Three Essays on Corporate Disclosure and Information Externalities


Book Description

This dissertation includes three essays on corporate disclosure and information externalities. In the first essay, I examine the disclosure behavior of rival firms identified by an Initial Public Offering (IPO) candidate during the IPO quiet period when the IPO candidate is restricted in its communication. I find that the tone of disclosures made by identified rivals becomes more positive during the quiet period, and reverses after the quiet period ends. The strategic disclosure behavior is mainly driven by identified rivals' concerns over product market competition. I also find that this behavior hurts the IPO candidate and benefits the identified rivals. In the second essay, I investigate the relations between IPO firms' peer choice and peer information environment. I find that IPO firms tend to select peer companies with a better information environment, and this effect is more pronounced for IPO firms with greater information uncertainties. I also find support that peer information environment is positively associated with upward offering price revision, post-offering analyst coverage, and negatively associated with the number of amendment filings. Overall, this essay shows that IPO firms can make use of the externalities of peer information to facilitate their initial public offerings. In the third essay, I switch my focus from intra-industry relations to supply chain relations. More specifically, I study the effects of layoff announcements by customers on the valuation and operating performance of their supply chain partners. I find that suppliers experience a negative stock price reaction around their major customers' layoff announcements. The negative price effect is exacerbated when industry rivals of layoff-announcing customers also suffer from negative intra-industry contagion effects. Moreover, these supply chain spillover effects are asymmetric, with only "bad news" layoff announcements causing significant value implications for suppliers, but not "good news" announcements. Supplier firms also reduce their investment in and sales dependence on layoff-announcing customers in subsequent years. Keywords: Disclosure; Product market competition; IPO quiet period; Identified rivals; Information externalities; Peer information environment; Corporate layoffs, Supply chain relations; Stock market return







Three Essays on Corporate Information Communications


Book Description

This dissertation consists of three essays that focus on corporate external communication of accounting information. My dissertation's primary goal is to understand better how firms' financial disclosure behaviors change in response to various internal and external forces. To achieve this goal, I use empirical archival methods and employ several unique settings to examine the influences of three particular forces on firms' financial disclosure activities. Specifically, in the first essay, I focus on a firm's internal production function and ask whether labor cost stickiness shapes income smoothing activities. By contrast, the second and third essays explore the influences of two external factors, namely product market competition with existing rivals and the local information environment, respectively, on firms' mandatory and voluntary disclosure behaviors.




Three Essays on Corporate Disclosure by Small and Medium Entities


Book Description

This Ph.D. thesis studies the determinants and consequences of information asymmetry between investors and financers on the one hand, and managers on the other, in an uncertain and complex environment. I focus on Small and Medium Entities (SMEs) where the links between the two and the associated agency costs are particularly significant. SMEs are concerned by a whole host of contractual issues. The uncertainties surrounding SMEs' activities also affect investor valuations due to the risk of adverse selection. SMEs' disclosure may play an important part in reducing for market participants the uncertainty surrounding SMEs' activities. My Ph.D. thesis, consisting of a general introduction and three chapters representing three self-contained essays, explores (1) the type of financial information relevant to SMEs' investors and financers; (2) managerial decisions following market expectations about SMEs' disclosure; and (3) the impact of social media on SMEs' disclosure.




Three Essays on Corporate Disclosure


Book Description

Mots-clés de l'auteur: Voluntary Disclosure ; Misreporting ; Earnings Management ; Informed Trading ; Feedback Effect ; Real Effects ; Margin Constraints ; Haircuts ; Information Acquisition ; Asymmetric Information.










The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions


Book Description

This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.







The Logic of Securities Law


Book Description

This book opens with a simple introduction to financial markets, attempting to understand the action and the players of Wall Street by comparing them to the action and the players of main street. Firstly, it explores the definition of a security by its function, the departure from the buyer beware environment of corporate law and the entrance into the seller disclose environment of securities law. Secondly, it shows that the cost of disclosure rules is justified by their capacity to combat irrationalities, fads, and panics. The third section explains how the structure of class actions is designed to improve deterrence. Next it explores the economic harm from insider trading and how the law fights it. In sum, the book shows how all these parts of securities law serve the virtuous cycle from liquidity to accurate prices and more trading and how the great recession showed that our securities regulation reacted mostly adequately to the crisis.