The Complete Maisky Diaries


Book Description

The complete diaries that Ivan Maisky, Soviet ambassador to London, kept between 1932 and 1943 Confiscated by Soviet authorities in the 1950s, the diaries of Ivan Maisky, the USSR's ambassador to Great Britain from 1932 to 1943, have been unearthed, annotated, and edited for publication in a three-volume set that Niall Ferguson predicts "will stand as one of the great achievements of twenty-first century historical scholarship." Maisky's revelations illuminate Soviet foreign policy in the years prior to and during World War II, providing fascinating perspectives on London's political life and climate, key figures and events, and the Kremlin rivalries that influenced Soviet policy. Volume 1: The Rise of Hitler and the Gathering Clouds of War, 1932-1938 Volume 2: The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the Battle of Britain, 1939-1940 Volume 3: The German Invasion of Russia and the Forging of the Grand Alliance, 1941-19




The Bloody Road to Tunis


Book Description

As the Afrika Korps withdrew after a bruising defeat at El Alamein, it became apparent that Axis forces would not be able to maintain their hold over Libya. Rommel pulled his troops back to Tunisia, digging in along the Mareth Line, and turned westwards t




The Road To 1945


Book Description

The Road to 1945 is a rigorously researched study of the crucial moment when political parties put aside their differences to unite under Churchill and focus on the task of war. But the war years witnessed a radical shift in political power - dramatically expressed in Labour's decisive electoral victory in 1945. In his acclaimed study, Paul Addison reconstructs and interprets the five-year wartime coalition, and traces this sea-change from its roots in the thirties, to the powerful spirit of post-war rebuilding. The Road to 1945 is an imaginative, brilliantly written and landmark work, underpinned by a powerful and expertly researched argument.




The Chamberlains


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The Almost Impossible Ally


Book Description

On 14 January 1963, General de Gaulle (described by the Foreign Office as an 'almost impossible ally') brutally vetoed Britain's first bid to join the Common Market. It was a blow that delayed Britain's entry for a decade and hastened the end of Harold Macmillan's political career. Peter Mangold writes in arresting detail about the fascinating personal duel that shaped high politics and Anglo-French diplomacy. He portrays two of the most complex and skilful leaders of the post-war era, old friends from their association in Algiers during World War II: de Gaulle the dour, lofty moralist obsessed with high notions of France; and Macmillan, the canny, ambitious fixer, always the pragmatist seeking to get things done. As Resident Minister, Allied Forces Headquarters in Algiers in 1943, Macmillan had done much to help de Gaulle, and protect him from Churchill's and Roosevelt's hostility. They next met in 1958, as leaders of their two countries, when Britain and France faced many similar problems ranging from decolonization and their determination to retain national Great Power status to relations with the impetuous Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev. But while both seemed anxious to retain their old wartime connection, they were now rivals with very different views of the world. Divided by the Atlantic as much as the Channel, the two leaders disagreed fundamentally over America. De Gaulle sought the leadership of a Europe independent of the United States; the pro-American Macmillan talked of Britain as a 'bridge' between the two sides of the Atlantic. When Macmillan finally sought EEC membership, de Gaulle played on the old alliance to keep the British Prime Minister off guard. Ultimately, Macmillan was outwitted, out-manoeuvred and even, perhaps, outclassed by the General. "The Almost Impossible Ally" is a fascinating story of a friendship turned sour, and of a compelling new episode in the turbulent relations between Britain and France.




Summits


Book Description

The Cold War dominated history for nearly half a century, locking two superpowers in a global rivalry that ended only with the collapse of the Soviet Union. For millennia, the outcomes of war had been determined on the battlefield, but the most decisive moments of the Cold War occurred in the carefully worded exchanges of world leaders meeting face to face. In the shadow of the bomb, the summit meeting offered an opportunity for heads of state to rattle sabers and cross swords without triggering nuclear apocalypse. Drawing on extensive archival material, prizewinning historian David Reynolds describes the outsized personalities who negotiated the course of twentieth-century history: Neville Chamberlain, Adolph Hitler, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, Richard Nixon, Leonid Brezhnev, Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Ronald Reagan. While these men addressed epochal issues, the outcome of each meeting was often determined more by individual personality than by international politics. Mishandled summits-Munich in 1938 and Yalta in 1945-brought about World War II and the Cold War, respectively. Kennedy's disastrous performance in Vienna in 1961 nearly brought about World War III. But successful summits in Moscow (1972), Camp David (1978), and Geneva (1985) led to dénte, a partial settlement in the Middle East, and a peaceful end to the Cold War. Written with verve and insight, Summits vividly describes the statesmen who stood, if only briefly, on top of the world. By revealing both the promise and the pitfalls of international diplomacy, David Reynolds offers valuable lessons as we find ourselves confronting once again a war without end.




Britain, France and Europe, 1945-1975


Book Description

Britain, France and Europe, 1945-1975 takes a fresh look at the international trajectories of Europe's premier democracies. The side-lining of Britain and France in the Cold War era, argues Adamthwaite, was preventable. A Franco-British Europe came within a whisker of realization. Condemning President Charles de Gaulle as an intransigent gatekeeper created a convenient alibi for self-inflicted missteps. UK bids for European Community membership ignored the elephant in the room - the need for partnership in a superpower age. A marriage powering the Community could have repositioned Western Europe as partner, not client of the United States. Although perceived as a failing power, France outperformed Britain - seizing the initiative in European construction, and winning primacy in western Europe. As well as exploring sharply contrasting national experiences in the aftermath of war, the author analyses the reasons for French success. The analysis evaluates key influences: the mental maps of decision makers; leadership styles; the post-1945 international system; policy making machinery; the 'democratic deficit' in British and French politics; and public opinion. Drawing on American, British and French official records, together with private papers and interviews, this enlightening study highlights the importance of contingency and individual actors, and will be of great interest to scholars of modern European history.




Radio London and Resistance in Occupied Europe


Book Description

This book examines British attempts to wage political warfare in the countries occupied by Germany in the Second World War. It describes the slow construction of political warfare machinery in London in terms of two twin difficulties: Whitehall politics and fundamental doubts about what a successful war should have as its purpose. It then examines how political warfare operated as a semi-detached adjunct of diplomacy, and how it engaged with the development of armed or "active" resistance in France, Denmark, Poland, and Yugoslavia. This is a study of British political imagination in a period when Britain still acted as a great power in control of her own decisions. The experience of near-defeat, however, left decision-makers with dilemmas about rhetoric and ideology as much as policy.Their refusal to resolve these dilemmas until pushed by events meant political warfare lacked the consistency and definition that might have given it greater force.