The Road to War, 1967
Author : Walter Laqueur
Publisher : London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson
Page : 374 pages
File Size : 24,52 MB
Release : 1968
Category : Arab-Israeli conflict
ISBN :
Author : Walter Laqueur
Publisher : London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson
Page : 374 pages
File Size : 24,52 MB
Release : 1968
Category : Arab-Israeli conflict
ISBN :
Author : Michael B. Oren
Publisher : Presidio Press
Page : 498 pages
File Size : 13,27 MB
Release : 2017-06-06
Category : History
ISBN : 0345464311
NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER • The first comprehensive account of the epoch-making Six-Day War, from the author of Ally—now featuring a fiftieth-anniversary retrospective Though it lasted for only six tense days in June, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war never really ended. Every crisis that has ripped through this region in the ensuing decades, from the Yom Kippur War of 1973 to the ongoing intifada, is a direct consequence of those six days of fighting. Writing with a novelist’s command of narrative and a historian’s grasp of fact and motive, Michael B. Oren reconstructs both the lightning-fast action on the battlefields and the political shocks that electrified the world. Extraordinary personalities—Moshe Dayan and Gamal Abdul Nasser, Lyndon Johnson and Alexei Kosygin—rose and toppled from power as a result of this war; borders were redrawn; daring strategies brilliantly succeeded or disastrously failed in a matter of hours. And the balance of power changed—in the Middle East and in the world. A towering work of history and an enthralling human narrative, Six Days of War is the most important book on the Middle East conflict to appear in a generation. Praise for Six Days of War “Powerful . . . A highly readable, even gripping account of the 1967 conflict . . . [Oren] has woven a seamless narrative out of a staggering variety of diplomatic and military strands.”—The New York Times “With a remarkably assured style, Oren elucidates nearly every aspect of the conflict. . . . Oren’s [book] will remain the authoritative chronicle of the war. His achievement as a writer and a historian is awesome.”—The Atlantic Monthly “This is not only the best book so far written on the six-day war, it is likely to remain the best.”—The Washington Post Book World “Phenomenal . . . breathtaking history . . . a profoundly talented writer. . . . This book is not only one of the best books on this critical episode in Middle East history; it’s one of the best-written books I’ve read this year, in any genre.”—The Jerusalem Post “[In] Michael Oren’s richly detailed and lucid account, the familiar story is thrilling once again. . . . What makes this book important is the breadth and depth of the research.”—The New York Times Book Review “A first-rate new account of the conflict.”—The Washington Post “The definitive history of the Six-Day War . . . [Oren’s] narrative is precise but written with great literary flair. In no one else’s study is there more understanding or more surprise.”—Martin Peretz, Publisher, The New Republic “Compelling, perhaps even vital, reading.”—San Jose Mercury News
Author : Isabella Ginor
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 539 pages
File Size : 34,20 MB
Release : 2017-08-01
Category : History
ISBN : 0190911433
Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history. This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces and some 20,000 Soviet servicemen with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope, timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the conventional view that détente with the US induced Moscow to restrainthat a US-Moscow détente led to a curtailment of Egyptian ambitions to recapture of the land it lost to Israel in 1967. Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new genre of sources-- -memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit this pivotal moment in world history.
Author : Shlomo Aloni
Publisher : Bloomsbury Publishing
Page : 97 pages
File Size : 36,19 MB
Release : 2019-06-27
Category : History
ISBN : 1472835298
On one day in June, the balance of air power in the Middle East was turned upside down by perhaps the most ruthlessly effective air superiority campaign in history – Operation Moked, or Focus. In 1967, the Israeli Air Force was outnumbered more than two to one by the jets of hostile Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Operation Focus was Israel's ingenious strike plan to overturn the balance. At 0745hrs on June 6, Israeli jets hit Egypt's airfields simultaneously, first bombing runways and then strafing aircraft. Another 20 follow-up missions were already in the air, initially scheduled to hit every five minutes. This new history of Operation Focus explains how the concept for Focus was devised and meticulously planned, the astonishing rate of serviceability and turnaround speed it required from ground crews, and how the relentless tempo of strikes shattered one air force after another. It is the story of how Israel's victory in the Six-Day War began with a single, shocking day.
