Waterloo


Book Description

The concluding volume of this work provides a fresh description of the climatic battle of Waterloo placed in the context of the whole campaign. It discusses several vexed questions: Blucher's intentions for the battle, Wellington's choice of site, his reasons for placing substantial forces at Hal, the placement of Napoleon's artillery, who authorized the French cavalry attacks, Grouchy's role on 18 and 19 June, Napoleon's own statements on the Garde's formation in the final attack, and the climactic moment when the Prussians reached Wellington's troops near la Belle Alliance. Close attention is paid to the negotiations that led to the capitulation of Paris, and subsequent French claims. The allegations of Las Cases and later historians that Napoleon's surrender to Captain Maitland of the Bellerophon amounted to entrapment are also examined. After a survey of the peace settlement of 1815, the book concludes with a masterly chapter reviewing the whole story of the 1815 campaign.




Waterloo: The Campaign of 1815, Volume 1


Book Description

This, the fourth volume in Andrew Field's highly praised study of the Waterloo campaign from the French perspective, depicts in vivid detail the often neglected final phase the rout and retreat of Napoleon's army. The text is based exclusively on French eyewitness accounts which give an inside view of the immediate aftermath of the battle and carry the story through to the army's disbandment in late 1815. Many French officers and soldiers wrote more about the retreat than they did about the catastrophe of Waterloo itself. Their recollections give a fascinating insight to the psyche of the French soldier. They also provide a firsthand record of their experiences and the range of their reactions, from those who deserted the colors and made their way home, to those who continued to serve faithfully when all was lost. Napoleons own flight from Waterloo is an essential part of the narrative, but the main emphasis is on the fate of the beaten French army as it was experienced by eyewitnesses who lived through the last days of the campaign.







Napoleon and Wellington


Book Description

A dual biography of the greatest opposing generals of their age who ultimately became fixated on one another, by a bestselling historian. 'Thoroughly enjoyable, beautifully written and meticulously researched' Observer On the morning of the battle of Waterloo, the Emperor Napoleon declared that the Duke of Wellington was a bad general, the British were bad soldiers and that France could not fail to win an easy victory. Forever afterwards historians have accused him of gross overconfidence, and massively underestimating the calibre of the British commander opposed to him. Andrew Roberts presents an original, highly revisionist view of the relationship between the two greatest captains of their age. Napoleon, who was born in the same year as Wellington - 1769 - fought Wellington by proxy years earlier in the Peninsula War, praising his ruthlessness in private while publicly deriding him as a mere 'sepoy general'. In contrast, Wellington publicly lauded Napoleon, saying that his presence on a battlefield was worth forty thousand men, but privately wrote long memoranda lambasting Napoleon's campaigning techniques. Although Wellington saved Napoleon from execution after Waterloo, Napoleon left money in his will to the man who had tried to assassinate Wellington. Wellington in turn amassed a series of Napoleonic trophies of his great victory, even sleeping with two of the Emperor's mistresses.










Wellington: The Iron Duke (Text Only)


Book Description

In this compelling book, Richard Holmes tells the exhilarating story of the Duke of Wellington, Britain's greatest ever soldier.




Clausewitz


Book Description

Carl von Clausewitz's On War, his chef d'oeuvre of strategic and military theory, was first published in 1832, after his death. The book remains a touchstone, dissected and debated by scholars, students, and military personnel around the world who consider it the founding document of the field. Yet to Clausewitz himself, far more important than achieving recognition for his written works was glory on the field of battle. He dreamed of winning renown not with his pen, but with his sword, and wielded both with the same determination and zeal. In this new biographical study of Clausewitz, Donald Stoker moves skillfully between his career as a soldier and his work as a theoretician. Conventional wisdom holds that Clausewitz was "merely a staff officer" who didn't see much combat, but Stoker shows this to be far from true. As a soldier during the era of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars - perhaps the most intense period of continuous large-scale warfare in history - Clausewitz gained an enormous amount of battle experience. By reconstructing his role in various compaigns, from Jena-Auerstedt to Waterloo, this work offers new insights into Clausewitz as both a soldier in an a witness to the momentous fighting of his time. Taking readers through the heat of these battles, Stoker provides historical overview and strategic analysis, showing the connection between events and Clausewitz's own words, taken both from his works and the abundant letters written to his wife, Marie, and friends throughout his life. Clausewitz's contributions to military theory have solidified his reputation, which seems continually to rise, and Stoker assesses each of his significant works and their contribution to his legacy. Grounding Clausewitz's theoretical analyses on the field of battle, Stoker traces the road to On War, and provides an absorbing reassessment of both the warrior and the theorist. -- from dust jacket.




Political and Military History of the Campaign of Waterloo


Book Description

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1864 edition. Excerpt: ... the 16th and 17th. The main body of the Prussian army (three corps, together 90,000 men) thus found itself in position between Bry and Tongrines, at ten o'clock on the morning of the 16th. Wellington, who believed Napoleon still at Paris, was not aware of his army's approach, until the news of the passage of the Sambre received at 5 P. M., on the 15th at Brussels, while at a dinner; but the duke had forewarned his troops to hold themselves in readiness for the first signal, and he sent ofiicers in all directions to put them in motion. His left under the Prince of Orange, was in cantonments between Mons and Nivelles, and with its head-quarters at Braine le Comte; his right under General Hill, extended towards Ath. It was then only by a prodigy of activity that this extended line could be concentrated on his left by the evening of the 16th or the morning of the 17th, and it was evident that a connection with the Prussians could be effected by the road from Nivelles to Quatre-Bras. After having dispatched these orders, Wellington repaired to Quatre-Bras, where on the morning of the 16th he found a portion of Perpoucher's Belgian division just from Nivelles, and the brigade of the Prince of Saxe-Weimar. While awaiting the columns from Brussels and Braine, the duke galloped over to Bry, where, about noon, he held an interview with Blucher; finding the Prussian army disposed to give battle, he promised to collect thirty or thirty-five thousand men during the night, to support his right, and with this object returned to QuatreBras, where he arrived after two o'clock. To conquer an enemy that made such wise disposiHons, it would have required the ancient impetuosity of the conqueror of Italy, Ulm, Jena, and Ratisbonne; but bis warmest admirers...