Book Description
Why and under what conditions are the state's regulationscomplied with, and when are they violated? Resource scarcity andstrict regulation of the Atlantic fisheries have generated a demandfor in-depth knowledge of this issue. This comparative study is basedon qualitative data from Norway and Newfoundland. It shows thatinformal social control is a major factor inhibiting violations offormal management regulations among fishermen, and it analyses therelevant moral norms and how they influence compliance. It addressesthe relationship between collective morality and self-interest, anddescribes combinations of normative and strategic action. Thecomparison of the cases ends with a general theory on the morality ofcompliance in economies based on harvesting of natural resources forhouseholds as well as the market. People concerned with management offisheries and other natural resources, and social scientists concernedwith the questions of compliance and legitimate law will most likelybe the primary audiences of the book.