The Reconstruction of Iraq After 2003


Book Description

Beginning in 2003, diverse and significant actors, both domestic and international, engaged in reconstruction activities in Iraq. The total budget committed to Iraq's reconstruction was unprecedented among postconflict operations mobilized by the international community. Despite the vast sums of money spent, and the implementation of its many projects and programs, the donors and the Iraqi people view the reconstruction efforts in Iraq in a negative light. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003: Learning from Its Successes and Failures focuses on the period between 2003 and 2014--that is, after the United States+"led invasion and overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, and before the sudden rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh. This book assesses several dimensions of Iraq's reconstruction. First, it considers the response of key international actors, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the United States, and other bilateral donors--specifically, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom--as well as nongovernmental organizations. Second, it analyzes the process and results of the reconstruction of key sectors (electricity, oil, education, and health), and the interventions geared to institution building and governance reform. Pursuing effective reconstruction within the context of conflict and fragility is a formidable challenge because of the uncertain, fluid, and complex environment. Based on the experience in Iraq, how can the international community support the effectiveness and durability of reconstruction? This book identifies lessons in seven areas and offers four recommendations for international and domestic actors and citizens engaged in reconstruction activities. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003 is important reading for development practitioners and policy makers who are or will be engaged in reconstruction efforts in fragile and conflict-affected environments.




The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003


Book Description

Beginning in 2003, diverse and significant actors, both domestic and international, engaged in reconstruction activities in Iraq. The total budget committed to Iraq’s reconstruction was unprecedented among postconflict operations mobilized by the international community. Despite the vast sums of money spent, and the implementation of its many projects and programs, the donors and the Iraqi people view the reconstruction efforts in Iraq in a negative light. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003: Learning from Its Successes and Failures focuses on the period between 2003 and 2014—that is, after the United States†“led invasion and overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, and before the sudden rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh. This book assesses several dimensions of Iraq’s reconstruction. First, it considers the response of key international actors, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the United States, and other bilateral donors—specifically, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom—as well as nongovernmental organizations. Second, it analyzes the process and results of the reconstruction of key sectors (electricity, oil, education, and health), and the interventions geared to institution building and governance reform. Pursuing effective reconstruction within the context of conflict and fragility is a formidable challenge because of the uncertain, fluid, and complex environment. Based on the experience in Iraq, how can the international community support the effectiveness and durability of reconstruction? This book identifies lessons in seven areas and offers four recommendations for international and domestic actors and citizens engaged in reconstruction activities. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003 is important reading for development practitioners and policy makers who are or will be engaged in reconstruction efforts in fragile and conflict-affected environments.




Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)


Book Description

Examines the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population for most of the military campaign in Iraq and analyzes the failure of a technologically driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. It outlines strategic considerations relative to COIN; presents an overview of the conflict in Iraq; describes implications for future operations; and offers recommendations to improve the U.S. capability to conduct COIN.




America's Role in Nation-Building


Book Description

The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for postconflict nation-building that have not since been matched. Only in recent years has the United States has felt the need to participate in similar transformations, but it is now facing one of the most challenging prospects since the 1940s: Iraq. The authors review seven case studies--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--and seek lessons about what worked well and what did not. Then, they examine the Iraq situation in light of these lessons. Success in Iraq will require an extensive commitment of financial, military, and political resources for a long time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed.




After Saddam


Book Description

This monograph examines prewar planning efforts for the reconstruction of postwar Iraq. It then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003, through June 2004. Finally, it examines civilian efforts at reconstruction, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services.




The Iraq Study Group Report


Book Description

Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which was formed in 2006 to examine the situation in Iraq and offer suggestions for the American military's future involvement in the region.




Losing Iraq


Book Description

According to conventional wisdom, Iraq has suffered because the Bush administration had no plan for reconstruction. That's not the case; the State Department's Future of Iraq group planned out the situation carefully and extensively, and Middle East expert David Phillips was part of this group. White House ideologues and imprudent Pentagon officials decided simply to ignore those plans. The administration only listened to what it wanted to hear. Losing Iraq doesn't't just criticize the policies of unilateralism, preemption, and possible deception that launched the war; it documents the process of returning sovereignty to an occupied Iraq. Unique, as well, are Phillips's personal accounts of dissension within the administration. The problems encountered in Iraq are troubling not only in themselves but also because they bode ill for other nation-building efforts in which the U.S. may become mired through this administration's doctrine of unilateral, preemptive war. Losing Iraq looks into the future of America's foreign policy with a clear-eyed critique of the problems that loom ahead.




Reconstructing Iraq


Book Description




The Iraq War


Book Description

This book provides information and analysis with respect to the 2003 war with Iraq, reviews a number of war-related issues, and provides links to additional sources of information. Contents: Introduction; US Policy: The Administration; Congressional Action; Issues fir Congress: Military Issues; Diplomatic Issues; Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues; Post-War Governance Issues; Burden Sharing; Implications for the Middle East; Humanitarian Issues; Humanitarian Assistance: Relief Operations; Post-War Relief Priorities; International and Domestic Legal Issues Relating to the Use of Force; Cost Issues; Oil Supply Issues; Information Resources; Index.




Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq


Book Description

Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq examines the controversial role of military contractors in the reconstruction of Iraq. When 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' was launched in March 2003, few, if any, of the Coalition's political leaders could have envisaged that within a few months the number of private contractors engaged to keep the troops supplied would exceed their actual combat strength. This alternative 'army' was not only to become the largest assemblage of contractors in living memory to accompany a military force into a war zone, but was also responsible for a fundamental transformation of how military logistics were delivered. This book explains how and why the US and UK governments became so dependent upon military contractors during the war in Iraq. It also examines the ramifications this new dependency will have on future military operations, as the conflict in Iraq has shown that private contractors are now indispensable to the attainment of both the military and political objectives of war. Finally, the book discusses what advantages and disadvantages these companies have brought to the reconstruction of Iraq, and what lessons need to be learned from this experience. This book will be of great interest to students of military and strategic studies, Middle Eastern politics and international security, and as well as policymakers and military professionals. Christopher Kinsey is a lecturer in international security at King's College London, Defence Studies Department, at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham. His previous publications include Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies (Routledge: 2006)