The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War


Book Description

The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahadeen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War is a 1998 non-fiction book written by former Afghan Army Colonel Ali Ahmad Jalali and American military scholar Lester W. Grau. The book was commissioned by the United States Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division to complement Grau's previous book, "The Bear Went Over the Mountain." Jalali and Grau had planned travel into Afghanistan to interview Mujahideen fighters in late 1996, but were forced to remain in Pakistan when a Taliban offensive campaign started to seize major portions of Afghanistan, eventually capturing Kabul on September 27. Jalali interviewed approximately 40 Mujahideen during the month which the authors spent in Pakistan and an associate, Major Nasrullah Safi, conducted interviews inside Afghanistan for two months to collect additional data.




The Bear Went Over the Mountain


Book Description

counterinsurgency punctuated by moments of heady excitement and terror. Colonel Grau, the editor and translator, has added his own commentary to produce a useful guide for commanders to meet the challenges of this kind of war and to help keep his fellow soldiers alive. This book will also be of interest to the historian and general reader, who will discover that advances in technology have had little impact on this kind of war, and that many of the same tactics the British Army used on the Northwest Frontier still apply today.




Afghan Guerrilla Warfare


Book Description

DIVWhen the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, few experts believed the fledgling Mujahideen resistance movement had a chance of withstanding the modern, mechanized onslaught of the Soviet Army. But somehow, the Mujahideen prevailed against a larger and decisively better equipped foe. No one predicted the Soviet Union would withdraw in defeat in 1989. With more than 100 first-hand reports from Mujahideen combat veterans and maps illustrating locations and disposition of forces, this book is a tactical look at a decentralized army of foot-mobile guerrillas as they wage war against a superior force. Learn about Mujahideen ambushes, raids, shelling attacks, fights against heliborne insertions, attacks on Soviet strong points, and urban combat in this rare look at the Soviet-Afghan conflict./div




The Soviet-Afghan War


Book Description

Offers a candid view of a war that played a significant role in the ultimate demise of the Soviet Union. Presents analysis absolutely vital to Western policymakers, as well as to political, diplomatic, and military historians and anyone interested in Russian and Soviet history. Provides insights regarding current and future Russian struggles in ethnic conflicts both at and within their borders, struggles that could potentially destroy the Russian Federation.




Ending Obama's War


Book Description

Now in its tenth year, the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan continues with no foreseeable end in sight. Ending Obama's War is intended to help and hold President Obama to his policy of beginning military withdrawals in July 2011 - and sooner if possible. Renowned peace scholar David Cortright offers realistic alternatives for ending the war whilst continuing to help the Afghan people, especially women, with development and human rights. Ending Obama's War outlines a responsible military disengagement strategy and links it to agreements on security cooperation, political power sharing, and a regional diplomatic compact. This is a timely, informed study which offers a way forward for one of the world's worst conflict zones.




The Battle for Afghanistan


Book Description

This is the story of the defeat of Soviet Russia's forces in Afghanistan by a guerrilla force known as the Mujahideen, heavily backed by Pakistan and the USA. The Mujahideen paved the way for the Taliban regime, to exist having all but defeated the Russian Army in the late 80's.The author, Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, was head of the Afghan Bureau of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence and as such was effectively the Mujahideen's commander-in-chief. He controlled the flow of thousands of tons of arms across Pakistan and into its occupied neighbor, arms that were bought with CIA and Saudi Arabian funds from the USA. One of the Mujahideen's close allies was none other than Osama Bin Laden.This compelling book was put together with great skill the by military historian, Mark Adkin in conjunction with Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and is essential reading for anyone interested in the truth behind the Afghanistan War which led to the conditions that exist there today.A hardback edition of this book was published by Casemate in 2001 under the title Afghanistan: The Bear Trap.




The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands


Book Description

This book investigates the Soviet response to nationalist insurgencies between 1944 and 1953 in the regions the Soviet Union annexed after the Nazi-Soviet pact.




From Kabul to Baghdad and Back


Book Description

From Kabul to Baghdad and Back provides insight into the key strategic decisions of the Afghan and Iraq campaigns as the United States attempted to wage both simultaneously against al-Qaeda and its supporting affiliates. It also evaluates the strategic execution of those military campaigns to identify how well the two operations were conducted in light of their political objectives. The book identifies the elements that made the 2001 military operation to oust the Taliban successful, then with combat operations in Iraq as a standard of comparison, the authors analyze the remainder of the Afghan campaign and the essential problems that plagued that effort, from the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2002, through the ill-fated transition to NATO lead in Afghanistan in 2006, the dismissal of Generals McKiernan and McChrystal, the eventual decision by President Obama to make the Afghan campaign the main effort in the war on extremism, and the final development of drawdown plans following the end of the war in Iraq. No other book successfully compares and contrasts the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan from a national strategic perspective, analyzing the impact of fighting the Iraq War on the success of the United States campaign in Afghanistan. It is also the first book to specifically question several key operational decisions in Afghanistan including: the decision to give NATO the lead in Afghanistan, the decisions to fire Generals McKiernan and McChrystal and the decision to conduct an Iraq War-style surge in Afghanistan. It also compares the Afghan campaigns fought by the Soviet Union and the United States, the counterinsurgency campaigns styles in Iraq and Afghanistan and the leadership of senior American officials in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the final chapter, the key lessons of the two campaigns are outlined, including the importance of effective strategic decision-making, the utility of population focused counterinsurgency practices, the challenges of building partner capacity during combat, and the mindset required to prosecute modern war.




Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam


Book Description

Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.




Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention


Book Description

Henry S. Bradsher, whose 1983 study of the Afghanistan situation was widely praised, sheds new light on the entire period of Afghan Communism, from its origins in the 1950s to the collapse of the Najibullah regime in 1992. Extensive interviewing, a wide range of source materials, and access to Soviet archives make this a comprehensive account.