Negotiating the New START Treaty


Book Description

Rose Gottemoeller, the US chief negotiator of the New START treaty-and the first woman to lead a major nuclear arms negotiation-delivers in this book an invaluable insider's account of the negotiations between the US and Russian delegations in Geneva in 2009 and 2010. It also examines the crucially important discussions about the treaty between President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev, and it describes the tough negotiations Gottemoeller and her team went through to gain the support of the Senate for the treaty. And importantly, at a time when the US Congress stands deeply divided, it tells the story of how, in a previous time of partisan division, Republicans and Democrats came together to ratify a treaty to safeguard the future of all Americans. Rose Gottemoeller is uniquely qualified to write this book, bringing to the task not only many years of high-level experience in creating and enacting US policy on arms control and compliance but also a profound understanding of the broader politico-military context from her time as NATO Deputy Secretary General. Thanks to her years working with Russians, including as Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, she provides rare insights into the actions of the Russian delegation-and the dynamics between Medvedev and then-Prime Minister Vladmir Putin. Her encyclopedic recall of the events and astute ability to analyze objectively, while laying out her own thoughts and feelings at the time, make this both an invaluable document of record-and a fascinating story. In conveying the sense of excitement and satisfaction in delivering an innovative arms control instrument for the American people and by laying out the lessons Gottemoeller and her colleagues learned, this book will serve as an inspiration for the next generation of negotiators, as a road map for them as they learn and practice their trade, and as a blueprint to inform the shaping and ratification of future treaties. This book is in the Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS) Series (General Editor: Dr. Geoffrey R.H. Burn) and has received much praise, including: “As advances in technology usher in a new age of weaponry, future negotiators would benefit from reading Rose Gottemoeller’s memoir of the process leading to the most significant arms control agreement of recent decades.” —Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State “Rose Gottemoeller’s book on the New START negotiations is the definitive book on this treaty or indeed, any of the nuclear treaties with the Soviet Union or Russia. These treaties played a key role in keeping the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union from breaking out into a civilization-ending war. But her story of the New START negotiation is no dry academic treatise. She tells with wit and charm the human story of the negotiators, as well as the critical issues involved. Rose’s book is an important and well-told story about the last nuclear treaty negotiated between the US and Russia.” —William J. Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense “This book is important, but not just because it tells you about a very significant past, but also because it helps you understand the future.” — George Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of State




Negotiating the New START Treaty


Book Description

"Rose Gottemoeller, the US chief negotiator of the New START treaty-and the first woman to lead a major nuclear arms negotiation-delivers in this book an invaluable insider's account of the negotiations between the US and Russian delegations in Geneva in 2009 and 2010. It also examines the crucially important discussions about the treaty between President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev, and it describes the tough negotiations Gottemoeller and her team went through to gain the support of the Senate for the treaty. And importantly, at a time when the US Congress stands deeply divided, it tells the story of how, in a previous time of partisan division, Republicans and Democrats came together to ratify a treaty to safeguard the future of all Americans. Rose Gottemoeller is uniquely qualified to write this book, bringing to the task not only many years of high-level experience in creating and enacting US policy on arms control and compliance but also a profound understanding of the broader politico-military context from her time as NATO Deputy Secretary General. Thanks to her years working with Russians, including as Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, she provides rare insights into the actions of the Russian delegation-and the dynamics between Medvedev and then-Prime Minister Vladmir Putin. Her encyclopedic recall of the events and astute ability to analyze objectively, while laying out her own thoughts and feelings at the time, make this both an invaluable document of record-and a fascinating story. In conveying the sense of excitement and satisfaction in delivering an innovative arms control instrument for the American people and by laying out the lessons Gottemoeller and her colleagues learned, this book will serve as an inspiration for the next generation of negotiators, as a road map for them as they learn and practice their trade, and as a blueprint to inform the shaping and ratification of future treaties"--




The START Treaty and Beyond


Book Description

I. Introduction -- II. Targeting, doctrine, and deterrence -- III. Options for U.S. forces -- IV. Costs of the options -- V. Nuclear forces and simulated nuclear war -- VI. Verification -- VII. Nuclear forces and international politics -- Appendix A. Details of the forces and their costs -- Appendix B. Exchange calculations -- Appendix C. Effectiveness of missile defenses -- Appendix D. Soviet forces.




Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace


Book Description

The definitive guide to the history of nuclear arms control by a wise eavesdropper and masterful storyteller, Michael Krepon. The greatest unacknowledged diplomatic achievement of the Cold War was the absence of mushroom clouds. Deterrence alone was too dangerous to succeed; it needed arms control to prevent nuclear warfare. So, U.S. and Soviet leaders ventured into the unknown to devise guardrails for nuclear arms control and to treat the Bomb differently than other weapons. Against the odds, they succeeded. Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare for three quarters of a century. This book is the first in-depth history of how the nuclear peace was won by complementing deterrence with reassurance, and then jeopardized by discarding arms control after the Cold War ended. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace tells a remarkable story of high-wire acts of diplomacy, close calls, dogged persistence, and extraordinary success. Michael Krepon brings to life the pitched battles between arms controllers and advocates of nuclear deterrence, the ironic twists and unexpected outcomes from Truman to Trump. What began with a ban on atmospheric testing and a nonproliferation treaty reached its apogee with treaties that mandated deep cuts and corralled "loose nukes" after the Soviet Union imploded. After the Cold War ended, much of this diplomatic accomplishment was cast aside in favor of freedom of action. The nuclear peace is now imperiled by no less than four nuclear-armed rivalries. Arms control needs to be revived and reimagined for Russia and China to prevent nuclear warfare. New guardrails have to be erected. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace is an engaging account of how the practice of arms control was built from scratch, how it was torn down, and how it can be rebuilt.




The Nuclear Ban Treaty


Book Description

The contributors to this book describe, discuss, and evaluate the normative reframing brought about by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the Ban Treaty), taking you on a journey through its genesis and negotiation history to the shape of the emerging global nuclear order. Adopted by the United Nations on 7 July 2017, the Ban Treaty came into effect on 22 January 2021. For advocates and supporters, weapons that were always immoral are now also illegal. To critics, it represents a profound threat to the stability of the existing global nuclear order with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as the normative anchor. As the most significant leap in nuclear disarmament in fifty years and a rare case study of successful state-civil society partnership in multilateral diplomacy, the Ban Treaty challenges the established order. The book’s contributors are leading experts on the Ban Treaty, including senior scholars, policymakers and civil society activists. A vital guide to the Ban Treaty for students of nuclear disarmament, arms control and diplomacy as well as for policymakers in those fields.




Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control


Book Description

Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control; (3) The Components of a Verification Regime: The Objectives of a Verification Regime; Assessing Verifiability; Monitoring and Verification in U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian Arms Control; Monitoring and Verification in New START (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty); National Technical Means of Verification; Providing Telemetry Generated During Missile Flight Tests: Telemetry Exchange in START; Telemetry Exchange in New START; Mobile ICBMs: Limits on Mobile ICBMs in START; Mobile ICBMs in New START; On-Site Inspections: On-Site Inspections in START; On-Site Inspections in New START; (4) Assessing the Verification Regime in New START. Illustrations.




The New START Treaty


Book Description

The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament-the Duma and Federation Council- approved the treaty in late January 2011 and it entered into force on February 5, 2011. Both parties met the treaty's requirement to complete the reductions by February 5, 2018. The treaty is due to expire in February 2021, unless both parties agree to extend it for no more than five years. New START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. New START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty's Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits. The monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side's forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges. New START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force. The Obama Administration and outside analysts argued that New START strengthens strategic stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, questioned whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that the United States would continue to implement the treaty, at least through 2021. The Administration has not yet determined whether it will request or support an extension of the treaty through 2026.







The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification


Book Description

In the treaty of Versailles and the SALT II Treaty, years of painstaking diplomatic effort were lost when the United States Senate refused to provide its consent to ratification. This book provides the first comparative assessment ever written of executive-congressional relations and the arms control treaty ratification process. A renowned team of historians, political scientists, and policy analysts look at seven case studies, ranging from Versailles to the INF Treaty, to explore the myriad ways to win and lose treaty ratification battles. This book constitutes a strong marriage of scholarship and public policy.




The New Start Treaty


Book Description

The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. Following ratification by the American and Russian legislatures, it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification. Reductions were to be implemented by February 5, 2018, a goal met by both parties. The Treaty is due to expire in February 2021, unless both parties agree to extend it for up to five years. New START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. New START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty's Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits. The monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side's forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges. New START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force. The Obama Administration and outside analysts argued that New START strengthens strategic stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, questioned whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. Secretary of State-designate Tillerson offered support for the Treaty during his confirmation hearings, noting that he supports "the long-standing bipartisan policy of engaging with Russia and other nuclear arms states to verifiably reduce nuclear stockpiles" and that it is important for the United States "to stay engaged with Russia [and] hold them accountable to commitments made under the New START." The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that the United States would continue to implement the Treaty, at least through 2021. The Trump Administration has not yet determined whether it will request or support an extension of the Treaty through 2026.