Author : George Walter Gawrych
Publisher :
Page : 164 pages
File Size : 45,17 MB
Release : 1990
Category : Abu Ageila, Battle of, Abū ʻUjaylah, Egypt, 1956
ISBN :
Author : Yaacov Ro'i
Publisher : Stanford University Press
Page : 400 pages
File Size : 17,49 MB
Release : 2008
Category : History
ISBN : 9780804758802
Why did the Soviet Union spark war in 1967 between Israel and the Arab states by falsely informing Syria and Egypt that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border? Based on newly available archival sources, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War answers this controversial question more fully than ever before. Directly opposing the thesis of the recently published Foxbats over Dimona by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, the contributors to this volume argue that Moscow had absolutely no intention of starting a war. The Soviet Union's reason for involvement in the region had more to do with enhancing its own status as a Cold War power than any desire for particular outcomes for Syria and Egypt. In addition to assessing Soviet involvement in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War, this book covers the USSR's relations with Syria and Egypt, Soviet aims, U.S. and Israeli perceptions of Soviet involvement, Soviet intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition (1969-70), and the impact of the conflicts on Soviet-Jewish attitudes. This book as a whole demonstrates how the Soviet Union's actions gave little consideration to the long- or mid-term consequences of their policy, and how firing the first shot compelled them to react to events.
Author : Wm Roger Louis
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 347 pages
File Size : 40,27 MB
Release : 2012-02-13
Category : History
ISBN : 1107377889
The June 1967 war was a watershed in the history of the modern Middle East. In six days, the Israelis defeated the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies, seizing large portions of their territories. Two veteran scholars of the Middle East bring together some of the most knowledgeable experts in their fields to reassess the origins and the legacies of the war. Each chapter takes a different perspective from the vantage point of a different participant, those that actually took part in the war and also the world powers that played important roles behind the scenes. Their conclusions make for sober reading. At the heart of the story was the incompetence of the Egyptian leadership and the rivalry between various Arab players who were deeply suspicious of each other's motives. Israel, on the other side, gained a resounding victory for which, despite previous assessments to the contrary, there was no master plan.
Author : Otto J. Lehrack
Publisher : Zenith Imprint
Page : 328 pages
File Size : 31,7 MB
Release : 2010-04-01
Category : History
ISBN : 9780760338018
This is an epic oral history of Vietnam's bloodiest campaign, fought for seven months in a series of battles, most of them within four miles of each other, along Route 534. Staring in October 1967, orders came down to the 2nd North Vietnamese Army Division commanding them to join with the local Viet Cong and seize the city of Danang in the Tet Offensive. After fighting for seven months in the Que Son Valley, the division was so battered that it failed to carry out its mission, with only one platoon making it inside the city limits. This is the true-life accounts of what fighting was like in that narrow, bloody valley from the veteran's own mouths, and how that saved Danang from suffering the same fate as Hue City
Author :
Publisher : Doubleday Books
Page : 580 pages
File Size : 33,11 MB
Release : 1974
Category : History
ISBN :
Reports findings of a December 1973 Jerusalem Symposium assessing the trauma among the world's Jews (and non-Jews) during and following the October war.
Author : Michael Sharnoff
Publisher : Taylor & Francis
Page : 248 pages
File Size : 48,91 MB
Release : 2017-05-23
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 135161763X
Gamal Abdel Nasser was arguably one of the most influential Arab leaders in history. As President of Egypt from 1956 to 1970, he could have achieved a peace agreement with Israel, yet he preferred to maintain his unique leadership role by affirming pan-Arab nationalism and championing the liberation of Palestine, a common euphemism for the destruction of Israel. In that era of Cold War politics, Nasser brilliantly played Moscow, Washington, and the United Nations to maximize his bargaining position and sustain his rule without compromising his core beliefs of Arab unity and solidarity. Surprisingly, little analysis is found regarding Nasser’s public and private perspectives on peace in the weeks and months immediately after the 1967 War. Nasser’s Peace is a close examination of how a developing country can rival world powers and how fluid the definition of “peace” can be. Drawing on recently declassified primary sources, Michael Sharnoff thoroughly inspects Nasser’s post-war strategy, which he claims was a four-tiered diplomatic and media effort consisting of his public declarations, his private diplomatic consultations, the Egyptian media’s propaganda machine, and Egyptian diplomatic efforts. Sharnoff reveals that Nasser manipulated each tier masterfully, providing the answers they desired to hear, rather than stating the truth: that he wished to maintain control of his dictatorship and of his foothold in the Arab world.