Spying Blind


Book Description

In this pathbreaking book, Amy Zegart provides the first scholarly examination of the intelligence failures that preceded September 11. Until now, those failures have been attributed largely to individual mistakes. But Zegart shows how and why the intelligence system itself left us vulnerable. Zegart argues that after the Cold War ended, the CIA and FBI failed to adapt to the rise of terrorism. She makes the case by conducting painstaking analysis of more than three hundred intelligence reform recommendations and tracing the history of CIA and FBI counterterrorism efforts from 1991 to 2001, drawing extensively from declassified government documents and interviews with more than seventy high-ranking government officials. She finds that political leaders were well aware of the emerging terrorist danger and the urgent need for intelligence reform, but failed to achieve the changes they sought. The same forces that have stymied intelligence reform for decades are to blame: resistance inside U.S. intelligence agencies, the rational interests of politicians and career bureaucrats, and core aspects of our democracy such as the fragmented structure of the federal government. Ultimately failures of adaptation led to failures of performance. Zegart reveals how longstanding organizational weaknesses left unaddressed during the 1990s prevented the CIA and FBI from capitalizing on twenty-three opportunities to disrupt the September 11 plot. Spying Blind is a sobering account of why two of America's most important intelligence agencies failed to adjust to new threats after the Cold War, and why they are unlikely to adapt in the future.




Blinking Red


Book Description

After the September 11 attacks, the 9/11 Commission argued that the United States needed a powerful leader, a spymaster, to forge the scattered intelligence bureaucracies into a singular enterprise to vanquish AmericaÆs new enemiesùstateless international terrorists. In the midst of the 2004 presidential election, Congress and the president remade the postûWorld War II national security infrastructure in less than five months, creating the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Blinking Red illuminates the complicated history of the bureaucratic efforts to reform AmericaÆs national security after the intelligence failures of 9/11 and IraqÆs missing weapons of mass destruction, explaining how the NSC and Congress shaped the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks. Michael Allen asserts that the process of creating the DNI position and the NCTC is a case study in power politics and institutional reform. By bringing to light the legislative transactions and political wrangling during the reform of the intelligence community, Allen helps us understand why the effectiveness of these institutional changes is still in question.




The Intelligence Community and 9/11


Book Description

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led many to inquire whether there had been a failure by United States intelligence agencies to collect all available information about the plots that led to the attacks, to analyze it properly, and disseminate it in time to protect the American public. Congressional intelligence committees responded by launching an unprecedented Joint Inquiry to investigate the Intelligence Community's record in regard to the 9/11 attacks and make recommendations for further legislative action. The Joint Inquiry began its investigation in February 2002 and held public hearings in September and October. Findings, conclusions, and recommendations were made public in December 2002; release of the final report is anticipated in 2003. In public hearings, the Joint Inquiry's Staff Director traced salient aspects of the Inquiry's work and emphasized that, whereas the Intelligence Community provided ample warning of an impending attack in mid-2001 against the U.S. by the Islamic terrorist group headed by Osama Bin Laden, the Community did not learn in advance the plans for the aircraft hijackings that occurred on September 11. The Joint Inquiry focused on several underlying problems. For a number of Constitutional, statutory, and organization reasons, information collected by intelligence agencies has historically not been routinely used for law enforcement purposes. Similarly, information collected in preparation for trials has not been routinely forwarded to intelligence agencies. In an era in which terrorists work abroad to launch attacks in the U.S., some have argued that the "walls" between intelligence and law enforcement have complicated the ability of any agency to put together a complete picture of evolving plots. Explaining the complexity of this situation was a major contribution of the Inquiry, although the issue of breaching these "walls" remains complicated and controversial. In addition, the Inquiry examined the role of the FBI. There were criticisms of the Bureau's ability to: process and store information; provide communications links between field offices and headquarters; process applications for surveillance; and coordinate with intelligence agencies. More fundamentally, the intelligence committees examined priorities that, prior to September 11, 2001, did not emphasize counterterrorism to the extent that has subsequently been considered necessary. The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-306) establishes an independent commission to assess the role of agencies throughout the government with regard to the 9/11 attacks. This independent commission, to be headed by former New Jersey Governor Thomas H. Kean, will build upon the investigatory record of the Joint Inquiry, but might reach further to assess organizational issues and the proper relationship of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This report will be updated as circumstances dictate.




Intelligence Matters


Book Description

A compelling account and analysis of the failures that led to the infamous September 11 attacks, as recalled by the co-chair of the Joint House-Senate inquiry that conducted the ensuing investigation. Raises fundamental questions about the competence and honesty of public officials in the CIA, the FBI, and the White House.




The U.S. Intelligence Community After 9/11


Book Description

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington led to profound changes in U.S. foreign and defense policy, internal security practices, and organization for national security -- including dramatic changes in the organization and operations of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Other changes have been the product of factors unrelated to the attacks. The U.S. Intelligence Community after 9/11 reflects the National Security Archive's interest in documenting the organizational and operational changes in the U.S. Intelligence Community since the attacks. For this publication, an effort was made to collect as many relevant documents as possible, both through examining the websites of relevant agencies and use of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Targets of research included all 16 agencies that constitute the U.S. Intelligence Community -- the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the national intelligence agencies (the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation), and the intelligence components of Cabinet-level departments (including State, Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury), and the military services. Also included are the organizations (such as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence) that supervise and manage the above agencies' activities as well as the means of management (such as departmental directives).




Intelligence and Surprise Attack


Book Description

How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to “connect the dots” of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report’s findings.




Breakdown


Book Description

New York Times bestselling author Bill Gertz uses his unparalleled access to America's intelligence system to show how this system completely broke down in the years, months, and days leading up to the deadly terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.




Preventing Surprise Attacks


Book Description

Posner discusses the utter futilty of this reform act in a searing critique of the 9/11 Commission, its recommendations, Congress's role in making law, and the law's inability to do what it is intended to do.




9/11 Commission Recommendations


Book Description

This title presents the 9/11 Commission's recommendations and the status of their implementation.




Imagine... an End to This Madness ~ TERRORISM


Book Description

This story is a compilation of visionary strategies, expedited to our Intelligence Community including the Oval Office ~ speaking truth to power-essentially to keep all Americans safe, especially our forces, currently in IRAQ. Unfortunately, this title has been assigned a rating of (9.5) on the Political Richter Scale in addition to the incredible unvarnished revelations involving IRAQ, and the Bush-Chaney Intelligence Community since the surprise lethal terrorist attacks, against America on that September 11, 2001. (Very Current Events).