Vietnam Studies - The Role Of Military Intelligence 1965-1967 [Illustrated Edition]


Book Description

[Includes 13 charts, and 46 illustrations] This book forms part of the “Vietnam Studies” series produced by various senior commanders who had served in the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War; each officer was chosen for their knowledge of the number of specialized subjects that were covered by the series. The challenge facing the General McChristian in 1965 was exceptionally daunting, as deputy head of General Westmoreland’s Intelligence section his orders were clear he was told that he must "Find the enemy!". A daunting task in a country filled with insurgents, uniformed enemy using other countries to move toward their targets, double agents, spies and a South Vietnamese Intelligence service to be integrated into his plans. As he himself put it: “I knew that finding the enemy was only part of the challenge. Our soldiers would have to fix and fight him. They would need to know enemy strength, capabilities, and vulnerabilities as well as information on the weather and terrain. Such intelligence had to be timely, accurate, adequate, and usable. It was to be my job to build an organization to meet that challenge.” It is remarkable that he achieved a good measure of success in his task in only two years in a country with so many endemic issues, and even more so that he was able to distil his story and of his department in to this detailed but very readable exposition of the Intelligence services in Vietnam. A complex and engaging study of a very difficult job done well.







Military intelligence


Book Description

CMH 60-13. Army Lineage Series. By John Patrick Finnegan. Lineages compiled by Romana Danysh. Presents an organizational history of Military Intelligence in the United States Army from its beginnings to the present. Includes the lineages and heraldic items of military intelligence brigades, groups, and battalions rganized under tables of organization and equipment.




Combat Operations


Book Description

Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive chronicles the onset of offensive operations by the U.S. Army after eighteen months of building up a credible force on the ground in South Vietnam and taking the first steps toward bringing the war to the enemy. The compelling story by George L. MacGarrigle begins in October 1966, when General William C. Westmoreland believed that he had the arms and men to take the initiative from the enemy and that significant progress would be made on all fronts over the next twelve months. Aware of American intentions, North Vietnam undertook a prolonged war of attrition and stepped up the infiltration of its own troops into the South. While the insurgency in the South remained the cornerstone of Communist strategy, it was increasingly overshadowed by main-force military operations. These circumstances, according to MacGarrigle, set the stage for intensified combat. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units retained the advantage, fighting only when it suited their purposes and retreating with impunity into inviolate sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. With Westmoreland feeling hamstrung by political constraints on his ability to wage war in the vast hostile areas along the border, 1967 ended with a growing uncertainty in the struggle to secure the countryside. Relying on official American and enemy primary sources, MacGarrigle has crafted a well-balanced account of this year of intense combat. His volume is a tribute to those who sacrificed so much in a long and irresolute conflict, and Soldiers engaged in military operations that place great demands on their initiative, skill, and devotion will find its thought-provoking lessons worthy of reflection.




Organizational Intelligence and Knowledge Analytics


Book Description

Organizational Intelligence and Knowledge Analytics expands the traditional intelligence life cycle to a new framework - Design-Analyze-Automate-Accelerate - and clearly lays out the alignments between knowledge capital and intelligence strategies.




Blowtorch


Book Description

History has not been kind to Robert Komer, a casualty of bad historical analysis and inaccurate information. A Cold War national security policy and strategy adviser to three presidents, Komer was one of the most influential national security professionals of the era. The book begins with a review of his early life that helped shape his worldview. It then examines Komer’s influence as a National Security Council staff member during the Kennedy administration, where he helped set its activist course regarding the Third World. Upon Kennedy’s death, Lyndon Johnson named Komer his “point man” for Vietnam pacification policy, and later General Westmoreland’s operational deputy in Vietnam. The author highlights Komer’s activities during the three years he strove to fulfill the president’s vision that Communism could be repelled from Southeast Asia by economic and social development along with military force. Known as “Blowtorch” for his abrasive personality and disdain for bureaucratic foot dragging, Komer came to be seen as the right person for managing that effort, and in 1968 was rewarded with an ambassadorship to Turkey. The book analyzes Komer’s work during the Carter administration as special adviser to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and credits him for reenergizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s conventional capability and forging the military instrument that implemented the Carter Doctrine in the Persian Gulf—the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. It also explores his final role as a defense intellectual and critic of the Reagan administration’s defense policies. The book concludes with a useful summary of Komer’s impact on American policy and strategy and his contributions to counterinsurgency practices, a legacy now recognized for its importance in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.







Strategic Military Surprise


Book Description