The United States and India


Book Description

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Aspen Institute India (Aii) have cosponsored a U.S.-India Joint Study Group to identify the shared national interests that motivate the United States and India. The group is releasing its conclusions from meetings held in New Delhi, and Washington, DC. It recommends* The United States express strong support for India''s peaceful rise as a crucial component of Asian security and stability.* The United States and India endorse a residual U.S. military presence over the long term in Afghanistan beyond 2014, if such a presence is acceptable to the government of Afghanistan.* The two countries resume regular meetings among the so-called Quad states (the United States, India, Japan, and Australia), and should periodically invite participation from other like-minded Asian nations such as South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. Representatives of the Quad states have not met since 2007.The group comprised business, policy, and thought leaders from the United States and India, and was co-chaired by Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Naresh Chandra, chairman of National Security Advisory Board.Other members are:Graham T. Allison - Harvard Kennedy SchoolK. S. Bajpai - Delhi Policy GroupSanjaya Baru - Business Standard, IndiaDennis C. Blair Former Director of National IntelligencePramit Pal Chaudhuri - Hindustan TimesP. S. Das Former commander-in-chief, Eastern Naval Command, Indian NavyTarun Das - Aspen Institute IndiaJamshyd N. Godrej - Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Company Ltd.Richard N. Haass - CFR, ex officioStephen J. Hadley - United States Institute of PeaceBrajesh Mishra - Observer Research FoundationC. Raja Mohan - Centre for Policy Research, New DelhiJohn D. Podesta - Center for American ProgressAshley J. Tellis - Carnegie Endowment for International PeacePhilip D. Zelikow - University of VirginiaThe following are select policy recommendations from the report, The United States and India: A Shared Strategic Future.On Pakistan:* Hold classified exchanges on multiple Pakistan contingencies, including the collapse of the Pakistan state and the specter of the Pakistan military losing control of its nuclear arsenal.* The United States should heavily condition all military aid to Pakistan on sustained concrete antiterrorist measures by the Pakistan military against groups targeting India and the United States, including in Afghanistan.* The United States should continue to provide technical assistance to Pakistan to protect its nuclear arsenal, and to prevent the transfer of this technology to third parties.* India should continue its bilateral negotiations with Pakistan on all outstanding issues, including the question of Kashmir. India should attempt to initiate quiet bilateral discussions with Pakistan on Afghanistan as well as trilateral discussions with Afghanistan.On Afghanistan:* India, with U.S. support, should continue to intensify its links with the Afghanistan government in the economic, diplomatic, and security domains.* The United States and India should determine whether large-scale Indian training of Afghanistan security forces, either in Afghanistan or in India, would be beneficial.On China and Asia:* The United States and India should jointly and individually enlist China''s cooperation on matters of global and regional concern. Neither India nor the United States desire confrontation with China, or to forge a coalition for China''s containment.* Given worrisome and heavy-handed Chinese actions since 2007, the United States and India should regularly brief each other on their assessments of China and intensify their consultations on Asian security.On the Middle East:* The United States and India should collaborate on a multiyear, multifaceted initiative to support and cement other democratic transitions in the Middle East-with Arab interest and agreement.* India should intensify discussions with Iran concerning the stability of Iraq and Afghanistan.On economic cooperation, the United States and India should:* Enhance the Strategic Dialogue co-chaired by the U.S. secretary of state and Indian minister of external affairs to include economics and trade.* Begin discussions on a free trade agreement, but recognize that it may not be politically possible in the United States to conclude negotiations in the near term.On climate change and energy technology, the collaboration should:* Include regular, cabinet-level meetings focused on bridging disagreements and identifying creative areas for collaboration.* Conduct a joint feasibility study on a cooperative program to develop space-based solar power with a goal of fielding a commercially viable capability within two decades.On defense cooperation, the United States should:* Train and provide expertise to the Indian military in areas such as space and cyberspace operations where India''s defense establishment is currently weak, but its civil and private sector has strengths.* The United States should help strengthen India''s indigenous defense industry. The United States should treat India as equivalent to a U.S. ally for purposes of defense technology disclosure and export controls of defense and dual-use goods, even though India does not seek an actual alliance relationship.This Joint Study Group, cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and Aspen Institute India, was convened to assess issues of current and critical importance to the U.S.-India relationship and to provide policymakers in both countries with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Joint Study Group members aimed to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and nonpartisan deliberations. Once launched, this Joint Study Group was independent of both sponsoring institutions and its members are solely responsible for the content of the report. Members'' affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement.







