Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy


Book Description

This book examines President Theodore Roosevelt’s use of the United States naval services as supporting components of his diplomatic efforts to facilitate the emergence of the United States as a Great Power at the dawn of the 20th century. After reviewing the development of Roosevelt’s personal philosophy with regard to naval power, the book traverses four chapters that reveal Roosevelt’s use of the Navy and Marine Corps to support American interests during the historically controversial Venezuelan Crisis (1902-03), Panama’s independence movement (1903), the Morocco-Perciaris Incident (1904) and the choice of a navy yard as the sight for the negotiations that ended the Russo-Japanese War. The voyage of the Great White Fleet and Roosevelt’s actions to technologically transform the American Navy are also covered. In the end the book details how Roosevelt’s actions combined to thrust the United States forward onto the world’s stage as a major player, and cemented T.R’s place in American history as a great president despite the fact that he did not serve during a time of war or major domestic disturbance. This history provides new information that finally lays to rest the controversy of whether Theodore Roosevelt did or did not issue an ultimatum to the German and British governments in December, 1902, bringing the United States to the brink of war with two of the world’s great powers. It also reveals a secret war plan developed during Panama’s independence movement which envisioned the United States Marine Corps invading Colombia to defend the sovereignty of the new Panamanian republic.




Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy


Book Description

This book examines the use of military force as a coercive tool by the United States, using lessons drawn from the post-Cold War era (1991–2018). The volume reveals that despite its status as sole superpower during the post-Cold War period, US efforts to coerce other states failed as often as they succeeded. In the coming decades, the United States will face states that are more capable and creative, willing to challenge its interests and able to take advantage of missteps and vulnerabilities. By using lessons derived from in-depth case studies and statistical analysis of an original dataset of more than 100 coercive incidents in the post-Cold War era, this book generates insight into how the US military can be used to achieve policy goals. Specifically, it provides guidance about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, the US armed forces can work in concert with economic and diplomatic elements of US power to create effective coercive strategies. This book will be of interest to students of US national security, US foreign policy, strategic studies and International Relations in general.




The Chinese Navy


Book Description

Tells the story of the growing Chinese Navy - The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) - and its expanding capabilities, evolving roles and military implications for the USA. Divided into four thematic sections, this special collection of essays surveys and analyzes the most important aspects of China's navel modernization.







Earning the Rockies


Book Description

An incisive portrait of the American landscape that shows how geography continues to determine America’s role in the world Book Club Pick for Now Read This, from PBS NewsHour and The New York Times • “There is more insight here into the Age of Trump than in bushels of political-horse-race journalism.”—The New York Times Book Review (Editors’ Choice) At a time when there is little consensus about who we are and what we should be doing with our power overseas, a return to the elemental truths of the American landscape is urgently needed. In Earning the Rockies, New York Times bestselling author Robert D. Kaplan undertakes a cross-country journey, traversing a rich and varied landscape that still remains the primary source of American power. Traveling west, in the same direction as the pioneers, Kaplan witnesses both prosperity and decline, and reexamines the history of westward expansion in a new light: as a story not just of genocide and individualism but also of communalism and a respect for the limits of a water-starved terrain. Concluding at the edge of the Pacific Ocean with a gripping description of an anarchic world, Earning the Rockies shows how America’s foreign policy response ought to be rooted in its own geographical situation. Praise for Earning the Rockies “Unflinchingly honest . . . a lens-changing vision of America’s role in the world . . . a jewel of a book that lights the path ahead.”—Secretary of Defense James Mattis “A sui generis writer . . . America’s East Coast establishment has only one Robert Kaplan, someone as fluently knowledgeable about the Balkans, Iraq, Central Asia and West Africa as he is about Ohio and Wyoming.”—Financial Times “Kaplan has pursued stories in places as remote as Yemen and Outer Mongolia. In Earning the Rockies, he visits a place almost as remote to many Americans: these United States. . . . The author’s point is a good one: America is formed, in part, by a geographic setting that is both sanctuary and watchtower.”—The Wall Street Journal “A brilliant reminder of the impact of America’s geography on its strategy. . . . Kaplan’s latest contribution should be required reading.”—Henry A. Kissinger “A text both evocative and provocative for readers who like to think … In his final sections, Kaplan discusses in scholarly but accessible detail the significant role that America has played and must play in this shuddering world.”—Kirkus Reviews




