To Hanoi And Back: The United States Air Force And North Vietnam 1966-1973 [Illustrated Edition]


Book Description

Includes 3 maps and 40 photographs No experience etched itself more deeply into Air Force thinking than the air campaigns over North Vietnam. Two decades later in the deserts of Southwest Asia, American airmen were able to avoid the gradualism that cost so many lives and planes in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Readers should come away from this book with a sympathetic understanding of the men who bombed North Vietnam. Those airmen handled tough problems in ways that ultimately reshaped the Air Force into the effective instrument on display in the Gulf War. This book is a sequel to Jacob Van Staaveren’s Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965-1966, which we have also declassified and are publishing. Wayne Thompson tells how the Air Force used that failure to build a more capable service-a service which got a better opportunity to demonstrate the potential of air power in 1972. Dr. Thompson began to learn about his subject when he was an Army draftee assigned to an Air Force intelligence station in Taiwan during the Vietnam War. He took time out from writing To Hanoi and Back to serve in the Checkmate group that helped plan the Operation Desert Storm air campaign against Iraq. Later he visited Air Force pilots and commanders in Italy immediately after the Operation Deliberate Force air strikes in Bosnia. During Operation Allied Force over Serbia and its Kosovo province, he returned to Checkmate. Consequently, he is keenly aware of how much the Air Force has changed in some respects-how little in others. Although he pays ample attention to context, his book is about the Air Force. He has written a well-informed account that is both lively and thoughtful.




Gradual Failure: The Air War Over North Vietnam 1965-1966 [Illustrated Edition]


Book Description

Includes over 100 maps, plans and illustrations The United States Air Force reached its nadir during the opening two years of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. Never had the Air Force operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful but necessary reading for all who care about the nation’s military power. Jacob Van Staaveren wrote this book in the 1970s near the end of his distinguished government service, which began during the occupation of Japan; the University of Washington Press published his book on that experience in 1995. He was an Air Force historian in Korea during the Korean War, and he began to write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought. His volume on the air war in Laos was declassified and published in 1993. Now this volume on the air war in North Vietnam has also been declassified and is being published for the first time. Although he retired to McMinnville, Oregon, a number of years ago, we asked him to review the manuscript and make any changes that seemed warranted. For the most part, this is the book he wrote soon after the war. Readers of this volume will also want to read the sequel, Wayne Thompson’s To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966-1973, which tells the more encouraging story of how the Air Force employed airpower to far greater effect using a combination of better doctrine, tactics, technology, and training.




MACV


Book Description

CMH Pub 91-6. United States Army in Vietnam. Covers the United States buildup in Vietnam from every angle: strategy, operations, tactics, logistics, inter-service relations, personnel policy, diplomacy, civil relations, and the handling of the news media to show how the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) developed and became the linchpin holding the entire American effort in Vietnam together.




Why Air Forces Fail


Book Description

Includes two new chapters! “One of the more interesting and better books on military aviation to appear in the last few years.”—Journal of Military History Since the publication of the first edition of Why Air Forces Fail, the debate over airpower’s role in military operations has only intensified. Here, eminent historians Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris assemble a team of experts to add essential new details to their cautionary tale for current practitioners of aerial warfare. Together, the contributors examine the complex, often deep-seated, reasons for the catastrophic failures of the Russian, Polish, French, British, Italian, German, Argentine, and American air services. Complemented by reading lists and suggestions for further research, this seminal study with two new chapters provides an essential and detailed analysis of defeat. “Contains many interesting insights and interpretations . . . an excellent introduction to the study of military failure in general and air forces in particular.”—Journal of America’s Military Past “I recommend this book to those who are interested in air forces and air power, whether amateur or professional, past, present and future.”—Richard Cobbold, Bryanston: The Yearbook “Provides an excellent analysis of the root causes of failure; this engaging study goes far beyond the aerial battlefield to examine the circumstances leading to defeat.”—Dennis Drew, Colonel, USAF (Ret.)




Fighting in Vietnam


Book Description

Stories of the men and women who served during the Vietnam War in active combat or in support roles overseas and stateside Wide range of topics, including combat, life in camp, food, R&R, the draft, the antiwar movement, and more Based on primary sources Timeline puts dates and events in better perspective Comprehensive bibliography for further reading







The Vietnam War


Book Description

The Vietnam War was different from most previous U.S. wars of the twentieth century. It was an undeclared and limited war. The draft to supply the soldiers and serious problems in the Selective Service system meant that the burden of the war was carried disproportionately by minorities and working class whites, many of whom did not want to serve. While many Americans saw service in Vietnam as their patriotic duty, others opposed the war. This is the story of the men and women who served in that war, whether overseas in active combat or in support roles in Viet Nam and stateside.




Air Force History Publications


Book Description




The Limits of Air Power


Book Description

Tracing the use of air power in World War II and the Korean War, Mark Clodfelter explains how U. S. Air Force doctrine evolved through the American experience in these conventional wars only to be thwarted in the context of a limited guerrilla struggle in Vietnam. Although a faith in bombing's sheer destructive power led air commanders to believe that extensive air assaults could win the war at any time, the Vietnam experience instead showed how even intense aerial attacks may not achieve military or political objectives in a limited war. Based on findings from previously classified documents in presidential libraries and air force archives as well as on interviews with civilian and military decision makers, The Limits of Air Power argues that reliance on air campaigns as a primary instrument of warfare could not have produced lasting victory in Vietnam. This Bison Books edition includes a new chapter that provides a framework for evaluating air power effectiveness in future conflicts.




To Hanoi and Back


Book Description

After nearly eighteen months of the largely unsuccessful bombing campaign called Operation Rolling Thunder, the US Air Force began to look for ways to overcome technological, geographical, and political challenges in North Vietnam and use limited air power more effectively. In 1972 the two Linebacker campaigns joined with other air operations to make a dramatic, although temporary, difference. While they unleashed powerful B-52 area bombers, the campaigns also demonstrated the efficacy of newly developed laser-guided precision bombs. Drawing upon twenty years of research in classified records, Wayne Thompson integrates operational, political, and personal detail to present a full history of the Air Force role in the war against North Vietnam. He provides an unprecedented view of the motivations and actions of the people involved—from aircrews to generals to politicians—in every phase of the air campaigns. He outlines, for instance, the political reasons for President Johnson's reluctance to use B-52 bombers against major North Vietnamese targets. He also examines how the media influenced US policy and how US prisoners became the war's most celebrated heroes. The war in Southeast Asia ultimately pushed the Air Force toward adopting more flexible tactics and incorporating increasingly sophisticated weapons that would shape later conflicts.