India’s Grand Strategy


Book Description

As India prepares to take its place in shaping the course of an ‘Asian century’, there are increasing debates about its ‘grand strategy’ and its role in a future world order. This timely and topical book presents a range of historical and contemporary interpretations and case studies on the theme. Drawing upon rich and diverse narratives that have informed India’s strategic discourse, security and foreign policy, it charts a new agenda for strategic thinking on postcolonial India from a non-Western perspective. Comprehensive and insightful, the work will prove indispensable to those in defence and strategic studies, foreign policy, political science, and modern Indian history. It will also interest policy-makers, think-tanks and diplomats.




Japan’s Decision For War In 1941: Some Enduring Lessons


Book Description

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.




The Causes of Instability in Nigeria and Implications for the United States


Book Description

The political economy problems of Nigeria, the root cause for ethnic, religious, political and economic strife, can be in part addressed indirectly through focused contributions by the U.S. military, especially if regionally aligned units are more thoroughly employed.




The India Way


Book Description

The decade from the 2008 global financial crisis to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic has seen a real transformation of the world order. The very nature of international relations and its rules are changing before our eyes. For India, this means optimal relationships with all the major powers to best advance its goals. It also requires a bolder and non-reciprocal approach to its neighbourhood. A global footprint is now in the making that leverages India's greater capability and relevance, as well as its unique diaspora. This era of global upheaval entails greater expectations from India, putting it on the path to becoming a leading power. In The India Way, S. Jaishankar, India's Minister of External Affairs, analyses these challenges and spells out possible policy responses. He places this thinking in the context of history and tradition, appropriate for a civilizational power that seeks to reclaim its place on the world stage.




The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy


Book Description

Following the end of the Cold War, the economic reforms in the early 1990s, and ensuing impressive growth rates, India has emerged as a leading voice in global affairs, particularly on international economic issues. Its domestic market is fast-growing and India is becoming increasingly important to global geo-strategic calculations, at a time when it has been outperforming many other growing economies, and is the only Asian country with the heft to counterbalance China. Indeed, so much is India defined internationally by its economic performance (and challenges) that other dimensions of its internal situation, notably relevant to security, and of its foreign policy have been relatively neglected in the existing literature. This handbook presents an innovative, high profile volume, providing an authoritative and accessible examination and critique of Indian foreign policy. The handbook brings together essays from a global team of leading experts in the field to provide a comprehensive study of the various dimensions of Indian foreign policy.




The Second Bush Presidency


Book Description

Relations of the United States with India, China, and Europe, Canada, and South America.




Blowtorch


Book Description

History has not been kind to Robert Komer, a casualty of bad historical analysis and inaccurate information. A Cold War national security policy and strategy adviser to three presidents, Komer was one of the most influential national security professionals of the era. The book begins with a review of his early life that helped shape his worldview. It then examines Komer’s influence as a National Security Council staff member during the Kennedy administration, where he helped set its activist course regarding the Third World. Upon Kennedy’s death, Lyndon Johnson named Komer his “point man” for Vietnam pacification policy, and later General Westmoreland’s operational deputy in Vietnam. The author highlights Komer’s activities during the three years he strove to fulfill the president’s vision that Communism could be repelled from Southeast Asia by economic and social development along with military force. Known as “Blowtorch” for his abrasive personality and disdain for bureaucratic foot dragging, Komer came to be seen as the right person for managing that effort, and in 1968 was rewarded with an ambassadorship to Turkey. The book analyzes Komer’s work during the Carter administration as special adviser to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and credits him for reenergizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s conventional capability and forging the military instrument that implemented the Carter Doctrine in the Persian Gulf—the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. It also explores his final role as a defense intellectual and critic of the Reagan administration’s defense policies. The book concludes with a useful summary of Komer’s impact on American policy and strategy and his contributions to counterinsurgency practices, a legacy now recognized for its importance in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.