The United States and India


Book Description

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Aspen Institute India (Aii) have cosponsored a U.S.-India Joint Study Group to identify the shared national interests that motivate the United States and India. The group is releasing its conclusions from meetings held in New Delhi, and Washington, DC. It recommends* The United States express strong support for India''s peaceful rise as a crucial component of Asian security and stability.* The United States and India endorse a residual U.S. military presence over the long term in Afghanistan beyond 2014, if such a presence is acceptable to the government of Afghanistan.* The two countries resume regular meetings among the so-called Quad states (the United States, India, Japan, and Australia), and should periodically invite participation from other like-minded Asian nations such as South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. Representatives of the Quad states have not met since 2007.The group comprised business, policy, and thought leaders from the United States and India, and was co-chaired by Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Naresh Chandra, chairman of National Security Advisory Board.Other members are:Graham T. Allison - Harvard Kennedy SchoolK. S. Bajpai - Delhi Policy GroupSanjaya Baru - Business Standard, IndiaDennis C. Blair Former Director of National IntelligencePramit Pal Chaudhuri - Hindustan TimesP. S. Das Former commander-in-chief, Eastern Naval Command, Indian NavyTarun Das - Aspen Institute IndiaJamshyd N. Godrej - Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Company Ltd.Richard N. Haass - CFR, ex officioStephen J. Hadley - United States Institute of PeaceBrajesh Mishra - Observer Research FoundationC. Raja Mohan - Centre for Policy Research, New DelhiJohn D. Podesta - Center for American ProgressAshley J. Tellis - Carnegie Endowment for International PeacePhilip D. Zelikow - University of VirginiaThe following are select policy recommendations from the report, The United States and India: A Shared Strategic Future.On Pakistan:* Hold classified exchanges on multiple Pakistan contingencies, including the collapse of the Pakistan state and the specter of the Pakistan military losing control of its nuclear arsenal.* The United States should heavily condition all military aid to Pakistan on sustained concrete antiterrorist measures by the Pakistan military against groups targeting India and the United States, including in Afghanistan.* The United States should continue to provide technical assistance to Pakistan to protect its nuclear arsenal, and to prevent the transfer of this technology to third parties.* India should continue its bilateral negotiations with Pakistan on all outstanding issues, including the question of Kashmir. India should attempt to initiate quiet bilateral discussions with Pakistan on Afghanistan as well as trilateral discussions with Afghanistan.On Afghanistan:* India, with U.S. support, should continue to intensify its links with the Afghanistan government in the economic, diplomatic, and security domains.* The United States and India should determine whether large-scale Indian training of Afghanistan security forces, either in Afghanistan or in India, would be beneficial.On China and Asia:* The United States and India should jointly and individually enlist China''s cooperation on matters of global and regional concern. Neither India nor the United States desire confrontation with China, or to forge a coalition for China''s containment.* Given worrisome and heavy-handed Chinese actions since 2007, the United States and India should regularly brief each other on their assessments of China and intensify their consultations on Asian security.On the Middle East:* The United States and India should collaborate on a multiyear, multifaceted initiative to support and cement other democratic transitions in the Middle East-with Arab interest and agreement.* India should intensify discussions with Iran concerning the stability of Iraq and Afghanistan.On economic cooperation, the United States and India should:* Enhance the Strategic Dialogue co-chaired by the U.S. secretary of state and Indian minister of external affairs to include economics and trade.* Begin discussions on a free trade agreement, but recognize that it may not be politically possible in the United States to conclude negotiations in the near term.On climate change and energy technology, the collaboration should:* Include regular, cabinet-level meetings focused on bridging disagreements and identifying creative areas for collaboration.* Conduct a joint feasibility study on a cooperative program to develop space-based solar power with a goal of fielding a commercially viable capability within two decades.On defense cooperation, the United States should:* Train and provide expertise to the Indian military in areas such as space and cyberspace operations where India''s defense establishment is currently weak, but its civil and private sector has strengths.* The United States should help strengthen India''s indigenous defense industry. The United States should treat India as equivalent to a U.S. ally for purposes of defense technology disclosure and export controls of defense and dual-use goods, even though India does not seek an actual alliance relationship.This Joint Study Group, cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and Aspen Institute India, was convened to assess issues of current and critical importance to the U.S.-India relationship and to provide policymakers in both countries with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Joint Study Group members aimed to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and nonpartisan deliberations. Once launched, this Joint Study Group was independent of both sponsoring institutions and its members are solely responsible for the content of the report. Members'' affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement.




Japan’s Decision For War In 1941: Some Enduring Lessons


Book Description

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.




Mission Failure


Book Description

Mission Failure argues that, in the past 25 years, the U.S. military has turned to missions that are largely humanitarian and socio-political - and that this ideologically-driven foreign policy generally leads to failure.