Book Description

"This dissertation consists of three essays on how leaders' pursuit of office shape their countries' military and economic relations with other states. The first essay shows that leaders often return to office after some time out of power. Leader comebacks are most common and most strongly related to past performance in parliamentary democracies. The essay provides novel explanations for why parliamentary democracies are more often victorious in war and less prone to democratic breakdown. It also implies that research on leader reputations should consider whether a leader has previously held office. The second essay analyzes how leaders with a military background may use foreign policy to prolong their tenure. Citizens value former soldiers' expertise in military affairs only if their nation faces military threats. Consequently, under certain conditions, leaders with a military background have an incentive to pursue a hawkish policy and raise the electoral value of their foreign policy expertise. Empirical tests confirm that in political regimes with few militarily competent candidates, former soldiers are more likely to initiate disputes during economic troubles. I discuss how this theory can be applied to other forms of political violence. The third essay studies Turkey's foreign aid program. I find that the determinants of Turkish aid have varied over time and between different types of aid. Interestingly, Turkey began to give more humanitarian aid to Muslim nations after the moderate Islamist AKP government came to power. Research on foreign aid should incorporate donor government preferences and transnational cultural ties"--Page v.