiency. And how does banking supervision affect banking efficiency? This paper uses the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) of Battese and Coelli (1995)and stochastic metafrontier function (SMF) of Huang et al. (2012) to explore different impacts of the Financial Regulation on cost efficiency of banking industry in India, Thailand, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Mongolia. This study found out that related supervision policies is necessary but not necessary be able to benefit cost efficiency. According to the analysis of inefficiency model, capital regulation can lower the cost efficiency of banking in India, Thailand and Mongolia. However, the results are opposite for Bangladesh and Malaysia, the cost efficiency increase with government financial supervision because they avoid high risk investment activities. In the second stage, estimated SMF under meta-frontier cost function of the five countries, for the banking supervision, no matter whether it is TGR or MCE, Indian banks has the best results of 0.7527and 0.6715 respectively. Thailand has the lowest TGR value of 0.4608. Malaysia has the lowest MCE value of 0.3531; and Tobit regression consistency indicated that an increase in the strength of legal right will increase MCE and TGR; but credit depth information will increase bank's total cost, and then decrease their cost efficiency. The result shows that higher minimum regulatory capital increase MCE, TGR, and CE is consistent with the hypothesis raised by the moral hazard approach (Mester, 1996). However, minimum capital entry requirement and MCE, TGR, and CE are negatively correlated, statistically insignificant.